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ABSTRACT:
REALISM, HISTORY AND THE QUANTUM THEORY: 
Philosophical and H istorical Argum ents  fo r  Realism  as a  
Methodological Thesis
Scientific realists and non-realists disagree over the reach of scientific knowledge: does it 
extend beyond the observational realm? Intuitions about abductive inferences are at the 
heart of many realist positions, but are brought into question by the non-realists’ contention 
that theories are underdetermined by data, and the alleged circularity of realist attempts to 
show that such inferences are reliable. Some realists have tried to circumvent this problem 
by constructing methodological arguments for realism: if realism is embedded in scientific 
practice, the realist’s picture of science might provide the best explanation of scientific 
success. Some non-realists reply by again pointing to the circularity of this strategy, which 
relies, again, on an abductive inference. Others deny that scientists do adopt realist stances. 
A methodological realist position is constructed: realist constraints on the acceptance and 
pursuit of theories—for instance requirements of intertheoretic coherence, and the 
avoidance of ad hoc explanation—have often contributed to progress in science. The 
position is immune to non-realist worries about the circularity of realist arguments, for it is 
a thesis about how science is practised, not the kind of knowledge it provides.
The argument is pursued within a diachronic account of theory appraisal: Imre Lakatos’ 
methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) examines the principles that 
govern the construction of theories, and provides criteria—achievement of progress—for 
the appraisal of research programmes. Although Lakatos may have seen these selection 
criteria, when fulfilled, as symptoms of something else—the fulfilment in the theory’s 
development of some ideal of scientific honesty—achievement of Lakatosian progress can 
serve as an end in itself. The realist methods mentioned in the last paragraph are then 
appraised as means to this end.
Since the position has a methodological formulation and background, it is applied as a 
historical thesis to case studies in line with Lakatos’ meftzmethodology. These comprise 
two explanatory forays into history: the consistency of Bohr’s 1913 model of the atom, and 
the construction by Heisenberg and Schrodinger of the two original formulations of 
quantum mechanics. There follows one contemporary application: the construction of 
explanations in quantum chemistry using approximate models of molecules.
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3
Intro d u ctio n
Among the arguments constructed, criticised and disagreed over by scientific realists and 
anti-realists are the methodological arguments for scientific realism. The common premise 
of these arguments is that scientific procedures presuppose the reality of the entities and 
processes invoked by theories. If science is a successful activity, scientific realism can be 
inferred as the best explanation, or inferred as a thesis that has been vindicated by the 
success that its assumption delivered. Although methodological theses may not be suitable 
as the premises of arguments that will convince the anti-realist of scientific realism, the 
central aim in what follows is to explore the common theme of these premises— 
methodological realism—and assess it as an historical claim about the construction of 
successful theories. Arguing in its favour, I propose an account of theory construction 
central to which is the intended interpretation of the equations that express a theory: the 
intended interpretation provides the theoretical background from which understanding 
(rather than calculating ability) is drawn. The realist’s approach to theories might be 
methodologically important in two ways. Firstly it might have heuristic value: for instance, 
where two theories are consistent according to their intended interpretations, realism 
provides the rationale for directing attention to models of the conjoined theories. On the 
other hand, there might be a regulative advantage to realism: in pursuit of realist aims 
(unification, explanation), scientists might expect more of their theories than if they 
regarded their theories as mere tools for prediction. Thus, for instance, if two theories are 
inconsistent when interpreted realistically, efforts to achieve consistency must be of prime 
importance to realists. Only observational inconsistency should concern the instrumentalist 
scientist. Methodological realism will be supported as an historical claim if realist aims and 
methods have been pursued and applied in successful episodes in the history of science.
The text divides into two sections: the aims of the first—comprising chapters 1 and 2—are 
philosophical. In chapter 1, Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes is 
defended as a historiographically illuminating account of theory construction. It is then set 
in a metamethodology that will ground a methodological conditional with a pragmatic 
consequent: the growth of knowledge. The antecedent of this conditional—the realistic 
attitude to theories—is set up in chapter 2. Put together, antecedent and consequent are 
linked either by the heuristic and regulative mechanisms outlined in the last paragraph. The 
resultant conditional grounds for a pragmatic rationale for realism: realistic interpretation 
might be a good means to pragmatic progress as an end. This is methodological realism, or 
realism as a methodological thesis.
The second (shorter) section sets out to support methodological realism via specific 
historical counterfactuals, taking examples from quantum physics and chemistry. Chapter
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3, which centres on Bohr’s proposal of his 1913 atomic model, makes an existence claim 
for the intended interpretation in the case of the Bohr atom, and illustrates a regulative 
version of MR. The existence claim is based on Bohr’s re-interpretation of his equations, 
which allowed him to explain new sets of facts without altering those equations. What must 
have changed, it is argued, is his intended physical interpretation of his equations. The 
proposal by Schrodinger and Heisenberg of two curiously similar theories in 1925 and 
1926 occupies chapter 4. It is argued that the continued presence of intended interpretations 
explains three sets of historical facts: (i) the authors’ heuristic routes to their respective 
formalisms; (ii) their taking positions in the debates over the correct interpretation of the 
joint formalism (and those positions themselves) even q/ferthe famous equivalence proofs; 
(iii) the continuity between (i) and (ii). The final chapter illustrates both heuristic and 
regulative versions of MR for molecular quantum chemistry. Quantum-chemical 
calculations start from models that are strictly false as descriptions of real molecules, for 
two sorts of reason: it is impossible in practice to enumerate (for instance) all the forces that 
act in and on a molecule; and even when one writes only as many of the initial conditions as 
are important, it is usually found that the resultant equations are insoluble. Instead, 
explanations are constructed with the help of idealised models. There are two realist lessons 
here. Firstly, the idealised models come from background classical theories, but the only 
rationale for their introduction into the quantum descriptions is as approximately true 
descriptions. Secondly, worries concerning those models that have been expressed in the 
quantum chemistry literature can be read as aspirations to apply MR in its regulative form.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Elie Zahar, for reading and criticising many earlier 
versions of this thesis. Daniela Slanickova has helped me in an uncountable number of 
ways all the way through its writing, and crucially aided its final production. She also 
explained to me the functionalist explanations that enter the discussion in chapter 1. Nancy 
Cartwright read and criticised an earlier version of chapter 3, and has heard and discussed 
proto-versions of other parts, especially chapters 2 and 5. Lastly, there is the Philosophy of 
Science Research Students’ Group, whose seminars provided the forum in which the 
theses defended here were first conceived and argued over.
Research towards this thesis was funded by a British Academy Major State Award.
5
1PRAGMATIC PROGRESS:
Scientific  Realism  
and  the
METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
The history of science alone can keep the physicist from the mad ambitions of dogmatism 
as well as the despair of Pyrrhonian scepticism (Duhem [1914], p.270)
Introduction
Lakatos’ philosophy of science is often presented as a corrective development of Popper’s 
brand of fallibilism. While it can be misleading, this approach can provide a fruitful and 
historically accurate entry into the methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP). 
It is misleading because Lakatos* mefamethodology bore little resemblance to the a priorist 
view of methodology that Popper set out in his [1959], and arguably represented a 
significant advance. However, the approach is historically accurate because wherever 
Lakatos concerned himself with the empirical sciences, he actually did correct some aspect 
of falsificationism: hence the proliferating subscripted Poppers of Lakatos [1968c] and 
[1974]. Furthermore it is fruitful because one of Lakatos’ chief innovations—the role of 
heuristic—was introduced in response to a central difficulty for Popperian falsificationism: 
the Duhem problem. This innovation and its consequences will be the central theme of this 
chapter.
The first two sections of this chapter will provide a detailed exposition of Lakatos’ notion 
of heuristic, and a review of some criticisms of Lakatos’ formulation. Suggested 
amendments will be noted along the way. In subsequent sections (1.3 to 1.7), Lakatos’ 
metamethodology will take centre stage. Exposition will be mixed with some recent 
criticisms, and the nuances emphasised and the position modified where necessary. Thus in 
the context of a reply to Newton-Smith [1981], it will be argued that Lakatos’ 
metamethodology appraises methodologies chiefly as a particular type of social theory 
(although Lakatos might have been less than happy with such a formulation). In 1.6, a 
naturalistic grounding for this metamethodology will be proposed, in response to recent 
critiques from Papineau ([1988] and [1989]). The key to that response is the reading of
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Lakatos’ notion of the “growth of knowledge”. Since Hacking ([1979] and [1983]) has 
identified a philosophical background to Lakatos’ work that would block the reading that 
the naturalistic grounding requires, an examination of Hacking’s claims occupies 1.7.
1.1. Duhem , Quine and  Research  Programmes
It would be useful to begin this section with a brief review of the Duhem thesis and its 
background, because it provided the problem situation that prompted Lakatos’ switch to 
diachronic appraisal. The structure of that appraisal—and the units of scientific endeavour 
to which it was applied—will then be presented.
The Duhem Thesis
The Duhem problem arises because, as Quine famously put it, ‘our statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate 
body.’ ([1953], p.41) Quine concludes that ‘it is misleading to speak of the empirical 
content of an individual statement’ (p.43). If the statements of science are to be appraised 
through their empirical content via modus tollens, this semantico-logical thesis will enjoy 
epistemological import. In the face of empirical anomaly,
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in 
the system.... Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.
(Quine [1953], p.43)
Of course Quine admitted that the ‘system’ in question need not include the whole of our 
knowledge (or ‘conceptual system’):
The holism in “Two Dogmas” has put many readers off, but I think its fault is one of emphasis. All 
we really need in the way of holism, for the purposes to which it is put in that essay, is to appreciate 
that empirical content is shared by science in clusters and cannot for die most part be sorted out among 
them. Practically the relevant cluster is indeed never the whole of science; there is a grading off. 
([1980], p.viii).
However, given a (possibly vast) negated conjunction, further guidance is needed in 
selecting one of the conjuncts for rej ection.
Lakatos’ longest discussion of the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ is in an appendix to his [1970] 
(pp. 184-9), where he attributes weak and strong readings to Duhem and Quine 
respectively. On the weak reading, one must find another base for rational choice to 
supplement the empirical (Lakatos cites Duhem’s ‘sagacity’). On the strong reading, we
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must recognise (with Quine, in Lakatos’ words) that: ‘the Duhem-Quine thesis excludes 
any rational selection rule among the alternatives’ ([1970], p.184). In reading Quine thus, 
Lakatos takes Quine’s proposed supplementary criteria (simplicity and pragmatic 
conservation of ontology) to encode won-rational or psychological virtues. Now Quine 
often does use psychological language in his discussions of scientific method (see for 
instance Quine [1960], pp. 19-25):
Scientific method [is] a matter of being guided by sensory stimuli, a taste for simplicity in some sense, 
and a taste for old things. ([I960], p.23)
Although it is difficult to see quite as much space between Duhem and Quine on this matter 
as is discerned by Lakatos, there are crucial differences in presentation. Quine’s concerns 
are primarily logical, and his suggested criteria substantive, forward looking and essentially 
ahistorical. Duhem, in contrast, expressed criteria that are extensionally similar as 
methodological judgements handed down by the ‘good seise’ whose application he thought 
to be so characteristic of the history of physics:
Now, it may be good sense that permits us to decide between two physicists. It may be that we do not 
approve of the haste with which the second one upsets the principles of a vast and harmoniously 
constructed theory whereas a modification of detail, a slight correction, would have sufficed to put those 
theories in accord with the facts. On the other hand, it may be that we may find it childish and 
unreasonable for the first physicist to maintain obstinately at any cost, at the price of continual repairs 
and many tangled-up stays, the worm-eaten columns of a building tottering in every part, while by 
razing these columns it would be possible to construct a simple, elegant, and solid system.
([1914], p.217)
To the extent that good sense is ‘vague and uncertain’ (p.217), Duhem is aligned with 
Quine: the added criteria governing theory-choice fail to be categorical, and such choices are 
still underdetermined. However, Duhem peppers his discussion with examples from the 
history of science, and is therefore aware that although logic leaves us free to adopt any of 
an infinite number of responses to anomaly, hindsight may judge unequivocally:
The day arrives when good sense comes out so clearly in favor of one of the two sides that the other 
side gives up the struggle even though pure logic would not forbid its continuation. ([1914], p.218)
At the risk of reading too much into such brief comments, we might conclude that Duhem 
implicitly separates two questions: (i) how we decide at some point in time which of the 
jointly-refuted conjuncts to reject; and (ii) whether that decision will turn out to have been 
‘correct’ at a (much) later time. Considering only the first question, Quine concludes that 
underdetermination will always be with us. In adding the second, Duhem realises that 
choices which are underdetermined anno 1800 might not practically be so by 1900.
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Research Programmes
In MSRP, the Duhem problem is answered by changing the unit of appraisal: instead of 
theories, series of theories are to be assessed Imagine a historical sequence of theories that 
speak of (roughly) the same phenomenal domain: as historical artefacts, such theories 
appear in journals and books as sets of statements, often with associated mathematical 
formulae. Now consider the logical and conceptual relations that hold between these 
statements: are they logically consistent? Is there some subset of the content of each that is 
shared by every theory in the sequence? If we follow their authors when interpreting these 
statements, are they amenable to the same realistic interpretation? Is there a rationale that we 
can reasonably attribute to the creators of these theories that would motivate this sequence 
of theories? For some such historical sequences, positive answers indicate that something 
unites the series: a plan or heuristic.
Technically, a research programme consists of a series of theories, each member of which 
contains a hard core of basic theoretical assertions plus a protective belt of auxiliary 
assumptions. In his [1970], Lakatos presented the ‘progressive problemshift’ to the 
appraisal of research programmes as an attempt to capture the Kuhnian continuity that 
‘plays a vital role in the history of science’ (p. 132). The construction of particular theory- 
versions within a research programme is governed by its heuristic, a sharper replacement 
for the vague Duhemian notion of ‘good sense’. The negative heuristic stipulates that every 
member of the series does indeed contain (assume or imply) the statements in the hard core. 
Thus where a change of theory is envisaged (perhaps in response to anomaly), reforming 
attentions are directed away from the hard core and towards the protective belt. Successive 
theory versions (or ‘refutable variants’) therefore differ in the constitution of their protective 
belts. The positive heuristic provides ‘partially articulated suggestions or hints’ (p. 135) on 
how this armour of auxiliary theories should be built up. Together, the hard core and 
positive heuristic constitute the line of research, the refutable variants being its temporary 
manifestations. The chief intuition behind appraisal in MSRP is that the best research 
programmes will make significant contributions to the growth of empirical knowledge 
drawing only on internal resources, the key term being progression, as against 
degeneration. MSRP makes two requirements: (i) ‘that each step constitute a consistently 
progressive theoretical problemshift9 (p. 134), in that each new refutable variant displays an 
increase in empirical content over its predecessor; and (ii) that ‘the programme as a whole 
should also display an intermittently progressive empirical problemshift’ (p. 134), in that the 
novel content is occasionally corroborated. A research programme that satisfies these 
requirements during some historical period is said to be progressive at that time. Otherwise 
it is degenerating.
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In an endnote to his [1971a], Lakatos specified three ways that ‘degenerating problemshift’ 
might occur, fleshing out the intuitive term 'ad hoc’ that was so beloved of Popperian 
appraisal Lakatos’ original formulation defined ad-hocness to be a relationship between a 
theory and its predecessors in the research programme of which it is a product, but Zahar
[1978] redefined it as a three-place relation between a problem situation, a theory, and a 
heuristic. Lakatos’ specification of the three types was also amended, in Zahar [1973] and 
Lakatos and Zahar [1976]. The final version is as follows: (i) a theory is ad hoc\ if it has no 
empirical content beyond the problem situation that prompted its construction; (ii) a theory 
is ad hoci—with respect to a particular explanandum or problem situation—if it does have 
such excess empirical content, but this content has not been corroborated; (iii) finally, a 
theory is ad hocz if the assumptions brought in to deal with the problem situation ‘sit 
uneasily’ with the hard core, invoking a different (and perhaps inconsistent) metaphysics, 
or ‘do not form an integral part of the positive heuristic’ (Lakatos [1971a], note 36). Now 
ad hoes moves will turn out to be of some importance, and therefore deserve an example: 
Newton famously ascribed wave-like properties to otherwise corpuscular entities—the ‘fits’ 
of easy transmission—to accommodate the (theoretical) fact that the speed of light 
increases, rather than decreases, on entering solid media. Whether or not the amendment 
was ad hoc in either of the previous senses, it surely introduced an interpretive tension: if 
light enjoyed some of the properties usually attributed to wave motions, in what sense did 
the amended theory fit with the corpuscular foundations and models? Analogously, while 
earlier falsificationism could perfectly well accommodate the Duhem thesis, epistemic 
holism was a natural feature of Lakatos’ methodology.
1.2. Heuristic and  Appraisal
In the last section, the difference between an arbitrary series of theories and a research 
programme proper turned on the heuristic motivating the latter. Despite this central position, 
heuristic itself received only the briefest definition there. Likewise, the appraisal of research 
programmes was only cursorily covered. These notions will now be considered more fully.
Heuristic
Formulated by Lakatos, a heuristic is a set of directives which contains elements of two 
sorts: (i) the ‘don’ts’; and (ii) the ‘dos’ of research.
(i) The negative heuristic bans by convention the construction of theories that do not contain 
some subset of the shared content of previous theories in the research programme, this 
subset bang the hard core. The ban is conventional in at least two senses. Firstly, there is 
no good empirical reason for it in advance of successful research activity, although it may
10
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reflect a metaphysical commitment. Secondly, if the hard core is partly constitutive of the 
research programme, then where it is allowed to be ‘falsified’, the research programme 
must consequently have changed, much as marriage entails instant exclusion from the set of 
bachelors. Despite the ‘conventional’ tag, the hard core is composed of factual—albeit 
highly theoretical—assertions about the world. However, the label ‘conventional’ was the 
methodological expression of a methodological decision: to use the hard core as the basis 
for research. In a broadly sympathetic critique of MSRP, Musgrave [1976] doubts that hard 
cores are rendered irrefutable by methodological fiat. Newtonians, for instance, did not 
treat the law of gravitation as irrefutable: on a number of occasions during the long 
hegemony of their programme, eminent Newtonians considered adjustments to the 
supposedly sacred inverse square law in response to anomalous planetary orbits. From this 
example, Musgrave concludes that one of Lakatos’ favourite examples of research activity 
as a programmatic affair fails to fit his description.
Musgrave then raises a logical problem: a ‘refutable version’ of a programme contains 
many assumptions. Why are only some of them treated as ‘irrefutable*, and how are they 
chosen? The worry is that, as formulated by Lakatos, MSRP ‘gives carte blanche to any 
group who want to erect some pet notion into a dogma’ (Musgrave [1976], p.465);
Howson and Urbach ([1989], p.96) have made a similar objection. Now in one sense this 
objection is misconceived: hard cores are identified by the historical facts of their 
appearance in each of a systematic progression of refutable variants. They are appraised via 
the success of the associated programme. Where a group of dangerous methodological 
anarchists do seize on a dogma in this way, either their researches will be valueless and 
sterile, or, if successful, they will surely be vindicated. Of course this conflicts with the 
spirit of Popperian methodology, in which award of the label ‘scientific’ to a theory was 
made to depend on the state of mind of its adherents. This was not one of its greater 
strengths, and I think Lakatos was correct to revise it. Musgrave concedes that the spirit of 
Lakatos’ use of the term ‘hard core’ was clear: hard cores would consist of ‘deep and fertile 
hypotheses, which have the ability to stimulate important mathematical research and to 
emerge victorious from empirical trials’ ([1976], pp.645-6). Thus assertions about 
voltmeters would be unlikely to find a motivating role at the heart of a durable research 
effort, but theories of the ultimate nature of electricity are a different matter. This, however, 
is already implicit in the requirement of fertility, because a (logically) stronger assumption 
will—ceteris paribus—be more fruitful than a weaker substitute.1
Although Musgrave’s interpretation of MSRP is a rather narrow and literal one, the logical 
objection indicates that Lakatos’ original formulation is surely somewhat idealised, and less
1 Provided, of course, that the surplus content does not turn out to be misleading.
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artificial accounts are available. Papineau [1979] offers a Quinean modification to the 
discrete structure of research programmes. Lakatos thought that a rigid qualitative 
difference between hard core and periphery was required to capture the relative longevity of 
core assumptions in Kuhnian normal science. In another context, Quine replaced the sharp 
distinction between analytic and synthetic with a notion of centrality that is a matter of 
degree. Analogously, the positive heuristic does not conveniently labd some theoretical 
assumptions ‘hands off and others ‘change where necessary’; some are simply more 
central than others. Any pair of scientists may agree on some assumptions and disagree on 
others, however central. To capture this diversity (which is in keeping with Lakatos’ 
advocacy of proliferation), Papineau invokes a tree by way of metaphor:
The trunk consists of those central assumptions common to all scientists in die field. The first 
branching of the trunk corresponds to those more basic points of initial disagreement which divide the 
community into a small number of groups. And so on with further branchings, until we get to the 
thinnest of twigs, to individual disagreements on die least central assumptions. ([1979], p.106)
Each tnmk-branch-twig is a ‘line’ of research. The decision to replace a more or less basic 
assumption—to revise a line of research—rests on the scientist’s individual judgement 
based on a complex of theoretical and empirical considerations. The relative stability of 
‘hard cores’ is easily explained without resorting to methodological conventions: For a 
Newtonian, a change in the law of gravitation from Fq <* l//2 to Fq a l/r*-ooi will entail 
recalculating every planetary interaction in the model of the solar system, and explaining the 
more serious anomalies that result, given that the existing model is fairly accurate. Positing 
the existence of a new planet will allow less radical changes. Continuity then arises because 
‘scientists should in the first instance always take the line of least resistance’ (Papineau
[1979], p. 107). When these lines-of-least-resistance are exhausted, it is time to turn the 
attentions of modus tollens to more central assumptions. Of course which line of theory 
replacement does offer the least resistance will depend on individual metaphysical 
predilections. The fact that action-at-a-distance had always been incomprehensible to a 
number of Newtonians might then explain why amendments to the inverse square law were 
considered at regular intervals (see Musgrave [1976] for details, especially pp.459-63).
(ii) The positive heuristic provides advice on how to construct the protective belts for future 
theories. Thus it ‘saves the scientist from becoming confused by the ocean of anomalies’ by 
setting out
a programme which lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating reality: the scientist’s 
attention is riveted on building his models following instructions which are laid down in the positive 
part of his programme. (Lakatos [1970], p.135)
12
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For Lakatos, then, the positive heuristic is ‘there as the strategy for both predicting 
(producing) and digesting [anomalies]’ (p. 136). If a physical system is modelled as (say) 
an idealised harmonic oscillator, a natural response to empirical difficulty is to introduce 
archarmonicity into the equations, although the specific form of the anharmonidty will 
depend on the particular application at hand. Like the negative heuristic, Lakatos gave the 
positive heuristic a methodological formulation: this is a necessary part of formulating a 
methodology, but it has misled some commentators (see for instance the objections of 
Newton-Smith [1981], raised and answered in 1.3 and 1.4 respectively). However, 
Lakatos’ intention that the positive heuristic encode substantive content is clear.
One may formulate the ‘positive heuristic’ of a research programme as a ‘metaphysical’ principle. For 
instance one may formulate Newton’s programme like this: ‘the planets are essentially gravitating 
spinning-tops of roughly spherical shape’. This idea was never rigidly maintained: the planets are not 
just gravitational, they have also, for example, electromagnetic characteristics which may influence 
their motion. Positive heuristic is thus in general more flexible than negative heuristic. 
([1970],pp.l36-7)
Now the degree to which theory-modifications ‘fit’ with advice derived from the positive 
heuristic plays an important part in the appraisal of each research programme: how could 
metaphysical statements provide such methodological advice? Zahar [1989] argues that 
behind the hard cores of powerful research programmes are metaphysical propositions of a 
high level of generality, citing as examples the principle o f sufficient reason (expressed in 
mathematical form by symmetry requirements) and the principle of proportionality of cause 
to effect. In the context of theory construction, such principles can be read as meta­
statements, or stipulations that equations should have a certain mathematical form. In 
similar fashion, the principle of correspondence requires that new equations are some 
transform of the equations of refuted but hitherto successful theories, such that the regions 
of phase space corresponding to the two sets of equations approach identity in the domains 
over which empirical adequacy was achieved by the older equations. Conformity to this 
principle ensures that the growth of empirical knowledge is continuous and cumulative, 
rather than revolutionary and revisionist. In conjunction with the more specific constitutive 
assumptions comprising the hard core, and any further relevant empirical constraints, these 
meta-statements may in certain cases uniquely specify the form of the equations that express 
the theory. Zahar ([1989], pp.28-33) has provided a detailed example of this in his 
derivation—contra Popper and Duhem—of Newton’s inverse square law from Kepler’s 
laws, plus the metaphysical theses expressed as mathematical constraints. Musgrave [1989] 
supports this deductive reading of the positive heuristic.
Postulating an evolutionary explanation for the emergence of such metaprinciples, Zahar 
takes them to be 'stable in the sense that they preceded science proper, and have since
13
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remained largely constant’ ([1989], p.33). He concludes that they must be ‘mostly non­
technical and often vague’, because they have been used in many programmes of research:
If they were all made precise and then conjoined, they might well contain contradictions. (After all, they 
may have arisen from a confrontation with very different physical situations.) The heuristic of a 
research programme is determined by die coherent choice it operates among these principles and by the 
more or less sharp formulation it gives to each of them. ([1989], p.33)
Thus only the specific forms of the metaprinciples—invoked by particular derivations—are 
precise. If theories can satisfy metaprinciples to greater or lesser degrees, or in different 
respects, then during the development of a research programme some theory-versions may 
be revised for purely internal reasons, to bring the programme/wrf/ter into line with the 
guiding metaprinciples. Thus ‘empirical refutations, though very important, are not 
indispensable’ (p.33). Now Lakatos agreed that the best (and of course only the best) 
theoretical developments are autonomous in this way, but in making the point with typical 
polemic, he perhaps overstates the case:
One of the most important points one learns from studying research programmes is that relatively few 
experiments are really important The heuristic guidance the theoretical physicist receives from tests and 
‘refutations’ is usually so trivial that large-scale testing—or even bothering too much with the data 
already available—may well be a waste of time. In most cases we need no refutations to tell us that the 
theory is in need of urgent replacement: the positive heuristic of the programme drives us forward 
anyway. ([1970],p.l51)
Although similar in effect, the Lakatos and Zahar visions of heuristic are quite distinct. The 
metaprinciples behind Zahar’s positive heuristic are very general, while Lakatos’ favourite 
example of programmatic research was the succession of increasingly-sophisticated 
Newtonian models of the solar system (dted throughout his [1968c] and [1970]) which 
indicates that he had in mind theory-development at a much lower level. The first refutable 
variants of the Newtonian programme were based on point-mass planets each interacting 
only with a stationary point-mass sun, while in the later versions, interplanetary 
interactions, spherical planets and a host of other improvements were introduced, all for 
internal reasons. These are low-level adjustments, specific to the constitution of the planets 
and their interactions; they are not comparable to the very general requirements of symmetry 
and correspondence. In fact, their function is qualitatively different: they add further detail 
to the models, making them more accurate. A positive heuristic that is powerful in this 
sense will do two things, (i) In its determinate or de-idealising role, it will indicate the 
respects in which present models are idealised, and suggest future improvements, (ii) In its 
open or reactive mode, it will provide an indeterminate list of possible responses to 
anomaly (for instance ‘posit further planets’ or ‘recalculate deflection of star-images due to
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atmospheric refraction’). The “de-idealising” role for the positive heuristic explains why 
Lakatos called for leniency towards underdeveloped research programmes: ‘to give a stem 
‘refutable interpretation’ to a fledgling version of a programme is dangerous methodological 
cruelty.’ ([1970], p.151) Leniency is not only merciful; to act otherwise would be to make 
a mistake:
The first versions may even ‘apply’ only to non-existing ‘ideal’ cases; it may take decades of theoretical 
work to arrive at the first novel facts and still more time to arrive at interestingly testable versions of 
the research programmes, at die stage when refutations are no longer foreseeable in the light of the 
programme itself. ([1970], p. 151)
In its determinate aspect, the positive heuristic provides a partially articulated vision of how 
the exact model should look, but this vision must be revisable, for the following reasons. If 
the auxiliary assumptions associated with the ‘virtual’ exact theory-version are correct, the 
development of new refutable variants—where each new refutable variant is a more detailed 
and complicated version of the last—will correspond to the primarily mathematical problem 
of writing down and solving the correct equations. Empirical ‘anomalies’ that arise before 
this task is finished could be accommodated by improvements to the model that would have 
been made anyway. So the perfect positive heuristic ‘produces’ and ‘digests’ anomalies— 
in advance—in the following sense: the best responses to anomalies are manoeuvres that 
are not mere responses to anomaly, but corrections of idealising assumptions that were 
(perhaps implicitly) recognised at the outset. However, if the ‘virtual’ exact model is 
incorrect—as is likely to be the case for any moderately complex system—we might expect 
unforeseen anomalies, for which recourse to reactive moves of type (ii) will be necessary.
Despite their transparently ontological nature, it seems implausible that assumptions as 
specific as those that are encoded in Lakatos’ ‘low-level’ positive heuristic could have the 
evolutionary origin ascribed by Zahar to more general heuristic principles. Opinions about 
the constitution of the planets would confer scant survival value—and therefore 
reproductive fitness—on their holder. However, Musgrave [1976], McMullin [1976] and 
Redhead [1980] have suggested a more recent and prosaic origin for detail-increasing 
moves suggested by the positive heuristic: the analogies through which we interpret the 
equations that express theories such as Newton’s.2 Take the oscillator example: equations 
that are written down to describe frictionless simple harmonic motion are equally applicable 
to circular motion projected onto a line, motion at a point due to a passing wave and the 
motion of a pendulum. However, their interpretation as any one of these types of idealised 
system will suggest a de-idealisation that is distinct from those suggested by the other
2  McMullin actually refers to metaphor rather than analogy ([1976] p.427).
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analogies. Under this reading, the positive heuristic will stipulate which interpretive 
analogies are to enrich the equations, and the particular analogies chosen will direct the de- 
idealising moves. Pursuing the naive example, a harmonic oscillator that is subject to 
friction will experience a damping effect due to its motion through the medium in which it 
finds itself. Pendulums, however, will experience resistance due to the motion of the arm in 
addition to that of the bob. Where equations accuratdy describe the motion of damped 
pendulums and oscillators, the toms that correspond to friction can therefore be expected to 
have different mathematical forms. Gearly this is what Lakatos must have had in mind 
when he argued that
two specific theories, while being mathematically (and observationally) equivalent, may still be 
embedded into different rival research programmes, and die power of the positive heuristic of these 
programmes may well be different. ([1970], p.164 fn. 2)
In his [1976] and [1978], Musgrave takes issue with this strong construal of the positive 
heuristic as a producer of anomalies, and suggests that its profile be drastically reduced. 
The reasons are two. The first is that Lakatos is mistaken in thinking that it was the positive 
heuristic of the Newtonian research programme that directed the de-idealisation of the 
planetary models. Instead there was a
strategy for solving, by a method of successive approximation, the difficult mathematical problem of 
calculating what Newton’s theory asserts about planetary motions. Lakatos is quite right that 
‘falsifications’ play no role in this process; for the various ‘models’ produced do not represent 
Newtonian predictions to be compared with the evidence, but are rather steps on the way to such 
predictions. (Musgrave [1976], p.469)
Furthermore, when no gross idealisations remained to be excised, and anomalies began to 
be accommodated via reactive moves (for instance the discovery of Neptune, and when the 
Newtonian programme hit the buffers of Mercury’s perihelion):
The heuristic did not just happen to run out of steam; rather, the logico-mathematical problem of 
deriving empirically testable predictions had been solved. ([1976], p.469)
In his [1978], Musgrave’s criticism is more pointed:
I do not think that a positive heuristic, however powerful, can predict refutations. Lakatos is led to 
make this surprising claim by confusing the logico-mathematical of deriving predictions with the 
empirical problem of testing them. The successive ‘Newtonian models’ which Lakatos describes are the 
result of trying to find out what Newton’s theory predicts about the solar system by a method of 
successive approximation. ([1978], p.189)
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On this point, I think that Lakatos can be defended against Musgrave’s criticism. Musgrave 
assumes there to be a neat methodological distinction between 'exact* and 'crude* models: it 
was only from the exact model that ‘real’ predictions could be derived, and Newton’s 
theory tested; earlier models were just ‘steps on the way to such predictions’. If this 
distinction were to operate during the development of real theories, the constructors of 
theories would need some sort of access to the exact model. However, no Newtonian could 
have known in advance precisely what the ‘exact’ model of the solar system would look 
like: there are a very large number of bodies in orbit around the sun, and neither their 
number nor their masses have ever been calculated (setting aside the problem of calculating 
their orbits). Now it might be possible to construct a model that is ‘exact enough’ for 
observational purposes (and theory testing): some bodies in the solar system exert only 
negligible gravitational attractions and might safely be left out of the initial conditions of the 
planetary problem. However, there is always the possibility that a body that was thought to 
exert only a minor attraction might in fact significantly perturb a neighbouring planet’s orbit 
(perhaps by having a larger mass than was hitherto allowed for). Also, the specification of 
the—idealised—initial conditions might just leave out an unknown body of significant 
mass, the discovery of Neptune being a case in point. If Newtonians were unable to access 
their exact model, and could not tell in advance whether an ‘approximate’ model is exact 
enough, then the model that figures in the appraisal of a research programme at a particular 
point in time will just be the least approximate one: the latest product of the positive 
heuristic. The ‘exact’ model, in effect, is what is left when the heuristic runs out of steam.
Musgrave’s distinction between exact and approximate parts of the application of a theory 
implies that there are two separate lists of improvements—those that definitely need to be 
made in order to correct known idealisations, and those that could be made as ‘natural’ 
responses to unforeseen anomalies, but members of the latter will often need to be 
transferred to the former. Now if the serious term ‘refutation’ is reserved for the 
observational inadequacy of a prediction that is derived from the exact solution to an 
equation that corresponds to the exact boundary and initial conditions, serious refutations 
will not occur until the heuristic runs out of steam. Musgrave wants to strip what I have 
called the ‘de-idealising’ role from the positive heuristic, leaving it a residual ‘reactive’ task, 
but there is no way that the two can be separated in advance of research. Lakatos’ construal 
of the undifferentiated positive heuristic fulfilling both requirements more closely reflects 
the open nature of de-idealisation.
Musgrave’s second complaint is that—contra Lakatos—empirical refutations must, in fact, 
play a part in the development of research programmes. The argument for this is as 
follows. The content of the ‘low-level’ (detail-increasing) positive heuristic resides in 
analogies that are drawn between the system to be described (for instance Bohr’s model of
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the atom) and some well-known system (the solar system, in Bohr’s case). Since Hesse 
(for instance [1966], chapter 1) has pointed out that between the analogical relata there will 
be some ‘positive analogy’ (structural similarity), and some ‘negative analogy’ (structural 
dissimilarity), we can expect that the positive heuristic will lead us astray at times. If the 
strength of the positive heuristic lies in the degree of positive analogy, its power cannot be 
estimated in advance:
For the question with any analogy is: “How far does it obtain?” (Musgrave [1976], p.471)
Musgrave concludes that only empirical testing can answer this question, and that 
theoretical development cannot therefore enjoy the autonomy claimed for it by Lakatos. 
Unfortunately, in making the useful point that many research programmes do require 
experimental input, Musgrave makes a specific claim that it took an empirical refutation to 
force Bohr to change his original circular electronic orbits into elliptical ones. This is 
incorrect: Bohr planned such sophistication in advance, before his seminal papers were 
even published (see 3.2 and 3.6 for further details). So complete theoretical autonomy can 
be conferred only on a research programme of the great heuristic power, the idea being that 
such a programme would successfully explain and predict interesting facts in a natural— 
non -ad hoc—way. This is most clearly the case when a theory is constructed on purely 
theoretical lines, prior (in logical rather than temporal terms) to any empirical input 
Lakatos’ favourite examples—-the Newtonian programme for planetary orbits, Bohr’s 
atomic model—did enjoy such power, but nowhere did Lakatos claim such power was a 
common occurrence. Lastly, although Lakatos retrospectively identified the early stages of 
Newton’s and Bohr’s research programmes as examples of powerful—and therefore 
autonomous—theoretical development, he was aware that this judgement could only be 
made with hindsight. Neither Bohr nor Newton could have been known how much—or 
which parts—of the analogical power of their programmes would turn out to be correct, but 
with hindsight we can see that their success was achieved by models that were constructed 
in accordance with preconceived plans, and developed in a systematic fashion. This does 
not, however, preclude useful—but fallible—forward-looking judgements of heuristic 
promise (seeUrbach [1978] and Whitt [1992] for relevant discussions).
Noimativity and Appraisal
From the sophisticated techniques of appraisal provided by MSRP, it would seem obvious 
that some sort of normative advice would be derivable. At any point in time, judgements 
can be made as to which research programmes are progressing and which degenerating. 
Where there is some overlap in the subject matter addressed by the latest refutable variants
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of two incompatible research programmes, they are said to be competing in that 
phenomenal arena. In such circumstances, the proper vehicle for research activity in the 
disputed area would seem to be the programme that is progressing. In an early presentation 
of MSRP, Lakatos is unequivocal: despite (a series of) ‘crucial’ experiments favouring the 
triumphant—progressive—^ research programme,
the resistance may last for a long time, for the defeated programme may hold out 'with ingenious 
content-increasing innovations unrewarded with empirical success. It is very difficult to defeat a 
research-programme supported by talented, imaginative scientists. Alternatively, stubborn protagonists 
of the defeated programme may offer ad hoc explanations of the experiments or a shrewd ad hoc 
‘reduction’ of the victorious programme to the defeated one. But such efforts we should reject as 
unscientific. ([1968c], pp.176-7)
Elsewhere in the same papa, however, Lakatos admits that
Criticism of a programme is a long and often frustrating process and one must treat budding 
programmes leniently. ([1968c], p.183)
As with Duhem, only hindsight can provide the final judgement. Now there is an obvious 
tension between the stem and permissive comments. There is no reason not to extend the 
leniency of the second quote to revived versions of old research programmes, and to 
vigorous (but of course theoretically progressive) attempts to turn an elderly research 
programme from the path of degeneracy. On the one hand, one of the crucial mechanisms 
for progress in science is the replacement of degenerating research programmes by their 
progressive rivals: if science is to progress as fast as possible, the majority of scientists 
should be working on the most progressive programme in the relevant field. On the other 
hand, Lakatos frequently stressed the value of theoretical proliferation: a minority might do 
fruitful work on alternatives. It should be noted, though, that such endeavours are not 
‘unscientific’ if the theoretical work involves theoretically progressive moves (see above).
Musgrave [1976] has disapprovingly observed a transition in Lakatos’ comments regarding 
the dispensation of methodological advice to scientists, from the early aspirations to the 
later caution. Feyerabend ([1970] and [1976]) has gleefully noted the samepositionshift, 
this time with approval:
scientific method, as softened up by Lakatos, is but an ornament which makes us forget that a position 
of ‘anything goes’ has in fact been adopted.... Such a development, far from being undesirable, changes 
science from a stem and demanding mistress into an attractive and yielding courtesan who tries to 
anticipate every wish of her lover. Of course, it is up to us to choose either a dragon or a pussy cat for 
our company. I do not think I need to explain my own preferences. ([1970], p.229)
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If Feyerabend and Musgrave are correct, the later Lakatos resolved the earlier tension in 
favour of the permissive reading, apparently renouncing the right to issue any binding 
advice to scientists, and therefore any condemnation of those who ignore it:
My ‘methodological rules’ explain die rationale of the acceptance of Einstein’s theory over Newton’s, 
but they neither command nor advise the scientist to work in the Einsteinian and not in the Newtonian 
programme. (Lakatos [1971b], p.174)
Lakatos then adds that the only advice he does give is that a public record be kept of the 
conceptual and empirical track records of research programmes, and that 'superseded 
methodologies should be ignored* (p. 174); falsificationism, for instance, should be 
avoided. There are no absolute injunctions at the individual level:
I, of course, do not prescribe to the individual scientist what to try to do in a situation characterised by 
two rival research programmes: whether to try to elaborate one or the other or whether to withdraw 
from both and try to supersede them with a Great Dialectical Leap Forward. Whatever they have done, I 
can judge: I can say whether they have made progress or not. But I cannot advise them—and do not 
wish to advise them—about exactly what to worry about and in which direction they should seek 
progress. ([1971b], p. 178)
Musgrave [1976] provides a perceptive construal of this apparently curious position. 
Advice is community-directed because
when you think about it, there is something rather odd about a general methodological position issuing 
in advice about what particular scientists should do. For what it is rational for an individual scientist to 
do will depend on a vast number of idiosyncratic factors: his training, his ambition, his (and other’s) 
estimates of his ability, his colleagues, his equipment, the availability of funds, etc. etc. All that a 
general methodological position like Lakatos’s can say to an individual is: “Whatever you do, be 
honest, and try to live up to the standards of good science”. ([1976], p.488 n.73)
So MSRP might describe the criteria on which individuals fallibly appraise the prospects of 
competing research programmes, based on their heuristic power and previous track record 
Public record-keeping is therefore crucial so that individuals have the relevant meta- 
empirical information with which to make such judgements. Feyerabend famously found 
this hilarious, arguing that
one might comment on the futility of a point of view where a thief can steal as much as he wants, is 
praised as an honest man by the police and by the common folk alike provided he tells everyone that he 
is a thief. If that is the sense in which the methodology of research programmes differs from anarchism, 
then I am ready to become a research programmist. ([1976], p.216 fh.25)
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Musgrave’s reading allows a reply. It is not futile for the thief to be required only to 
‘openly declare his thievery’, because the “common folk” may decide that they would rather 
buy their second-hand goods elsewhere: someone with a track-record of sharp-dealing 
might sell them a video-recorder lacking innards. Likewise, the community of scientists—if 
they are interested in Lakatosian progress—will turn away en masse from programmes with 
a history of botched-together theories, and work on progressive ones where these are 
available. On this account, MSRP would describe a two-component science. The majority 
would pursue something like Kuhnian normal science, except that Lakatos provides a 
rationale—judgements of Lakatosian progress—for their doing so. Meanwhile, an avant 
garde would throw rivals into the ring at regular intervals. Taken as a whole, this picture 
would explain how Lakatosian empirical progress would be maximised by science so 
practised.
Musgrave, however, complains that Lakatos concedes too much to anarchism. Advice—of 
an inductive character, based on the track-record of the competing research programmes— 
can be given, although it will be fallible. Howevert fallible advice cannot be binding, the 
danger is that where an Einstein complies with it, the ‘Great Dialectical Leap Forward’ 
might be discouraged. Advice that is not binding can provide no secure basis for the use of 
pejorative terms like ‘irrationality’. So it appears that Lakatos has abandoned an ambitious 
attempt to secure wide-ranging—and binding—norms that are to be contravened only on 
pain of irrationality, and instead offers a vestigial rationality that requires only honest score- 
keeping and the awareness of the relative chances of success and failure:
One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. 
What one must not do is to deny its poor public record. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend conflate 
methodological appraisal of a programme with firm heuristic advice about what to do. It is perfectly 
rational to play a risky game: what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk. ([1971a], p. 104)
One point should perhaps be conceded to Feyerabend while rationality is under discussion. 
Feyerabend begins his [1976] critique of MSRP by observing that a philosophical 
investigation of science (or any other practice) should address two questions:
(i) What is science? How does it proceed, what are its results, how do its procedures, standards and 
results differ from the procedures, standards and results of other enterprises?
(ii) What’s so great about science? What makes science preferable to other forms of life, using different 
standards and getting different kinds of results as a consequence? What makes modem science preferable 
to the science of the Aristotelians, or to the ideology of the Azande? ([1976], p.203)
In addressing (i), MSRP would describe—as a sociological matter—the standards of 
appraisal within science. At times, Feyerabend seems to approve of its performance here,
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with some reservations (see for instance his [1976], p.202). However, Lakatos is accused 
of misappropriating the general tom ‘rationality’ for ideological purposes, by assimilating it 
to standards that are relevant to just one community: modem scientists. Defining 
‘rationality’ to be just conformity to the intellectual standards encoded in MSRP assumes 
that question (ii) has been answered, which it has not. Can we just say that it is irrational to 
strive for alternative values? The quick answer is to set aside the tricky question of 
transcendent rationality. Separating (i) and (ii) amounts to the extraction of means from 
ends, (i) asks what the ends are, and the means by which they are achieved; (ii) questions 
the desirability of those ends, Now if MSRP correctly describes scientific standards as 
applied, and explains how their application produces growth-in-knowledge-of-a-certain- 
sort, it might ground a conditional: if you. value some commodity, state of affairs or social 
development that Lakatosian pragmatic progress maximises, then MSRP describes how its 
achievement has been achieved. The preferences of those who eschew pragmatic progress, 
and do prefer to pursue other aims—whatever aims astrological research does achieve, for 
instance—we can put down to taste.
In conclusion then, theoreticians should follow their heuristic noses. For some, a meta- 
inductive inference based on the previous success of a research programme will recommend 
its further development. Others will give greater weight to particular conceptual and 
empirical difficulties, and be spurred to embark on new lines of research that attempt to 
solve those difficulties. In this way, the load of research effort will be spread between 
conservative and revisionary approaches. Only subsequent history—in the form of 
empirical results not yet available—will decide which of the strategies will have been the 
‘right’ one. Feyerabend is surely correct: the labels ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ attached to 
individual research strategies add nothing to appraisal in this context.
1.3. Newton-Sm ith  o n  Lakatos
In his [1981], Newton-Smith devotes a chapter to a comprehensive critique of Lakatos’ 
views on methodology. First note that Lakatos often took his methodology to be a 
descriptive and explanatory advance on its perceived predecessor—Popperian fallibilism— 
with respect to the history of science. Taking Lakatos at his word, Newton-Smith examines 
the descriptions and explanations that issue from MSRP, and argues that the descriptions 
are false and the explanations fail to explain. Turning to Lakatos’ metamethodology, he 
finds this too to be inadequate: it will not pick out the methodologies that really explain 
historical transitions between theories.
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MSRP, claims Newton-Smith, misdescribes some aspects of real scientific practice. 
Consider the creation by Newton of a procession of increasingly accurate models of 
planetary motion. Contrary to Lakatos’ claim, the earlier members of this series of theories 
were not ‘theories’ in the same sense as their more highly-evolved descendants: it was 
known that they did not represent exact Newtonian descriptions of planetary motion. In 
calling the earlier versions ‘theories’, Lakatos mistakes theory development for the serious 
business of proposing finished theories:
There is no reason to suppose that Newton seriously posited each model in turn and revised them in the 
face of observed anomalies. Newton no doubt knew firom the start that the initial models would not do. 
The development of this sequence of models was simply the thought process whereby he arrived at a 
detailed model worth positing as a theory of planetary motion. (Newton-Smith [1981], p.81)
Thus an episode in the history of science—one of Lakatos’ favourite examples—fails to fit 
the MSRP mould. This, however, is a minor matter, because Newton-Smith moves on to 
targets—the hard core and two types of heuristic—that are closer to the centre of MSRP’s 
explanatory edifice.
First the negative heuristic and hard core: Lakatos was fond of pointing out that a serious 
problem for Popperian falsificationism was the unfortunate but fruitful dogmatism 
displayed by great scientists of the past. This he expressed in methodological form as the 
negative heuristic’s injunction—licensed by Duhem-Quine holism—to deflect the ‘arrow of 
modus tollens' away from the hard core. Lakatos even provided a positive rationale for 
such a rule: don *t kill off budding research programmes before they have a chance to bear 
fruit. Disagreeing, Newton-Smith argues that scientists are nor in fact dogmatically 
committed to their theories, because alternatives that conflict with widely-accepted 
theories—but are observationally equivalent—are often worked on by mainstream 
theoretical scientists. Secondly, their commitment cannot be conventional: the success of its 
associated theories provides reasons to accept—evidence for—statements in the hard core. 
Conventions would not get treated this way. Newton-Smith continues:
In point of fact what should be recognised is that the scientist’s faith is a faith that there is something 
important in the basic theoretical assumptions and not that those assumptions are exactly right as they 
stand. ([1981], p.84)
In place of the negative heuristic, a weaker constraint on theory-construction is proposed:
while progress is being made, only those variants on the basic assumptions which preserve the 
observational successes of the programme should be explored. ([1981], p.84)
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Newton-Smith next argues that on Lakatos’ characterisation, the positive heuristic must fail 
in the crucial methodological role allotted to it: driving the pragmatic progress that 
constitutes success in MSRP. According to Lakatos’ strong construal, the positive heuristic 
provides the ‘preconceived plan’ (Lakatos’ words) by which theories are constructed and 
anomalies turned ‘victoriously into examples’. For Newton-Smith, however
It is implausible in the extreme to suppose it to be characteristic of successful theories that they come 
equipped with this sort of advance warning system. ([1981], p.84)
This is because some anomalies never get addressed (where is the advance warning in these 
cases?) and because:
Response to anomalies, empirical or conceptual, comes after the fact of their discovery. And so it 
should be. For it would be a most inefficient use of our intellectual resources to formulate now what 
our response would be to entirely hypothetical anomalies. ([1981], pp.84-5)
As evidence of Lakatos’ strong construal of the positive heuristic, Newton-Smith points to 
his [1970] remark to the effect that two formally equivalent theories might be embedded in 
two different research programmes and be developed into theories with very different 
content. Unfortunately, on this strong reading, there is:
no reason to think that the success of an SRP indicates anything more than the power of the heuristic 
itself to generate successful new predictions. ([1981], p.87)
Newton-Smith argues that this is fine for instrumentalists, but Lakatos—qua realist—needs 
support to accrue to the metaphysical hard core. It is, however, an inevitable consequence 
of the curious way that MSRP labels dogmatic acceptance of the hard core conventional: 
one doesn’t seek evidence for conventions. Newton-Smith takes the hard core to consist of 
the ‘primary, basic empirical assertions about the world’ (p.86), but:
Lakatos's invocation of conventions in this context has blinded him to the fact that the crucial problem 
is that of obtaining evidence for the approximate truth of theoretical assumptions. ([1981], p.87)
Mirroring Musgrave’s [1976] critique, Newton-Smith detects an alternative understanding 
on the part of Lakatos’ students, citing Worrall [1976] and Zahar [1973]. Identified by 
extension (i.e. examples given by Worrall and Zahar), the minimally construed positive 
heuristic is not strong enough to differentiate rival research programmes, and could not 
therefore explain their differential rates of progress. They would need to be distinguished 
instead by their hard cores, and the positive heuristic would therefore have ‘no real role to 
play’ (Newton-Smith [1981], p.87) in theory appraisal.
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In MSRP, rival research programmes are comparatively evaluated by assessing the extent to 
which their successive theory-versions are ad hoc, which is in turn defined in terms of 
novelty. According to Newton-Smith, Lakatos originally had temporal novelty in mind, but 
was corrected by Zahar, who recognised that 'the explanation of a known fact can be as 
important in providing evidence for a theory as the generation of true novel predictions’ 
(Newton-Smith [1981], p.87). The notion of heuristic novelty raises an irrelevant 
psychological question of which perceived problem-situation prompted the theory’s 
construction. This is unnecessary and misleading, claims Newton-Smith: the same 
assessment can be made if we just weigh up the number and variety of facts explained: an 
ad hoc theory will be unsatisfactory on these grounds because it will fail to provide 
explanations of any number or quality outside the domain for which it was 'cooked up’. An 
old objection is then raised to the relative appraisal of theories by their explanatory and 
predictive powers by this method: where two theories are compared, Newton-Smith claims 
that MSRP
is making intuitive use of a notion of the relative size of classes of successful predictions and
successful explanations of known facts. ([1981], p.8 8 )
If all such classes are denumerably infinite and therefore equinumerous, MSRP will fail to 
differentiate good theories from bad ones. Lastly, Lakatos’ model is 'too simplistic’ 
because it ‘accords no role to conceptual evaluation* (p.89).3
Newton-Smith then assesses whether MSRP performs well in the three roles that Lakatos 
allotted to methodology: (i) providing a demarcation criterion; (ii) evaluating research 
programmes; and (iii) explaining scientific change. Newton-Smith argues that the first of 
these roles is ‘pointless’ (p.90), and figured only as a rhetorical device in Lakatos’ 
denunciations of research activities of which he (following Popper) happened to 
disapprove. ‘Good’ versus ‘bad* is a more useful dichotomy than ‘scientific’ versus 
‘pseudo-scientific’, claims Newton-Smith, and turns to the evaluation of MSRP’s 
machinery of evaluation. Interpreting methodology normatively, Lakatos envisaged journal 
editors and funding bodies refusing to cooperate with those who cling to degenerating 
research programmes. However, Lakatos had to admit that a programme that has been 
degenerating for many years may be ‘turned around’ by vigorous research activity and that 
a progressive one may run out of heuristic steam. If MSRP provides criteria for the 
normative assessment of theories, it also dictates that they can never be applied.
3 See Feyerabend’s criticism of Laudan’s similar claim (Feyerabend [1981a], p.235 fri.12).
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The third use for a methodology—explaining scientific change—brings us to Newton- 
Smith’s objections to Lakatos’ metamethodology, because for Lakatos, we chiefly appraise 
a methodology on its explanatory power vis-d-vis the history of science via a methodology 
of historiographical research programmes (MHRP), of which more in 1.6. Newton-Smith 
agrees with Lakatos that history and philosophy of science require ‘mutual interaction' 
(p.92) but disagrees as to the form that the exchange should take In line with his 
requirement that methodology be true to the historical facts, Newton-Smith argues that if a 
methodological principle is to explain an event in the history of science, we must have 
reason to suppose that the protagonists actually believed in it. Explanations provided by 
MSRP do not satisfy this criterion, because Lakatos assumes that where there was a 
transition from a theory T\ to its successor T2, we have explained the episode merely if we 
can show that T2 is superior to T\ according to our methodology.
For Lakatos, the best methodology is that which requires the least explanatory recourse to 
external factors in its reconstructed historical stories, where there is no independent 
evidence for interference. Claiming that Lakatos provides no arguments for this, Newton- 
Smith points out that there is some dispute over how important ‘external’ influences realty 
are to good science. In other words, whether the history of science does require rational (as 
opposed to non-rational) reconstruction is itself an issue; one that Lakatos settles by fiat. 
Where two incompatible reconstructions are historically equivalent, we cannot decide in 
favour of the rational one a priori. We need independent evidence that it was consciously 
applied. To express these worries more succinctly, Newton-Smith offers two counter­
examples to Lakatosian metamethodology as amended by Worrall [1976]:
(1) Suppose that a methodology M\ to which we subscribe privileges a theory B over 
its rival A. Historically, scientists chose A. We can explain their choice by reference 
to external factors, but unfortunately we can find no other evidence for their 
presence. Under MHRP, this disconfirms M\. Newton-Smith objects that past 
scientists might have used another methodology M2 : we and they may just disagree 
on “what makes a theory a good one”. If we have an a priori rationale for Mi as a 
normative theory, we certainly should not abandon it for flimsy historiographical 
reasons: MHRP’s disconfirmational procedures are therefore unsatisfactory.
(2) Now consider a methodology Mi that adequately explains theory-change in the 
history of science. MHRP would have Mi being confirmed. If there exists an M2  
which is explanatorily equivalent, except that M2  was actually employed whereas 
Mi was not, MHRP’s confirmation procedures must be equally misleading.
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The Lakatos-Worrall methodology is inadequate because it makes no reference to the actual 
methodological beliefs of scientists, and requires only that a methodology concur with the 
‘intuitive* judgements of scientists:
What is misleading about this picture is that there is no room in it for the scientists’ own reasons for 
preferring one theory over another. They do not simply make intuitive judgements, they standardly give 
reasons for their preferences. We certainly have not explained their decisions unless we make reference 
to what they believe, which may not be what we believe. (Newton-Smith [1981], p.97)
An alternative metamethodology is advanced:
In fact we need first to establish that there has been progress in science without the use of 
methodological principles. Having done that, we then need carefully to examine the history of science 
to see what principles have actually been operative in bringing about that progress. That is how one 
vindicates a methodology; that is, by showing that it encapsulates the principles that have in fact been 
followed in bringing about progress. ([1981], p.97)
The ‘Popperian Dilemma’ concludes the critique: Popper, argues Newton-Smith, cannot 
make MHRP-style appeals to progress because he is anti-induction, and therefore cannot 
claim that there has been progress in science. Although careful to distance himself from 
Popper on inductivism, Lakatos
also fails to establish that following his methodology is a means to the aim of science which, with 
Popper, he takes to be that of increasing verisimilitude. ([1981], p.98)
Newton-Smith discerns an admission of this failure in Lakatos* decision to ‘accept’— 
tentatively, of course—the metaphysical inductive principle that increase in apparent 
verisimilitude reflects real progress along the Road to Truth. Citing the famous Russdl 
passage that Lakatos himself invoked in exactly this context, Newton-Smith complains that 
Lakatos has stolen this result, rather than earned it.
1.4. MSRP as So cia l  Theory
There are parallels between the difficulties for Lakatos’ views raised by Newton-Smith and 
Musgrave: both mix some very astute detections of difficulty with other objections that 
depend on very literal readings of Lakatos’ often high-flown rhetoric. More concretely, 
certain of Newton-Smith’s criticisms—particularly regarding heuristic—are very similar to 
those of Musgrave, and were hopefully answered earlier (in 1.2). Where Newton-Smith’s 
formulation is slightly different to Musgrave’s, I will risk repetition. Towards the end of
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this section, the most interesting of these problems—concerning metamethodology—will 
be answered by reading MSRP as a certain species of social theory.
First let us turn to the hard core and negative heuristic: Newton-Smith objects to the labels 
(i) ‘dogmatic’ and (ii) ‘conventional’ being applied to scientists’ attitudes to the basic 
metaphysical assumptions underlying their research, because (i) they work on other 
theories, and (ii) collect evidential support for the core assumptions. Now the ‘dogmatic’ 
label was chiefly meant to distance MSRP from Popperianism: the theory-defending 
tenacity is relative to the completely wntenacious behaviour that Lakatos felt that Popper 
unreasonably expected of scientists. For (ii), there is a long tradition in which 
‘conventional’ is applied to principles or beliefs whose provenance we do not wish to 
discuss for the moment. Poppa:, for instance, used this device in his [1959] to avoid a 
discussion of the status of his methodological views, so that their consequences might be 
explored. It was never likely to be a stable position: how could a phenomenon like 
science—that enjoys a public existence—be a matter for definition? Lakatos employs the 
device of conventions to side-step the rather uninteresting question of how new research 
programmes get to be worked on before there is any evidence in their favour. Newton- 
Smith’s argument then conflates two senses of ‘convention’. A statement can be a 
convention, lacking any real content (it doesn’t make any real difference whether I measure 
distance in metres or yards). On the other hand, our reasons for adopting some contentual 
sentence might be conventional in the sense that we don’t want to discuss its provenance 
now, we want to see where it gets us: this is the sense in which commitment to the hard 
core is conventional in MSRP. Moves of this type are at the heart of the ‘quasi-empirical’— 
as opposed to ‘quasi-Euclidean’—structure that Lakatos thought to be applicable to any 
intellectual endeavour.4 The standard examples of hard-core assumptions make it clear that 
they are supposed to express very general states of affairs. For instance, the assumption 
that light consists of a wave process could not be a convention: it is plainly of a factual 
nature, so there is some point in gathering evidence for it, and realists would look to the 
success of its associated research programme for the premises of their evidential arguments. 
When Newton-Smith observes that
the scientist’s faith is a faith that there is something important in die basic theoretical assumptions and
not that those assumptions are exactly right as they stand ([1981], p.84)
he purports to correct Lakatos’ mistake. Lakatos, however, would have endorsed the 
sentiment: it sounds much like the faith that at some point the action of the positive heuristic 
will produce a theory that is correct.
4  Lakatos [1967b] makes the case for this structure for mathematics, and defines these terms.
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Now consider Newton-Smith’s accusation that MSRP is false to the historical facts. 
Newton’s earlier models of planetary motion, we are told, were not proposed seriously, 
and MSRP therefore errs in asserting that anomalies forced him to revise his theories. 
Unfortunately for Newton-Smith, history disagrees: Newton actually did on occasion 
amend his models in the face of (empirical) objections. So let us emphasise the 'seriously’: 
Newton only amended approximations of his model of which he was already aware. Now 
this could mean either of two things: (i) Newton was already in possession of the more 
sophisticated models, and comparison with these revealed the crudity of the early models; 
or (ii) Newton had a plan governing the construction of models such that the improvements 
would have been made without the stimulus of anomaly, (i) raises a historical 
explanandum: why did Newton fail to publish the more sophisticated models in the first 
place? (ii) indicates the presence of a positive heuristic as described in 1.2. Newton-Smith, 
however, felt that it was 'implausible in the extreme’ to suppose that there are constraints 
on theory-construction of this order of strength.
The positive heuristic is designed to encapsulate the difference between a planned response 
to anomaly—a response with a theoretical rationale—from an ad hoc response. For 
Newton-Smith this is either implausible in its strong form (a la Lakatos), or nothing special 
under its minimal construal (a la Worrall and Zahar). When a response to anomaly is 
appraised in MSRP, one central question is: can the anomaly be explained by correcting 
some theoretical defect of the model of which we were already awarel If so, the response is 
well-motivated. This motivating role is clearly what Lakatos had in mind for the positive 
heuristic when he claimed autonomy for Bohr’s development of atomic models (represented 
by Mi, M2,...) in the research programme of 1913:
The apparent refutation of M2  turned into a victory for M3 , and it was clear that M2  and M3  would 
have been developed within the research programme—perhaps even Mi 7  or M2 0 —without any 
stimulus from observation or experiment. (Lakatos [1970], p. 149)
So Newton-Smith may be correct to argue that it would be ‘inefficient’ to formulate 
responses to as-yet hypothetical anomalies, but this is not how the positive heuristic acts in 
MSRP. The positive heuristic encodes theoretical developments, some of which—if the 
research programme turns out to be progressive—will imply non-ad-hoc responses to as- 
yet undiscovered anomalies. Whether those anomalies turn up before or after the addition of 
the sophistications that would ‘explain’ them is a matter of little interest Now in order to 
know that Bohr’s first (static nucleus) model is an idealisation, we first have to know that 
the nucleus actually does move, however insignificantly. Then we need some idea of how 
that motion could be given mathematical expression. In conclusion, we need a plan as to 
how the inaccuracy can be removed, the plan in question coming from the interpretive 
analogies that turn a set of equations into a model. In Bohr’s case, the analogue was clearly
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the solar system, so that the substitution of (for instance) reduced mass for electronic mass 
was a very natural move. But to possess an implicit plan is not to possess the implicitly- 
planned: the content of the positive heuristic is formulated as a set of guidelines because it 
would be impracticable to write down descriptions of physical systems—like the solar 
system—that reflect a realistic interpretation of the core assumptions. Take the inverse 
square law: suitably interpreted, it 'says’ that every free-floating dust particle in the solar 
system perturbs Mars’ orbit. In place of a list of initial conditions of unfeasible length and 
complexity, MSRP invokes a list of sophistications: allowances for dust-motes would be 
unlikely ever to reach the top.
To Newton-Smith’s complaint that it is the positive heuristic that is doing all the work, and 
that any success achieved by the programme should accrue to this instrument for producing 
good theories rather than to the factual statements in the hard core, there is the following 
reply: If the positive heuristic does encode factual content (albeit potential factual content), 
as was argued above and in 1.2, its use in MSRP need not be instrumentalist. Admittedly, 
Lakatos was ambivalent towards the realist construal of scientific theories. As a fallibilist, 
he thought that 'all hard cores of scientific programmes are likely to be false’ ([1971b], 
p. 175), and that science could only reliably produce increasing verisimilitude. Elsewhere, 
however, the aim of science was Truth (see his [1974], pp.253-9), so that the link to the 
analytic Popperian virtues was synthetic, supported by a “whiff of inductivism”.
Newton-Smith’s most substantial objection to appraisal in MSRP is that 'the explanation of 
a known fact can be as important in providing evidence for a theory as the generation of 
true novel predictions’ ([1981], p.87), so that the temporal ordering of theory and 
observation cannot be significant. He reads Lakatos’ acceptance of Zahar’s [1973] 
amendment as removing the historical nature of the theory-appraisal calculation: replacing a 
definition in toms of temporal novelty with one in terms of heuristic novelty. Newton- 
Smith then replaces Zahar’s version with a system of appraisal that compares the number 
and variety of successful explanations and predictions, and correctly points out that 
quantifying such virtues will be of no help when choosing among theories, because of the 
infinite size—for all theories—of the classes to be compared. An initial textual rejoinder to 
Newton-Smith is that he corrects a position that he mistakenly attributes to Zahar. Zahar’s 
amendment did not dehistoricise theory-appraisal: it changed the nature of the historical 
context, replacing a temporal ordering with a heuristic ordering. Thus (for instance) the 
precession of Mercury ’ s perihelion would count as evidence in favour of general relativity: 
although it was not temporally novel, it was heuristicatty novel with respect to Einstein’s 
construction of relativity, because it played no role in the construction of that theory (see 
Zahar [1973]).
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The next move in Newton-Smith’s argument is to raise the problem of underdetermination 
against one of the few philosophers of science to place a cogent response to it at the heart of 
his philosophy of science* Lakatos was aware of the ‘weight of evidence’ problem, which 
is why he historicised the appraisal of theories in the first place:
the dogma of independence of evidential support from prehistory is false. It is false because the problem 
of the weight of evidence cannot be solved without historico-methodological criteria for ‘collecting’ 
theories and evidence. Both the truth-content and the falsity-content of any theory contains infinitely 
many propositions. (Lakatos [1968b], p.394)
Lakatos’ recognition of the general problems associated with comparisons of verisimilitude 
is no bar to its being assumed for progress within a research programme. Each new theory 
version T2 implies the true consequences of its predecessor T\ within the same research 
programme. In this case, we don’t have to determine the cardinality of their true 
consequence classes to know that T2 has greater verisimilitude than T\\ we merely have to 
note that Ti’s truth content is a proper subset of that of 72.5 This inclusion relation will not 
generally hold between theories embedded in different research programmes, but 
Lakatosian diachronic judgements—comparing the relative progression and degeneration 
achieved by rival research programmes—provide a surrogate in such cases. There might be 
a problem were Newton-Smith to provide a reason to deny heuristic novelty a role in 
appraisal, but there are only the usual logical arguments that temporal order cannot alter 
relations of implication between sentences, and after Zahar’s amendment, it is the heuristic 
order that is involved.
Now there has been some debate as to the relative value of prediction and accommodation 
(where ‘prediction’ includes prediction of known facts). Glymour [1980], Zahar [1983], 
Giere [1984] and Redhead [1986] provide probabilistic arguments to the effect that mere 
accommodation provides less support to an explanatory hypothesis than prediction (or even 
none at all). Howson and Uibach have argued on Bayesian grounds for the independence 
of inductive support from heuristic background, and that the correct methodological 
distinction is between theories with no internal rationale and no independent support, and 
theoretical models with a causal structure that explains the predicted phenomena, or enjoy 
support from other sources (Howson and Urbach [1989], pp.275-84). Two things should 
be noted here. Firstly, Howson and Urbach’s distinction is captured in MSRP by the 
pejorative identification of theories as ad hoc$. Secondly, on the Bayesian account, the 
problem is either pushed back to the ‘independent support’, or just lumped into the 
subjective prior probability (this is no problem in itself). Now suppose, for the sake of
5 This is not to suggest that Popperian verisimilitude increases in transition from Tx to T2.
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argument, that the canons of inductive reasoning do provide no reason to differentiate 
prediction and accommodation (as we have seen this is controversial): this does not imply 
that it is incorrect to take a theory’s heuristic background into account, only that Bayesian 
inductive logic provides no reason for doing so. Past episodes of theory construction have 
not, in general, been beset by problems of underdetermination: what strategies for choosing 
among theories have been used successfully? If there are cases in which heuristic novelty 
was an issue, and the Howson-Urbach criteria (independent support and internal causal 
structure) are not applicable, it might be inferred that inductive reasoning cannot rationalise 
these episodes (Bohr’s atom might be a case in point: see chapter 3). If such strategies are 
systematically successful, the logico-probabilistic independence arguments would need to 
be qualified by ceteris paribus clauses. In any case, if it is progress that is the aim of 
science, the prediction of temporally novel facts will be of pragmatic importance.
There were three things that a methodology should do, and according to Newton-Smith, the 
second and third tasks—evaluating research programmes and explaining scientific 
change—are not performed efficiently by MSRP. First consider evaluation: the inability to 
rationalise the permanent rejection of research programmes, I think, reflects a failure 
elsewhere in epistemology: the problem of induction’s failure to be soluble. We can never 
show a research programme to have degenerated irreversibly because we cannot see into the 
future, and it would be foolish to write off research programmes in this way given their 
history of reinventing themselves. However, inductive appraisal based on the relative 
length of the period of degeneration can be given: it is pretty certain that (for instance) a 
revived phlogistonist research programme would not enjoy success. The same response 
serves for Newton-Smith’s observation that Lakatos fails to establish increasing 
verisimilitude as a result of the application of MSRP’s principles. What can be discerned in 
MSRP, however, is a rationale for continuing research on a programme that is producing 
increasing apparent verisimilitude, plus an explanation of how communities of researchers 
come to work on such programmes. There can be no guarantees that such success will be 
achieved, or that it must always signal an approach to the ontological order.
This last claim brings us to MSRP’s performance in the third role: explaining scientific 
change. Newton-Smith’s most interesting objection is that a certain criterion of explanation 
is not satisfied by Lakatos’ rational reconstructions: that if we wish a methodology to 
explain specific theory-changes in the history of science, we need to know that the relevant 
protagonists actually did adhere to it. This sounds reasonable: how can a methodology M 
explain a scientist’s transition from (say) T \toT 2 unless we have reason to believe that she 
or he passed through intermediate bdief-states that correspond to appraisal in M? There are 
actually two requirements being made here: (i) we must see how belief in M  ensured the 
transition, for instance by showing that Tj is preferable to T\—according to Af-—in the
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evidential circumstances known to obtain at the time of the transition; and (ii) we must 
know that the relevant scientist believed in Af, so that the explicit adoption of M  was the 
actual (or quasi-causal) driving force in the transition from a cognitive state corresponding 
to acceptance of T\ to a cognitive state corresponding to acceptance of Tj. Note that both of 
Newton-Smith’s counter-examples to MHRP hinge on the latter requirement.
Ryle ([1949], pp.28-32) made a helpful distinction: people know how (for instance) to ride 
bicycles without being aware that certain physical laws underpin balance. This does not 
stop those theories explaining why people are able to balance in the way they do. The thesis 
that real knowledge is knowledge that—which Newton-Smith appears to assume—is 
criticised by Ryle as ‘intellectualism’. Most of the human population make inferences from 
P and ‘if P, then Q  to Q without knowing that ‘if (if P, then Q) and P, then Q  is a logical 
truth of the prepositional calculus, or having any idea what modus ponens might be. 
Elsewhere in his [1981], Newton-Smith characterises scientific judgement as a skill: surely 
one can have a skill while entertainingjafre beliefs about how that skill works: one might 
believe false theories of how bicycles are balanced without this affecting one’s ability to 
ride them. Returning to science, Newton claimed to have deduced the law of universal 
gravitation from the phenomena, but Duhem [1914] has argued on logical grounds that this 
was impossible. On a similar note, Koyrd’s [1965] study of Newton’s disputes with the 
Cartesians reveals that his interpretational attitude to the law of gravitation was far removed 
from his espoused instrumentalist stance to ‘final causes’. Now recent efforts have been 
made to rehabilitate Newton’s explicit methodology (for instance Glymour [1980] and 
Laymon [1983]), but the aim of these reconstructions is to bring a subset of Newton’s 
methodological utterances into line with modem canons, given his actions; explanations of 
type (i) therefore seem to be primary. Newton may just have been misguided about the 
processes by which he arrived at his theories. This is not to say that his inferences were 
‘unfounded’ or ‘unscientific’, merely that his methodological utterances might have been a 
poor guide to the methodology he was implicitly following. In a similar context, Lakatos 
summarises the point eloquently:
This little story, I think, bears out my pet thesis that most scientists tend to understand little more
about science than fish about hydrodynamics. ([1970], p. 148)
A distinction between the two requirements is therefore crucial. Newton-Smith is quite 
correct in pointing out that Lakatos’ metamethodology requires only (i). Assimilate, for the 
moment, rationality to instrumental rationality: to vindicate M  for some aim A, we might 
look for an instance of theory-change that promoted A , and show that following M  would 
have resulted in the same transition, in that the successor theory was preferable to its 
predecessor according to Af. The separate problem of explaining how the transition actually 
occurred would be solved by adding to these considerations a social explanation of the
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social fact that an implicit methodology that promoted A came to be adopted among 
scientists during the relevant period.6 Would we also need to know that individual members 
of the scientific community consciously sought to promote A by explicitly adopting M l A 
useful analogy might be drawn with functionalist explanations of the role of religion in 
traditional societies: according to their adherents, the occurrence of religious rituals would 
be explained by the truth of the religions in question. For the anthropologist, however, the 
proper explanation— from the point of view of social theory—would invoke the social 
function of rituals, perhaps in promoting social cohesion. The explanation is completed by 
a description of some process of selection that acts to spread cohesion-promoting rituals 
among such societies. Newton-Smith just assumes that to explain the actions of 
individuals, we have to invoke their intentions. This requirement rules out explanations of 
action that appeal to false consciousness, and Newton-Smith presents no conclusive 
argument for such general preconditions on social explanation.
Turning finally to the two counter-examples to MHRP, Newton-Smith objects to a 
metamethodology that disconfirms a methodology M\ {qua meta-historical thesis) where it 
fails to rationalise an episode in the history of science, because we might disagree a priori 
with the relevant scientists. Now the relevant question is: was that episode successful? Did 
it produce growth in knowledge? If not, then we can write the episode off (along with M2) 
as either (i) bad science if the aim was progress, but progress failed to be achieved; or (ii) 
some other activity if the aim was different. If the episode was successful, and following 
Mi would not have produced such success, we really should examine Mi, and its a priori 
rationale. After all, what use is a methodology that does not deliver progress? The intuition 
behind Newton-Smith’s second counter-example is that Mi should not be confirmed if 
another methodology M2 was actually employed. One might wonder how we are supposed 
to have access to the relevant actors’ heads. Given that we do not, we have to infer from the 
actions and utterances of the actors which out of Mi and M2  produced the progress. If Mi 
would have produced the same advantageous result, there is no reason why it should not 
enjoy some confirmation: M2 will in any case. The situation is analogous to familiar cases 
in which two rival theories enjoy support from an experimental outcome that both 
predicted. The solution, as ever, is to wait and see, hoping that an explanatory divergence 
will appear. In any case, Newton-Smith’s intuition that one can adhere to a methodology 
that has been refuted by the history of science on the basis of an a priori rationale—the 
disagreement with MHRP that motivates his first counter-example—contradicts the naive 
meta-inductivism of his alternative metamethodology:
6  See Hesse [1988] for a fuller discussion.
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we need first to establish that there has been progress in science without the use of methodological 
principles. Having done that, we then need carefully to examine the history of science to see what 
principles have actually been operative in bringing about that progress. ([1981], p.97)
1.5. Papineau  on  Lakatos
In his [1988], Papineau argues that traditional ‘Cartesian’ epistemologies give an account of 
the correctness of bdiefs such that ‘rationality’ does not amount to getting the world right, 
and that they are consequently unable to counter relativist critiques issuing from Kuhn, 
Feyerabend and recent social studies of science. The quote marks indicate that 
‘Cartesianism’ is used hare in a technical sense, signifying a nest of theses that usually 
imply the existence of universal standards of reason—over and above how people actually 
reason—that are accessible a priori to the unaided intellect. In his [1989], Papineau directs 
these arguments more specifically at Popper and Lakatos. Now it may seem curious for 
Lakatos to be included in the set {x: x is a Cartesian}, even for the sake of an argument. 
After all, in his papers on the philosophy of mathematics, Lakatos set out to oppose what 
he called ‘quasi-Euclideanism’ (see his [1962] and [1967b]). Likewise, ‘justificationism’ 
was the target of extensive criticism in the papers on the methodology of the natural 
sciences that introduced MSRP, and in his [1971a] he proposed a ‘quasi-empirical’ 
methodology for methodology. However, Papineau has a specific argument that Lakatos’ 
views on metamethodology do not make sense unless certain ‘Cartesian’ theses are 
assumed. If correct, the claim would show that MSRP is subject to the same relativist 
challenge as traditional theories of knowledge.
In his [1987], Papineau sets out a taxonomy for epistemological positions under which it is 
possible to be a scientific realist while adopting an anti-realist position at the level of 
method. Tensions that inevitably afflict such a position, however, are at the centre of 
Papineau’s relativist challenge. For naturalists, the mind is a ‘normal part of the natural 
world’ (p.ix). The first disagreement with Cartesianism, then, concerns dualism: cut off 
from the natural world, the Cartesian mind has to spin a web of knowledge using only the 
‘givens’—reason and experience—to which it is granted infallible access. Given this 
isolation, ‘rationality’ is granted only to those belief-forming processes—arguments, in 
common parlance—that can be constructed from ‘given’ inferential steps. This engenders 
an ‘anti-realism of method’, according to which
the principles by which people arrive at beliefs are in no need of justification. According to anti-realism 
of method it is acceptable for people to adopt false beliefs, and therefore perfectly sensible to ask, at 
that level, whether one person’s beliefs are more correct than another’s. But anti-realists of method
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insist that there is no sense to questions as to whether the standards by which people decide such 
questions are themselves legitimate as good methods for arriving at correct beliefs. ([1987], p. 13)
If the 'correctness’ of a belief is assimilated to its provenance in a preferred method, the key 
difference between the Cartesian and the naturalised epistemologist will be the grounds on 
which they prefer methods:
The Cartesian theory of epistemology recommends that we should get our beliefs from good arguments. 
We should assent only to those beliefs that have been generated by logically valid steps from secure 
premises. An actual belief is justified just in case it issues from such an argument ([1988], p.39)
On a naturalised account, however,
the right technique for acquiring beliefs is simply to be a reliable belief-former, that is, to have belief- 
forming processes that generally produce true beliefs. Concerned believers should try to ensure that all 
their beliefs come from belief-forming processes that are reliable in this sense. ([1988], p.40)
There is a connection between this anti-realism of method and traditional instrumentalism: 
Papineau detects a 'strong tendency for Cartesians to reject realism9 (p.46), because:
They have to show from first principles that the standards of reason 'which (a) recommend themselves to 
conscious human minds are (b) guaranteed to produce beliefs that correspond to an independent reality.
It is not at all clear how to show this. So the natural move is to reject (b) and embrace anti-realism. 
([1988], p.46)
Now this anti-realist move makes 'reason prior to truth’ (p.46) because we now define 
success in judgement to be having good Cartesian reasons for a belief, rather than in the 
content of that belief corresponding to an external reality. In the absence of such an anti- 
realist move, the Cartesian must appeal to some mechanism which links up reason with 
truth-as-correspondence. Thus, for instance, Descartes himself invoked a non-deceiving 
God (for whose existence there was a separate argument, of course) to warrant reliance on 
'clear and distinct ideas’. If we do follow the anti-realist move, there are no other criteria 
for beliefs being the right ones, other than that they are held for the right reasons, or have 
been generated by methods that answer to some universal rationality. This, however, is the 
problem: if other communities have other standards of rationality, it looks like there are no 
universal standards of human rationality, so in what way is this rationality objective? The 
Cartesian anti-realist, Papineau argues, must simply insist that there cannot be alternative 
rationalities. However,
this blunt denial of any possibility of alternative rationalities will seem too quick to anybody working 
in the philosophy of science, to anybody concerned specifically with the rationality of scientific theory
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choice. For it is manifestly possible for people to suppose that modem astrology, or creationism, are 
supported by reason. And it would be tendentious at best to insist that such people must be crazy. 
([1988], p.48)
Then, Papineau continues, a natural move is to restrict the sample. If scientists are typically 
‘mature, serious thinkers’ (p.48), a theory of rationality could be distilled from the history 
of science:
If there isn’t anything more to the ‘right’ standards of rationality than simply the standards that come 
naturally to mature human thinkers, then how else should we identify those standards except by 
familiarizing ourselves with the habits of thought of the central figures in our scientific tradition? 
([1988], p.49)
This rather ‘puzzling’ approach—a view especially associated with Lakatos and Laudan— 
only makes ‘perfect sense when seen against the background of Cartesian anti-realism.’ 
(p.49) From this position, Papineau concludes, we can see that recent sociology of science 
(e.g. Pickering [1984]), that sees complex social interaction and negotiation where 
rationalism sees scientific reasoning, is going to be a threat to this programme: here are 
other, ‘ulterior’ motives that might cloud the judgements of people we had hoped to use in a 
definition of disinterested rationality. If social pressures are effective causal influences on 
scientific judgement, the purity of scientific reason is at risk, and so, therefore, is the 
objectivity of rationality. It would be useful at this stage to rehearse the steps in the 
argument:
(1) Cartesians must explain the link between self-conscious rationality and truth as 
correspondence, which is a difficulty unless realism is dropped or a link-mechanism 
found.
(2) For anti-realists, reason is prior to truth, leading a Cartesian to equate the ‘light ’ 
beliefs with those recommended by the ‘universal standards of rationality’.
(3) If there are no universal standards of rationality, then in the absence of an external 
(i.e. truth-linked) characterisation of when a belief is ‘right’, the Cartesian must 
resort to the reading of any such standards from an dite: Great Reasoners in the 
history of science.
(4) A severe problem arises for this programme if sociologists can show that other 
(social) processes ‘interfere’ with the cogitations of the Great Reasoners, making 
the purity of scientific reason a myth.
37
PRAGMATIC PROGRESS
In his [1989], Papineau pins the ‘Cartesian’ label specifically on Lakatos. He does this by 
arguing that MHRP implicitly assumes the Cartesian thesis that is central to his critique: that 
success-in-judgement is conformity to standards of rationality that are accessible to a priori 
reasoning. Popper is presented as the source of Lakatos’ implicit anti-realism, where, to 
repeat a point made earlier, the anti-realism in question is not one side of the usual realism- 
instrumentalism dichotomy. Instead, it is a thesis about what success-in-judgement is. To 
be a realist in this sense is to think there is nothing more to good methodology than the 
description of a process in which minds—as natural entities—reliably make transitions 
from states in which their beliefs have lower truth content to belief-states with higher tnrih 
content, whore ‘truth’ is not to be assimilated to warranted assertibility. Anti-realists in this 
sense think that something crucial is missing from the previous characterisation: rationality. 
Thus for Popper, the rational choice among unfalsified theories is—other things being 
equal—the most falsifiable, and therefore the least probable. Now Popper’s attitude to 
methodological prescriptions underwent a transition from an early conventionalism to a 
later—albeit unsuccessful—historical meta-empiricism. Even success for the Popperian 
historiographical programme could only show that past science conforms to Popperian 
standards; we are still in the dark as to whether that past science came up with any truths. 
Thus the process of taking one’s rationality from a revisable identification of good science 
might be internally coherent and non-circular, but ‘the price of this strategy is abandoning 
all vestiges of scientific realism.’ (Papineau [1989], p.436) Turning to Lakatos’ vision of 
metamethodology, Papineau argues that it too is prey to the central objection: anti-realism of 
method.
First note that each methodology picks out a package of allowed methods or inferential 
moves. According to MHRP, each methodology will make its own distinction between: (i) 
episodes in the history of science in which theory-change outcomes were the product of 
external forces (inferential moves that are not contained in its package); (ii) those that were 
governed only by the ‘rational’ processes that can be broken down into ‘allowed’ moves. 
The methodology that ‘rationalises’ the greatest proportion of previous ‘successful’ science 
in this way is therefore the one to choose. If we do assimilate rationality to rationality- 
according-to-the-progressive-methodology, we must be equating rationality with the 
methods used by scientists during ‘internal’ episodes in the history of science. This is to 
assume that scientists are ‘rational’, except when social, political or economic circumstance 
perturbs the process. Lakatos must therefore be assuming that rationality is what minds 
exhibit when left to themselves:
It’s not just any human beings whose intellectual inclinations are self-justifying. Some humans will 
have their thinking distorted by ideology, or politics, or perhaps by simple shortage of time and 
resources. So to identify the ideal rational standards for human beings we need to turn away from such
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cases of external distortion, and look at how humans think when they are free of such handicaps. It is 
the pattern of thought displayed by the human mind when it is free from external influences that is 
constitutive of rationality. (Papineau [1989], pp.438-9)
Now remember that Papineau understands ‘rationality’ to be the choice of belief-forming 
processes that reliably conduce to truth. We can therefore ask whether the methodology 
chosen under MHRP will produce beliefs that are ‘rational’ in this sense. In other words, 
would following it be a reliable source of beliefs that correspond to reality? Of course there 
is no such guarantee, and so
Lakatos’s proposed strategy for evaluating methodologies makes little sense from a realist viewpoint. 
But if we reject any concern with truth, and look at things from an explicitly anti-realist perspective, 
then it seems perfectly cogent. ([1989], p.439)
Divorced from truth this way, methodologies that are approved by MHRP will still be 
subject to the relativist challenge that follows from (1) to (4).
1.6 . MSRP N a tu ra lis e d
From an early stage in his development of a distinctive methodology, Lakatos deployed 
historiographical arguments in his debates with Feyerabend, Kuhn and Popper. In his 
[1971a], he proposed a metamethodological framework in which the argumentative 
strategies that he had hitherto used implicitly were provided with an explicit motivation. 
Now Papineau criticised Lakatos for turning to the intuitive judgements of a rational 
scientific elite for the foundation of his view of scientific objectivity. In what follows, I will 
give an account of Lakatos’ theory that will attempt to show how it can be made consistent 
with Papineau’s key requirement that methodology be amenable to realist construal.
Is naturalised epistemology in a better position than Cartesianism? For Papineau, a belief 
was justified just in case it was the product of a reliable belief-forming process. Such a 
process will be rdiable if it typically arranges that the occurrence of a belief is brought 
about by its being true. It is not important whether some of the processes that place beliefs 
in scientific heads are social; we merely have to be sure that the relevant state of affairs in 
fact did have a hand in it:
So there is a minimal demand to be made by the naturalized friend of science: the explanation of 
creditable beliefs needs to differ from those of beliefs in general at least to the extent of allowing that 
amongst the causes of those beliefs are the truth conditions of those beliefs. ([1988], p.52)
39
PRAGMATIC PROGRESS
In one sense, this is a form of empiricism, except that we claim “I know that Uranium-235 
decays with such-and-such a half-life because I arranged for my beliefs on this matter to 
become an effect of some actual episodes of Uranium-235 decay”, instead of “I know that 
Uranium-235 decays with such-and-such a half-life because I looked”. Papineau then 
argues that social constructivists fail to discredit science if they cannot show that social 
influences were in general sufficient for the acceptance of scientific theories. The causal 
challenge arises at two levels. Where large-scale political pressures have been sufficient for 
the acceptance of a theory—for instance when Lysenko dominated Soviet biology—we 
should indeed be suspicious of the theory in question. At the micro-sociological level, we 
need not worry that personal ambition, rather than a dispassionate and critical quest for 
truth, motivates scientific enquiry:
No doubt it is true that scientists are often primarily concerned to attach their names to facts, and to 
build up the scientific credibility that will enable them to do this. But consider how they go about 
doing this. A prime concern, if they are to persuade others, is to ensure that their opponents won’t be 
able to pick holes in their published claims. So scientists take care that their experiments are 
repeatable. They try to design experiments so that the move from the observed results to the desired 
theoretical conclusions depends on as few disputable auxiliary hypotheses as possible. ([1988], p.53)
At the third stage of his argument, Papineau accuses Cartesians of having to give a ‘blunt 
denial of any possibility of alternative rationalities’ (p.48), which is ‘too quick’, but in what 
sense is it possible for astrology or creadonism to be supported by reason? Papineau 
objects to the use of the term ‘irrational’ to signal that anyone who disagrees with us about 
‘rationality’ must necessarily be mad. Papineau’s intuition is that where there is 
disagreement about which beliefs are rationally acceptable, there is probably also 
disagreement as to facts, but which kind of facts?
Suppose that there are reasons for a belief in astrology or creationism. These might be 
national (that is, not obviously inconsistent): for instance, the belief that everything in the 
bible is literally true would be a good enough reason, if one believed it, for a belief in 
creationism. However, on Papineau’s [1987] account, these criteria will fail to cohere with 
other beliefs that creationists (who are also ordinary people who make everyday inferences) 
are likely to hold concerning which belief-forming processes are reliable. What kinds of 
belief are relevant here? Given true beliefs about the history of the creationist and 
astrological research programmes, their proponents could not argue that they have enjoyed 
a history of pragmatic success. It may not be irrational to side with the creationists, but a 
creationist must surely recognise the long-term historical degeneration of creationism as a 
scientific research programme, rather than as an attempt to interpret the natural world 
through biblical doctrines. Obviously there might be a disagreement over ends: a creationist 
might not see pragmatic failure—or degeneration—as a problem, and there might be
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other—value-based or theological—reasons for believing everything that is in the bible (see 
Hesse [1980]). However, if astrology and creationism are supported by ‘reason’, it is 
surely not the same kind of ‘reasoning’ as that which supports a science that has manifested 
pragmatic success, as the other two miscreants have not
In his [1982], Newton-Smith provides a closely-argued critique of relativist theses about 
reason and logic as explanatory with respect to the behaviour of others. His point is simple: 
that relativity of reason implies relativity of facts, which cannot be coherently conjoined 
with truth-as-correspondeace without an inflation of different worlds to which different 
conceptual systems correspond. Perhaps I should fill in the arguments. Relativism about 
reasoning can either be relativism about logic, or relativism about ‘reasons for thinking that 
p ' in the wider sense. The implication is immediate for relativism about logic, because for 
every valid inference there is a logical truth. Relativism about reason in general is 
formulated schematically by Newton-Smith as an assertion of the form ‘R is a reason for 
holding p to be true for ip while R is not a reason for holding p  to be true for <p' (Newton- 
Smith [1982], p.l 10). To make such an assertion interesting (i.e. to avoid triviality), the 
situations must be relevantly similar. Low-level ‘reasons’ then cannot vary, because if I 
hold R to be a reason to bdieve p, then I think there to be a truth linking R and p. Taking 
Newton-Smith’s example, litmus paper turning red is taken to be a good reason to think 
that acid is present just because it is thought to be true that add causes litmus paper to turn 
red. So it appears that relativism about reason(s) implies relativism about truth. The 
contrapositive of this condusion—that non-relativism with respect to the facts that support 
‘good reasons’ implies non-relativism with respect to those reasons—suggests an argument 
against the cultural relativity of reason and method.
In conclusion, it seems that low-level facts may impinge on such high-level debates in two 
ways. Firstly, there are the causal relations invoked by Newton-Smith that link up the facts 
whose (low-level) basis we are examining, with those that we hope to adduce in their 
support. If it is not plausible that incompatible states of affairs simultaneously obtain in this 
one world, then there must be something to choose between contradictory opinions about 
such facts. Non-relativism about facts of a different kind provides a second argument 
against relativism of reasons. These are the historical facts: the occurrence of processes (in 
some sdentific institutions) that have delivered growth in low-level truths of a certain kind 
If historical records are correct, more is known today about the workings of everyday 
objects like bridges and telephones than in earlier ages. After all, there were times—quite 
recently in the case of telephones—when such objects did not exist The existence of these 
recently acquired low-level truths then supports the thesis that science has progressed; the 
attraction of such a strategy is that low-level facts about bridges and telephones seem to be
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less subject to plausible relativist theses, being comfortably trans-cultural. Given that such 
progress has occurred, we can investigate the processes that brought it about.
Now MSRP purports to provide a retrospective explanation of the acceptance of (say) 
evolutionary theory, given its history of pragmatic success. Does this explanation link up to 
the discovery of the sort of truths outlined above? Summarised briefly, Lakatos’ proposal 
for a metamethodology is as follows: (1) Methodologies of science provide a demarcation 
between ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ procedures. (2) When applied to the history of 
science, this distinction, particular to each individual methodology, sorts episodes in the 
history of science into two kinds, corresponding to the above demarcation: those to be 
given a rational (i.e. internal or evidential) explanation; and those to be given a non-rational 
(i.e. external or socio-psychological) one. (3) We can assess a methodology as a theory of 
the history of science, by seeing how many pragmatically successful episodes in the history 
of science are saved as ‘rational’. (4) On what basis do we assess the different accounts 
given by each methodology? In other words, what metomethodology do we apply to judge 
the relationship between the methodological theory and the methodological—historical— 
data? Falsificationism as a meta-criterion would require the rejection of all methodologies:
All methodologies, all rational reconstructions can be historiographically ‘falsified’: science is rational,
but its general laws cannot be subsumed undo- the general laws of any methodology.
(Lakatos [1971a], p.l 15)
In place of falsificationism, Lakatos—perhaps unsurprisingly—proposes a methodology of 
historiographical research programmes (MHRP). (5) Leaving aside the yawning infinite 
regress which seems to open up, if we apply MHRP to each of a number of rival 
methodologies: (naive) falsificationism, inductivism, conventionalism, and of course 
MSRP, we can assess their progressive or degenerating character as historiographical 
research programmes.
So we have the Lakatos recipe for constructing a historical—and retrospective—account of 
scientific rationality within MHRP, via the process of rational reconstruction. This amounts 
to setting methodologies the task of giving an internal (scientifically rational) account of as 
much as possible of the growth of knowledge that the history of science exhibits. MHRP 
applied to MSRP yields a historiographical conjecture: The unit of growth in knowledge is 
the research programme. Some of these progress, some degenerate. Knowledge grows by 
thetriumph—perhaps after a ‘war of attrition’ ([1971a], p. 118)—of the progressive over 
the degenerating. However, MSRP also
predicts the existence of hordes of known anomalies in research programmes progressing on possibly
inconsistent foundations. ([1971a], p.l 18)
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Now to the process of deciding whether this conjecture will yield a progressive 
historiographical research programme. First, pick an episode in the history of science 
which is generally admired by scientists, in that it is thought to exemplify growth-in- 
knowledge. These judgements need not necessarily be taken on trust: the adoption of some 
particular theory might have prompted the discovery of a rash of the ‘little technological 
facts’ invoked earlier. The discovery of such facts can be recognised even by those outside 
the scientific community. Second, identify the research programme^) involved, and find 
the texts germane to it (or them). Within these texts, we should be able to pick out those 
parts which illustrate the scientific content of the programme, leaving out any irrelevant 
feelings expressed by the protagonists, descriptions of their breakfasts, and other external 
chaff. We now have the internal history, for which an MSRP-rational story can be 
constructed. If we find we are offending too many historians of science, in that we are 
unable to make a good fit between our story and the historical facts, we can either: re- 
analyse the history; revise our conjecture; or conclude that this episode does not instantiate 
‘growth in knowledge’. The third option, as Hacking [1979] rightly observes, looks much 
like ‘monster-barring’, unless we require that an appropriate—and progressive—external 
explanation be given. A well-known example of the last option is the invocation of the 
action on the minds of Soviet biologists in the 1950s of Lysenko’s imprisonment of his 
scientific opponents, to explain the dominance of the (degenerating) Lamarckian 
programme over the (progressive) Mendelian one. Independent corroboration of such 
explanations can then be sought, in the form of ‘novd’ historical facts:
Thus progress in the theory of scientific rationality is marked by discoveries of novel historical facts, 
by the reconstruction of a growing bulk of value-impregnated history as rational 
(Lakatos [1971a], p.l 18)
We can see straight away that Feyerabend’s famous charge of elitism doesn’t stick, because 
although the basic judgements of a scientific elite are taken as a starting point, they need not 
be not carried over unquestioningly into the historical account of rationality, because 
occasionally the ‘scientists’ judgement fails’. Nor do such judgements constitute the growth 
of knowledge. Firstly, we might have some antecedent notion of progress or growth in 
knowledge (see above) with which to measure the scientific community’s judgements. 
Secondly, in Lakatos’ own words, MHRP implies a ‘pluralistic system of authority’ 
([1971a], p. 121). He continues:
I disagree... both with those philosophers of science who have taken it for granted that general 
scientific standards are immutable and reason can recognise them a priori, and with those who have 
thought that the light of reason illuminates only particular cases. The methodology of historiographical 
research programmes specifies ways both for the philosopher of science to learn from the historian of 
science and vice versa. ([1971a] p.121)
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How did MSRP fare under the criticism of methodologies encoded in MHRP? It would 
surely be non-trivial for MSRP to be successful by its own lights, that is, to provide the 
hard core for a historiographical research programme that is progressive according to 
MHRP. In an otherwise relentless political and philosophical critique of the very notion of 
scientific rationality, Feyerabend [1976] endorses the progressiveness of the historical 
essays that appear in the same volume as historical studies. As sociological studies they are 
‘excellent’ (p.202), and as historical studies ‘We see at once that they are superior to earlier 
studies of the same kind’ (p.220). In his review of the same volume, Kuhn [1980] 
observes that ‘In the event these historical chapters are a considerable success, and I have 
not been altogether able to set aside the question how this could be so.’ ([1980], p.181) In 
contrast, Kuhn’s objections to MSRP's performance as historical description have the 
flavour of the a priori misgivings of a historical purist about the very notion of rational 
reconstruction: ‘As a motive for doing history that one seems to me a likely invitation to 
disaster’ (p. 182); ‘History done for the sake of philosophy is often scarcely history at all’
(p. 183). When the programme gets to work, however, Kuhn admits that historians ‘should 
not ignore’ (p.185) the findings. The historical studies inspired by MSRP are an advance 
on earlier such accounts. While they might exist in a sea of philosophical and historical 
anomalies, this—under MHRP—is the best that could be hoped for them.
I claim that Lakatos' metamethodological vision is a naturalised one. Firstly, methodologies 
are interpreted partly descriptively. Prescriptions are parasitic on the historiographical 
reconstructions. Secondly, the standards that are taken to govern the appraisal of 
methodologies are those that—it is argued—govern the growth of scientific knowledge 
itself. In MSRP, the objectivity of scientific judgements is argued for by pointing to the 
growth in knowledge that flows from such judgements. In MHRP, methodologies were 
appraised by their ability to provide rational reconstructions of historical episodes in which 
growth in knowledge occurred. The starting point and foundation is the growth of 
knowledge. Suppose that we have historical arguments showing that where MSRP has 
been followed, growth in knowledge has been achieved: MSRP must encode reliable means 
for achieving pragmatic progress as an end. So the crucial question is whether growth in 
knowledge does answer to truth. Papineau argues that it does not, and attributes his reading 
to Hacking [1979], a paper to which we will turn in the next section. Papineau’s second 
objection centres on his construal of the distinction between external and internal history. If 
‘rationality’ is assimilated to what people do when left unperturbed by ‘corrupting’ 
influences, where is the guarantee that this sort of rationality is conducive to truth? First 
identify internal episodes with episodes in which the scientific belief-outcomes were 
primarily caused by reliable (although perhaps indirect) links to the natural world, or 
MSRP-rational inferences from the products of such mechanisms. The rest are external 
episodes. On this construal, a reasonable answer to Papineau's query is that there is no
44
PRAGMATIC PROGRESS
guarantee that ‘internal’ episodes will deliver true beliefs. However, there are a posteriori 
reasons to think that this * ceteris paribus ’ rationality is conducive to truth, if previous 
episodes of unmolested science have, in fact, been productive of truths J
1.7. H acking  on  L akatos
In a review of the Lakatos’ posthumously collected papers (Lakatos [1978a] and [1978b]), 
Hacking [1979] has provided an intriguing interpretive hypothesis based on Lakatos’ 
philosophical background. On the strength of this reading, Hacking attributes to Lakatos an 
implicit philosophical agenda that suggests a particular interpretation of his methodology 
and metamethodology. Now Hacking’s criticisms of MSRP and MHRP (revised and 
repeated in his [1983], chapter 8) depend crudaUy on this attribution, which has been 
influential: the review has been dted with approval by Papineau, Fine [1986], Leplin 
[1984b], and Giere [1988]. I will argue that Hacking’s is not the only possible reading of 
Lakatos, and that Lakatos’ methodology and metamethodology might find a home in an 
altogether different project I will therefore begin by examining Hacking’s exegesis.
Hacking’s chapter on MSRP in his [1983] is entitled “A surrogate for truth”. His central 
thesis is that Lakatos’ education within the Hungarian ‘Hegelian and Marxist’ (p. 112) 
tradition lead him to ‘take for granted the post-Kantian, Hegelian, demolition’ (p.l 12-3) of 
correspondence theories of truth. He was, however, keen on the objectivity of science. 
Now Putnam has followed a ‘simple Piercean’ course that attempts to secure objectivity for 
science by invoking a universal scientific method, so that everyone will eventually agree to 
accept its products. This consensual vision is ihersforeforward looking. Lakatos, in 
contrast, embarked on a more radical programme that denied a forward-looking rationality. 
He did not redefine truth to be ‘whatever it is rational to believe’, because
Lakatos is no born-again pragmatist. He is down on truth, not just a particular theory of truth. He does 
not want a replacement for die correspondence theory, but a replacement for truth itself. ([1983], p.l 19)
For Lakatos, the objectivity of present knowledge can be assessed only in retrospect, by 
inspection of the growth of knowledge through history:
The one fixed point in Lakatos’s endeavour is the simple fact that knowledge does grow. Upon this he 
tries to build his philosophy without representation, starting from the fact that one can see that 
knowledge grows whatever we think about ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ ([1983], p.l 19)
7  Note: conducive to truths (plural). We have not yet discussed whether science approaches ‘the’ truth.
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A theory of reason is built up in which past episodes of growth of knowledge—where 
knowledge is identified internally to the enterprise of science—demarcate the rational from 
the irrational. But how can objective knowledge grow except by the addition of new truths 
to the known? After all, commentaries on the Talmud have grown. Therefore the account
must, if it is of worth, effect a distinction not between die rational and reasoning, and die irrational and 
unreasoning, but between those reasonings which lead to what Popper and Lakatos call objective 
knowledge and those which pursue different aims and have different intellectual trajectories.
([1983], pp.120-1)
This is where what Newton-Smith ([1981], p.99) calls the “shy Hegelian” thesis comes in. 
Lakatos made the distinction between internal and external history central to MHRP: 
external history includes the history of what people actually believed, and their—good or 
bad—reasons for those beliefs. Internal history, in contrast, only encodes the growth of 
objective knowledge:
It is to exclude anything in the subjective or personal domain. What people actually believed is 
irrelevant: it is to be a history of some sort of abstraction. It is, in short, to be a history of Hegelian 
alienated knowledge, the history of anonymous and autonomous research programmes. ([1983], p. 122)
Hacking looks back to Proofs and Refutations for an explicit example of a Hegelian gloss 
to this alienation, but there is another model in Popper’s three ‘worlds’: the physical; the 
mental (containing consciousness and, crucially, belief); and that of ideas and knowledge. 
The difference between scientific and Talmudic knowledge lies in the loci of their growth, 
but it should not be forgotten that the criterion of objectivity is internal to the enterprise.
So Lakatos sets out ‘to characterize the growth of knowledge internally by analysing 
examples of growth’ (Hacking [1983], p.124), so that both science and its objectivity 
would be safe from the cataclysms in knowledge that he thought were implied by Kuhnian 
irrational change between paradigms. What is required is a rationale for the replacement of 
research programmes, a rationale to be provided by MSRP in terms of progression and 
degeneration. Growth of knowledge replaces truth as the proper aim for rational enquiry; 
process stands in for its product. Now MSRP may be a ‘good stab’ (p. 127) at providing 
the required rationale, but Hacking has reservations. The first of these is that, like 
Feyerabend, he suspects that Lakatos’ analysis is accurately applicable only to the growth 
of knowledge during the ‘last couple of hundred years’, because it presupposes a 
hypothetico-deductive model for reasoning between theories and lower-level facts. Without 
any external connections (such as truth-as-correspondence), objectivity must be tied 
inextricably to a particular mode of reasoning. So if that mode of reasoning is shown to be 
culturally or historically bounded, the same can be inferred for the corresponding notion of 
‘objectivity’. MSRP offers only a parochial message: a description of the process by which
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objectivity is achieved within the recent ‘style of reasoning’ called hypothetico-deductivism. 
That message cannot be generalised to ‘timeless knowledge and timeless reason’ (p. 127). 
Once we observe, with Hacking, that styles of reasoning actually do change, eternal 
objectivity is lost, to be replaced by some (disembodied) species of internal consensus.
Now changes of style might be cumulative, so that the style of reasoning described by 
MSRP is a clear advance on earlier styles, and will be preserved through future changes of 
style. However, ‘these are matters which are only recently broached, and are utterly ill 
understood.’ (p. 128) We should therefore be
chary of an account of reality and objectivity 'which starts from the growth of knowledge, when the kind 
of growth described turns out to concern chiefly a particular knowledge achieved by a particular style of 
reasoning. ([1983] p. 128)
The second problem follows on from the first: ‘a style of reasoning may determine the very 
nature of the knowledge it produces’ (p. 128), by dictating (for instance) which kinds of 
sentence are even candidates for truth or falsity. Lakatos concentrates on the issues that 
have dominated recent Western science: high-level laws, their empirical consequences and 
the theoretical entities they invoke. So for Hacking, MSRP is a competent—but limited— 
attempt to ‘characterize certain objective values of Western science without an appeal to 
copy theories of truth’ (p. 128). However, we are left with no ‘external way to evaluate our 
own tradition’, but the writer is Ian Hacking, so the conclusion is ‘why should we want 
that?’ (p. 128)
So is Hacking correct to attribute an implicitly coherentist view of rationality to Lakatos? 
There are two intimately connected issues that need to be separated here: (i) whether 
Lakatos really can be read as a ‘shy Hegelian’ who nurtures a deep hostility to the 
correspondence theory of truth; (ii) whether or not this matters, i.e. whether or not a 
definition of ‘truth’ is relevant in MSRP. Addressing the first question, I think that Hacking 
mistakenly reads agnosticism as atheism. According to Hacking, Lakatos left truth-as- 
correspondence out of his account of scientific objectivity because he was hostile to it. The 
Hegelianism is crucial, then, because it motivates this hostility. Now Lakatos’ philosophy 
of science was conceived at the London School of Economics in the 1960s, although it 
was, of course, the product of many influences. Surely, then, another philosophical 
background that is relevant to Lakatos’ development was the Popperian-failibiUst matrix; 
this relevance is reflected in the number of references to Popper in Lakatos’ writings on 
science. In Popperian methodology, correspondence to external reality is tht  aspiration, and 
it is in correspondence that objectivity inheres—hence the preoccupation with the simple 
application of modus tollens:
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It is only the idea of truth which allows us to speak sensibly of mistakes and of rational criticism, and 
which makes rational discussion possible—that is to say, critical discussion in search of mistakes with 
the serious purpose of eliminating as many of these as we can, in order to get nearer to die truth. Thus 
the very idea of error—and of fallibility—involves the idea of an objective truth of which we may fall 
short. (Popper [1963], p.229)
Now Lakatos criticised Popper for many things, but among them we do not find Popper’s 
adoption of correspondence as the relation that holds between theories and world (in the 
most favourable cases). However, in a fallibilist setting, truth cannot provide a criterion for 
acceptability because it notoriously fails to be manifest: therefore in appraising theories, 
science must turn to pragmatic virtues, and agnosticism must reign as to the attainment of 
truth. The only reason for fallibilism of this sort is the gulf between the world as truth- 
maker and its appearances. Now Hacking discounts Lakatos’ playful references to Truth’, 
putting the playfulness down to Lakatos’ antipathy to the very notion. But Hacking’s 
reading renders inexplicable Lakatos’ famous [1974] plea to Popper for a “whiff of 
inductivism” that would turn a ‘game’ of science into a more serious business. If, however, 
Lakatos is read as zfaUibiUst, the plea—and the playful references to ‘Truth’—make perfect 
sense, reflecting Lakatos’ recognition that the approach of scientific knowledge to the Truth 
About the World can only be a metaphysical conjecture.
Truth-as-correspondence can be what scientific objectivity inheres in—granted the 
conjectured metaphysical principle of induction—but we must judge theories by their 
pragmatic virtues. Appraisal must therefore bc fallible:
While upholding the view that the supreme aim of science is the pursuit of truth, one must be aware 
that the path towards Truth leads through ever-improving false theories. It is therefore naive to believe 
either that one particular step is already part of the Truth or even that one is on the right path.
(Lakatos [1971b], p.175)
A note to that passage reads:
In these matters I follow Bolzano, Frege and Popper. (Lakatos [1971b], p.182)
Is the definition of truth relevant to appraisal MSRP? Not as Lakatos formulated it. Hacking 
accurately points out that the grounding for rationality in MSRP is the growth of 
knowledge, and that ‘knowledge’ is a primitive. MSRP describes the means by which such 
growth is achieved. Now Hacking assimilates ‘growth in knowledge* to the growth of 
disembodied ‘third world’ knowledge, and cuts this growth off from its ‘first world’ by­
products. This, however, is unjustified. The Hegelian tag is a red herring because it 
purports to motivate Lakatos’ silence on the issue of correspondence between theories and 
external reality, and thereby obscures the main advantage of Lakatos’ pragmatic account of
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objectivity over the Putnam-Pierce version: that it does not adopt an account of truth-as- 
coherence or truth-by-consensus. In MSRP, it seems, truth does not appear in the story— 
quite reasonably, given the fallibilist setting—and is therefore not antecedently defined; in 
one sense, any definition of truth can be adopted. But one theory of truth motivates the 
whole fallibilist enterprise: truth as correspondence. This points to a reply to the main 
charge against MSRP: its historical specificity. Hacking’s version of how objectivity is 
obtained in MSRP is perceptive, but the account of objectivity is mistakenly read as a 
definition. It should instead be read as an objective acceptability criterion, or as a story 
about how scientific judgements are judged to be objective, a story that is told within the 
hypothefico-deductive style of reasoning. When challenged to give a constitutive account of 
scientific objectivity, realists are as free as ever to appeal to a (conjectured) Truth that is 
external to their particular style of reasoning. Anyway, a more homely appeal was hinted at 
in the previous section: The first world by-products of pragmatic progress are technological 
artefacts like bridges and telephones. If our reconstructions of history show that the 
knowledge that made telephones possible was uncovered in accordance with MSRP, the 
objectivity of Lakatosian progress is no more specific to one style of reasoning than are the 
myriad episodes of the correct functioning of telephones.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the final sections of this chapter have tried to provide a grounding for 
Lakatosian methodology—the growth in easily accessible technological facts—that is not 
plausibly subject to relativist challenge. MSRP provides methodological imperatives, which 
correspond to facts about correlations between means and ends. If (for instance) theory 
proliferation is a 'good thing’, this is because it is an efficient means to an end such as 
scientific progress: those scientific communities in which many incompatible theoretical 
frameworks are developed will progress fastest. Does this ensure ‘progress’? Taking the 
methodological ‘norms’ to mean standards that are—as a matter of social fact—shared by a 
community, we need some virtue of sets of theoretical assumptions by which their 
acceptance by scientists is ‘hooked up’ to scientific progress. In other words, there must be 
some property shared by the theories that are accepted by a community that explains that 
acceptance, given the criteria that are applied—rather than explicitly adhered to—by that 
community. If MSRP makes factual assertions about science and its history, it implies that 
that property is fruitfulness. But what eventually decides whether a research programmes is 
‘fruitful’? The discovery of novel facts. According to a causal theory of scientific 
knowledge, communities of scientists interact with the world: it is nature that determines the 
acceptance and rejection of research programmes. The causal interaction consists of the 
many (messy and interpreted) experiences that some scientists accumulate during their
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careers, so the ‘bottom line* for MSRP must therefore be empirical fruitfulness. Now a 
theory’s claim to (approximate) truth or reference can only begin to be assessed in the long 
term historical run of things, in the light of the structure of successor theories: how else are 
we supposed to make such a judgement? We cannot fail to be influenced by our current 
favourite theories. In many cases, this would mean that a fallibilist realist’s attitude should 
be analogous to Mao Tse Tung’s when asked about the historical significance of the French 
Revolution: It is too early to tell. But for current theories, the inference from empirical 
adequacy to approximate truth is a separate matter: scientific realism is independent of 
MSRP, and Lakatos recognised this when he made the convergence of science to Truth the 
subject of a separate, metaphysical conjecture.
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Bold explorations which have contributed greatly to the progress of geography are due to 
adventurers who were looking for the golden land—that is not a sufficient reason for 
inscribing ‘El Dorado’ on our maps of the globe. (Duhem [1914], pp.31-2)
INTRODUCTION
For as long as realists and instrumentalists have disagreed, partisans of both sides have 
pointed in argument to the actions and sayings of scientists. Realists in particular have often 
drawn comfort from the literal understanding given to theories by those who are paid to 
deploy them. The scientists’ realism, according to the realist, is not an idle commitment: a 
literal understanding of past and present theories and concepts underwrites their 
employment in the construction of new theories. New theories point out—and explain— 
new phenomena. So realism, claim the realists, is at the heart of science’s achievement of 
what Bacon identified as science’s aim: new knowledge offering new powers. How does 
this become an argument for realism? Scientific realism enters the story twice: (tacitly) 
adopted by scientists, it motivates scientific practice, while the success of the practice might 
support realism as a philosophical view of science. To fill the story in, we need to know 
what the realist view is, and an account of how a scientist who accepts it would behave 
differently from one who does not. In 2.1, below, I will set out three ways realists and 
anti-realists differ in their interpretation of science: (i) realists and anti-realists may adopt 
different semantics for scientific theories; (ii) they may apply different epistemologies 
(some realists take it that the success of a theory is ipso facto a reason to think it true, or 
referentially successful); and (iii) they may identify different aims for science as an activity 
(discovery and explanation, rather than construction and saving the phenomena).
With an eye on the three components of realism, we can see that some feature of scientific 
practice might commit practitioners to realism if it reveals realist semantics, presumes that 
some theory is true on account of its predictive success and explanatory power, or is 
appropriate only to realist aims. Now let methodological realism be the claim that some 
practices that are central to the success of science reveal realist commitments in any of these
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ways. Arguments for scientific realism from methodological realism have been presented in 
two forms: the explanationist argument due to Richard Boyd and Hilary Putnam, and the 
vindicationist version presented by R.I.G. Hughes. In 2.21 will examine the explanationist 
version which has it that only realism itself cam explain the success of the realist practices. 
The vindicationist argument eschews explanation: some realistic commitments are 
presupposed by scientific practice, and where the practice is successful, both practice and 
presupposition are justified: this argument will occupy 2.3. Central to the examination of 
these arguments are the following issues: (i) whether—and in what way—features of 
scientific theorising commit scientists to realism; (ii) whether these features contribute to 
success; (iii) whether a convincing argument for realism can be grounded in positive 
answers to (i) and (ii). In 2.41 will argue for a positive answer to (i) and (ii), but 2.2 and 
2.3 suggest a qualified no to (iii): some of those who reject realism can accept—and 
understand—the implicit recommendation in methodological realism. In 2.51 will fill out 
the argument for (i) and (ii) with some examples. In 2.6, methodological realism is applied 
to theory construction, and it is argued that the methodology of scientific research 
programmes provides an account of this activity which embodies MR. At the end of the 
chapter are two appendices that constitute a digression. The first appendix explores what 
follows if the practice-centred notion of model used in 2.6 is explicated in terms of the 
model of mathematical logic. The second appendix follows this up with an examination of 
Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism.
2 .1 . Form ulating  scien tific  Rea lism
Scientific realism is a thesis about science as an activity. Put naively, scientific realists see 
science as an activity best described as discovery and explanation—scientists discover 
entities and laws that were ‘there before’, and explain the phenomena. Anti-realists tend to 
see science as a process of construction (of theories and concepts) and of saving the 
phenomena. The realist view of science involves a number of theses, of which the 
following is a representative sample:1 (Semantics) Theoretical discourse is to be construed 
literally: uses of theoretical terms are putative references to theory-independent entities— 
whether observable or not. Literally construed, theoretical claims can be true or false 
independently of our interests and commitments. (Epistemology) Given the success of our 
best theories, we have reason to believe they are (approximately) true and referentially 
successful, not just empirically adequate. (Aims) Science aims to provide literally true
1 Here I (roughly) follow van Fraassen [1980], ch.2. The list is not meant to be independent, exhaustive or 
acceptable to all realists: I have tried to select methodologically relevant claims.
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stories about the world, to be a process of discovery and of explanation rather than one of 
construction and of saving the phenomena. The different components work together: in 
accepting a theory, we take it that it advances our scientific aims, so the realist’s acceptance 
of a theory must involve the (tentative and qualified) belief that it is true. The realist’s 
deeper commitment reflects stricter criteria of adequacy: explanatory power as well as 
empirical adequacy. Thus some realists present their deeper commitment as the result of 
inference to the best explanation. Given that we do have predictively successful explanatory 
theories, we have reasons to think them (approximately) true. In what follows I will 
explore the content of each of the components of realism by looking at the different reasons 
that have been found to reject them. The purpose in doing this is not to argue for or against 
any aspect of scientific realism, but rather to investigate what it is that a scientist is 
committed to by being a scientific realist. In later sections I will investigate the expression 
these commitments may have in scientific method.
The Semantic-Metaphysical Component
The are two parts to the realist’s construal of scientific discourse. The first is that theories 
are to be construed literally, rather in terms of any translation or analysis that fails to 
preserve logical form. The second is that, literally construed, statements in scientific 
discourse can be true or false independently of our ability to know their truth values. This 
expresses the metaphysical idea behind realism that science investigates a world that is 
independent of our knowledge, commitments and experience, and the semantic thesis that 
scientific statements are true or false by virtue of some semantic relation to this world.
There are a number of different commitments that might be involved in saying that theories 
are to be construed literally, (i) Theories genuinely make statements, they are not just (non- 
propositional) tools or instruments for making predictions or classifying the phenomena 
This rules out Duhemian conventionalism as well as those forms of instrumentalism that 
derive semantic theses from methodological theses concerning how theories are used in 
science, (ii) Theoretical statements cannot be translated without loss of content into 
statements about phenomena. This rules out the phenomenalistic reductions conceived by 
Mach, and early logical positivism, (iii) Terms in scientific theories are to be construed as 
expressions that putatively refer to theory-independent entities, rather than uses of 
contextually-defined theoretical concepts which appear in our theories only to help us 
predict phenomena in convenient ways. For instance, the theoretical assertion “the force on 
a body of mass m at distance r from the centre of the earth is ...” should be taken to imply 
that there are such things as forces that act on bodies, causing their motion (this rules out 
the law-cluster theory of meaning for theoretical terms proposed by the later Rudolf 
Carnap).
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The second part of the realist’s account of scientific discourse concerns the theory of truth. 
According to the realist, theoretical statements—literally construed—can be true or false 
independently of our ability to know their truth value: realists adopt a non-epistemic theory 
of truth for theoretical statements. This formulation is weaker than that proposed by 
Dummett [1963], who defines realism about a discourse as acceptance of the principle of 
bivalence (every statement is either true or false) for statements of that discourse. The 
bivalence formulation is probably too strong for there are reasons to reject bivalence that are 
not also arguments against realism.2 Dummett claims that the bivalence formulation 
captures the intuitive content of metaphysical realism—the existence of a mind-independent 
world—which at best has a ‘metaphorical’ meaning. Now one might quibble with this 
claim, because bivalence is a semantic thesis: it seems to express only the semantic role of 
the mind-independent world. Arguments concerning metaphysical realism have not always 
centred on semantics: sometimes (as in the theory of perception) it is the causal role of a 
mind-independent world that is at issue, which suggests that the existential commitment of 
metaphysical realism (to a mind-independent reality) could play different roles in different 
areas and should therefore be separated from its role in semantics. However, it is important 
for the weaker formulation to capture whatever the bivalence formulation does of a non- 
epistemic theory of truth. The weak formulation does do this, for it is incompatible—as it 
should be—with two key formulations of arcri-realism that have been proposed in 
opposition to the bivalence version of metaphysical realism, and is subject to the same anti- 
realist objections as the bivalence version.
Firstly, there is the pragmatism associated with Pierce and (one stage of) Putnam. The 
pragmatic theory of truth defines truth in terms of the theory that would be accepted in the 
ideal limit of scientific enquiry. Putnam’s argument against metaphysical realism envisages 
an ideal theory that satisfies all epistemic constraints: according to metaphysical realism, 
this ideal theory could be false, because truth is independent of rational acceptability, even 
rational acceptability in the ideal limit of enquiry. Putnam then presents an argument to the 
effect that it is inconceivable that this theory could be false.3 Putnam’s argument, it should
2  There are, for instance, theories of reference (like Strawson’s) according to which a statement can fail to 
have a truth value because it contains a descriptive tom, and the existential presuppositions involved in 
making an assertion involving that descriptive term are false. Also, according to one interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, if a statement ascribing a definite momentum is true, then a statement ascribing a 
particular position is neither true nor false. Yet this is not an anti-realist construal of quantum mechanics, 
for it is consistent with the existence of a mind-independent microphysical realm of which quantum 
mechanics is true (see van Fraassen [1980], p.38).
3  See Putnam [1980] and [1981]. This argument is also discussed in appendix 1.
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be noted, is directed at the possibility of the ideal theory’s being true or false, and so can be 
construed as an attack on the weak formulation of realism. The second kind of anti-realism 
relevant here is Dummett’s own anti-realism. Dummett’s anti-realism, and his arguments 
against realism, are founded on the intimate connection Dummett sees between meaning 
and use (see Dummett [1963], [1975] and [1976]). A theory of meaning must provide an 
account of the use of sentences, and therefore an account of what a competent language 
user knows when she knows how to use—i.e. understand—a. sentence. The competent 
language user could have learned how to use any particular declarative sentence only by 
learning how to apply it when certain conditions verifiably obtain. Thus the theory of 
meaning—as a theory of understanding—must explicate meaning (and truth) in terms of 
verifiability conditions. The realist, in contrast, explicates meaning in terms of truth 
conditions, where those truth conditions may outrun our ability to verify whether or not 
they obtain because they can be true or false independently of our ability to know whether 
they are true or false. Dummett argues that the realist will find it difficult to explain how 
competent language users come by the knowledge that constitutes their understanding of 
sentences, if this knowledge involves knowledge of when truth conditions obtain, and 
those truth conditions outrun our ability to verify whether or not they obtain. Note that 
Dummett’s argument—as given here—turns on the impossibility of our coming to 
understand a sentence in terms of verification-transcendent truth conditions. It therefore 
works against the weaker version of realism.
The Epistemic Component
The epistemic component of scientific realism is the thesis that theories—even where they 
invoke unobservable entities and processes—can be confirmed as true by the ordinary 
methods of science. In accepting a theory on account of its empirical success, the realist 
accepts the theory as true, and the entities it invokes as real: the realist’s acceptance of a 
theory involves the belief that the theory is true and referentially successful. This rules out 
(for instance) van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (van Fraassen [1980]), according to 
which empirical evidence can select among theories only up to empirical adequacy. Thus 
for van Fraassen, acceptance of a theory involves only the belief that it is empirically 
adequate.4 Constructive empiricism turns on a general epistemic distinction between 
observable and unobservable entities, and offers an attitude towards theories—belief in 
empirical adequacy—to replace that offered by the realist (i.e. belief)- There are, however,
4  Note that the difference between the realist and non-realist accounts of acceptance need not be construed in 
tenns of the difference between belief and acceptance. Realists and anti-realists can each formulate their 
positions in tenns of either, but will differ over the proper reach of the relevant prepositional attitude, be it 
belief or acceptance.
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ways to reject realism that do not presume an epistemologically important observable- 
unobservable distinction, or offer another general claim as to what is the correct attitude to 
successful theories. For instance Laudan [1984] and Cartwright [1983] claim (in their 
different ways) that a theory need not be true to make successful predictions. Their claims 
depend on particular analyses of the history of science (in Laudan’s case) or of the 
application of theories to particular systems (in Cartwright’s case). In addition, there are 
those, like Fine ([1984] and [1986]), who are suspicious of any general philosophical 
account of science. For Fine, the provision of either an external semantics or a particular 
epistemology for science is ‘inflationary’. In his deflationary approach to science, Fine 
refuses to say anything about either truth or the inferences involved in acceptance of a 
successful theory. If scientists say electrons exist, then they exist: end of story.
Defences of (the epistemic component of) scientific realism typically centre on the inference 
to the best explanation (sometimes also called the abductive inference). This form of 
inference is used all the time (argues the realist): providing the best explanation constitutes a 
reason to believe the assumptions that provide it Inference to the best explanation can be 
applied at different levels to provide distinct arguments for realism, (i) Firstly, it can be 
applied directly to unobservable entities: the existence of electrons as described in our best 
theories is the best explanation of the behaviour of cloud chambers, mass spectrometers 
and so on. Therefore electrons exist (ii) At a higher semantic level, we could say that the 
truth of a theory is the best explanation of its predictive success (alternatively, the theory 
itself provides this explanation, and so must be true), (iii) Thirdly, some realists would 
generalise the last argument. Consider scientific realism as a (quasi-scientific) hypothesis 
about science: the best theories we have accurately represent the ‘deep structure* of the 
world and the unobservable entities that populate it (that is, they are true and referentially 
successful). Scientific realism provides the best explanation of the power to predict 
phenomena with which science furnishes us. This power would be a miracle if the theories 
were not true or if the entities did not exist. Hacking [1983] and Cartwright [1983] have 
presented arguments for entity realism that, they claim, do not involve inference to the best 
explanation. Hacking’s version is that where scientists (appear to) use one kind of entity to 
investigate the properties of another, the relevant experimental set-ups must be able to be 
manipulated reliably, and so there must be some set of entities that have stable causal 
properties that underwrite the scientists’ ability to manipulate. Cartwright (for a number of 
reasons) rejects inference to the best explanation in general, but accepts such inferences 
where a causal explanation is given. Thus she presents inference to the most probable cause 
as the inference that underlies the argument for entity realism: the stable dispositions of 
electrons cause the phenomena that are cited in evidence for their existence. If electrons are 
the most probable cause of the phenomena, electrons must exist.
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Objections to these arguments have been various, (i) Some (e.g. van Fraassen [1980], 
[1985] and [1989]) criticise inference to the best explanation generally, where the best 
explanation in question ‘trades in unobservables’. First note that theories are 
underdetermined by evidence: different incompatible theories can make the same 
predictions. Where one is empirically adequate, so will be its empirical equivalents. The 
realist will reply that not all theories explain the phenomena they predict The non-realist 
replies that what counts as an explanation reflects our interests: why is it that what we think 
is the best explanation must be true? Secondly, we choose the best explanation from a 
historically restricted pool of theories: we have no reason to think that the true theory must 
be among them, (ii) In his [1984], Laudan attacks the second-level argument: the realist 
does not provide a good explanation of predictive success. There have been many past 
theories, successful in their time, that we now know to be either false or referentially 
unsuccessful (the phlogiston theory of combustion and the caloric theory of heat are among 
Laudan’s examples). Conversely, there have been (approximately) true and referentially 
successful theories that have failed to be predictively successful. Thus the implication 
between truth and referential success (on the one hand) and predictive success (on the 
other) holds in neither direction. Neither truth nor referential success explain a theory’s 
predictive success. Cartwright limits her critique of realism to truth, for she accepts that 
referential success can (on occasion) explain predictive success. Analysing the application 
of theories within physical models, Cartwright ([1983], pp.44-73) notes that the truth of a 
theory is not a good explanation of its use in the construction of successful models, for 
models are piecemeal affairs that seldom satisfy the equations of the theories that 
(ostensibly) are applied through them, (iii) Replying to the ‘no miracles’ argument (at level 
(iii), last paragraph), van Fraassen argues that in the predictive success of science 
generally, there is no miracle to explain: our best theories are successful because we 
systematically reject those that are not. Finally, the realist arguments at the higher levels 
have been held to be circular if intended as defences—against non-realist critiques of 
inference to the best explanation—of the ground-level argument: the higher level arguments 
use the same form of inference, and will therefore fail to impress the non-realist. Whether 
the (causal) arguments for entity realism are subject to the same kinds of objection depends 
on how far inference to the most probable cause can be distinguished from inference to the 
best explanation.
It should be noted here that according to the formulations given above, the epistemic and 
semantic components of realism are independent. There are those, like Putnam, who have 
accepted the epistemic component while rejecting metaphysical realism (in its bivalence 
guise). Indeed Putnam rejects metaphysical realism precisely because he seeks to defend 
the epistemic component of realism (which he calls just ‘scientific realism’). On the other 
hand there are those, like van Fraassen, who accept that theories can be true or false
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independently of our ability to know their truth values, but deny our ability to know 
anything more than that a theory is empirically adequate. There is, however, a sense in 
which the issue of whether theories can be confirmed as true arises in an interesting way 
only i/a non-epistemic theory of truth is agreed upon: certainly van Fraassen’s critique of 
the epistemic component seems to presuppose one. Putnam’s acceptance of the epistemic 
component is rendered Pickwickian, perhaps, by its identification of truth with rational 
acceptability in the ideal limit of enquiry.
The Aspirational Component
In discussing science as an activity, we have not yet addressed its aims. This is not to seek 
an account of the motives of individual scientists, but rather to ask what counts as success 
in science.5 According to the realist, science aims to discover (entities and processes) and to 
explain (the phenomena), rather than to construct and to predict. Realists see constraints on 
theory acceptance—such as explanatory power—as central to the achievement of the aims 
of science, where the non-realist—for whom the aim of science is the construction of 
empirically adequate theories—interprets explanatory power as a pragmatic (non-evidential) 
element of theory choice. This component of realism is required to distinguish between 
constructive empiricists (like van Fraassen) from critical or fallibilist realists such as Popper 
(or, perhaps, Lakatos). Popper and van Fraassen both reject the epistemological component 
of realism, although Popper’s reasons for rejecting it are broader than are van Fraassen’s. 
Popper’s rejection of epistemological realism rests on his general stance on ampliative 
inferences,6 while van Fraassen distinguishes between ampliative inferences that involve 
unobservables and those that do not ([1980], pp. 19-20). Popper, however, accepts the 
aspirational component, while van Fraassen rejects it Popper adopts aspirational realism as 
a kind of categorical epistemological imperative that motivates the methods of science. For 
van Fraassen, the methods presumably determine the aims: we should trim the latter to suit 
what can be achieved with the former.
2.2 . THE EXPLANATIONIST ARGUMENT
In his middle period, Putnam often adduced scientific practice in his arguments against 
positivist philosophy of science. In ‘Explanation and Reference’, for instance, he charged 
that positivist analyses of meaning fail to do justice to scientific usage of either theoretical
5  In van Fraassen’s example, the aim of chess is to checkmate one’s opponent, while individual chess 
players may seek fame or fortune.
6  See Popper [1956] and [1983], pp. 110-11 and 131-46.
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terms or the theories in which they are embedded. To understand science, claimed Putnam, 
we need realist semantics and a realist account of theory acceptance.
To take one of Putnam’s examples,7 it is common to conjoin accepted theories and look to 
their joint consequences for novel predictions. The realist—for whom acceptance means 
acceptance-as-true—finds this easy to rationalise: if T\ and I 2 are true, then so must be T\ 
& 7 2 - For the non-realist, however, acceptance means only acceptance-as-empirically- 
adequate, and it is less than obvious that the empirical adequacy of T\ and T2 separately 
must imply the empirical adequacy of T\ & T% indeed, T\ and T2 might be inconsistent, 
and therefore trivially empirically inadequate. So the pooling of explanatory and predictive 
power—central to the very cumulativity of science—seems inexplicable on any non-realist 
account of acceptance. Putnam’s other examples continue in similar vein: in a good theory, 
scientists seek the realist’s theoretical plausibility rather than the positivist’s simplicity; 
auxiliary hypotheses are not the minor premises in deductions o f observational 
consequences, but rather further facts to be filled in, so the aim of research must be fact­
finding rather than theory-testing.
So where are these examples leading? In ‘Explanation and Reference’, Putnam is content to 
show that the positivists failed to do justice to scientific practice, but in The Meaning of 
“Meaning”’, there is the outline of a positive argument for realism:
It is beyond question that scientists use terms as if the associated criteria were not necessary and 
sufficient conditions, but rather approximately correct characterizations of some world of theory- 
independent entities, and that they talk as if later theories in a mature science were, in general, better 
descriptions of the same entities that earlier theories referred to. In my opinion the hypothesis that this 
is right is the only hypothesis that can account for the communicability of scientific results, the 
closure of acceptable theories under first-order logic, and many other features of the scientific method. 
([1975], p. 155)
The force of the argument has to be in the centrality of the realist features of practice to the 
success of science, whether in communication or prediction: otherwise the realist 
practices—and the semantics—might only be so much decorative embroidery on the 
tapestry of science. In Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Putnam fills out the argument (but 
famously re-interprets it), avowedly following Boyd in the details.
7 See Putnam [1973], pp.210-11.
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Boyd’s defence of realism is set within a naturalistic epistemology that provides a detailed 
mechanism by which realist methods contribute to the success of science.8 First define the 
instrumental reliability of a method in terms of the instrumental reliability of theories:
Call a theory instrumentally reliable if it makes approximately true predictions about observable 
phenomena. Call a methodology instrumentally reliable if it is a reliable guide to the acceptance of 
theories which are themselves instrumentally reliable. (Boyd [1985], p.4)
Boyd’s explanationist strategy is as follows: (i) Identify a reliable methodological principle 
or strategy of theory construction, and show that the principle can be rationalised only 
given realist inferences and a realist construal of theories, (ii) Show that the employment of 
that principle ‘contributes to the likelihood that accepted theories will be good predictors of 
the behaviour of observables’ ([1973], p.9). (iii) Claim that realism provides the only 
plausible explanation for the reliability of that principle.9 Boyd’s various examples of realist 
methods—united under a theme of the unity of science—arise in all areas of scientific 
practice: construction of theories, design of experiments, and assessments of the degree to 
which a given body of evidence supports a theory.
Theory, Evidence and Non-experimental Criteria: Phenomena can evidentially support a 
theory only if explained by it, but explanatory power is appraised by comparing the 
structure of a theory with previously accepted theories. For instance, a theory only explains 
a phenomenon if it accounts for that phenomenon by postulating a process that is relevantly 
similar to processes that are postulated by previously accepted theories (eschewing 
universal forces, for example: see Boyd [1973], pp.7-9). So considerations of explanatory 
power, based on intertheoretic plausibility considerations, count as evidential. On the realist 
view, it is easy to see why this should be so: only theories that are plausible in the light o f 
background theoretical knowledge should be constructed and considered as candidates for 
confirmation by experimental evidence. This radically reduces the infinite pool that are 
consistent with any finite body of evidence. Anti-realists see explanatory power as a (non- 
evidential) pragmatic consideration, but how could pragmatic considerations contribute to 
the instrumental reliability of our standards of theory choice? If they do do so, empiricist 
claims that theories are underdetermined by evidence must be false.10
8 See Boyd [1973], [1981], [1984] and [1985].
9 The procedure in (i) and (ii) might be the same: realism motivates a method by showing that it is likely 
to produce success, while on at least one view of explanation to show that success is to be expected is to 
explain it.
10 The evidential underdetermination thesis is formulated by Boyd as the claim that evidence for a theory is 
evidence of equal force for its empirical equivalents ([1973], p.2).
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Experimental Design: Typically, theories are tested under experimental conditions in which 
they are most likely to fail, if they are false. These conditions are identified by comparing 
the causal structure of the theory under test with other theories that postulate (theoretically) 
relevant processes: we would not consider a theory to have been tested were there another 
theory that provides an alternative explanation of a successful outcome for the theory under 
test. (See Boyd [1973], pp.10-1 1 for a detailed example.)
Cumulativity and Retention: Commitments which hang over from our previous acceptance 
of now-refuted theories constrain theory construction: we consider only that ‘small 
handful* of theories which (partially) preserve the ontology and mechanisms of previous 
theories. This would not make sense unless we regarded the success of the old theories as 
indicators of their successful reference and their approximate truth. (See Putnam [1978], 
p.21 and Boyd [1981], p.619).
Reference and Univocality: Realists take it that the theoretical terms of successful theories 
refer to theory-independent entities. Thus where two theories invoke (say) atoms, it makes 
perfect sense to apply the claims made by one theory about atoms to the atoms invoked by 
the other theory. This would mean, for instance, that it is unacceptable for the two theories 
to make incompatible claims about atoms, even where they cover different domains. Again, 
the realist view—that success indicates successful reference—motivates the strategy and 
explains its success (See Boyd [1981], sec. 2.4). On an anti-realist view, in contrast, 
theoretical entities are but players in empirically adequate yet fictional stories. Assuming 
univocality on this view would be as much of a mistake as worrying that a character plays 
the violin in one novel, while in another—unrelated—work of fiction, someone with the 
same name is tone deaf.
In his [1984], Boyd challenges the chief anti-realist traditions—empiricism and (social) 
constructivism—to explain the instrumental reliability of the above methods. Take 
empiricism first: non-experimental criteria of theory acceptance like unity, simplicity and 
explanatory power are non-evidential according to the empiricist, and could not contribute 
to a theory’s future fulfilment of evidential criteria of theory acceptance such as logical 
consistency and empirical adequacy. The fact that ‘pragmatic’ considerations do so 
contribute is inexplicable to the empiricist. Now the theory-dependence of appraisal criteria 
has long been recognised in the constructivist tradition. It is no surprise to the constructivist 
if our best theories fit ‘reality’: the theory-dependent methods are construed as procedures 
for the social construction of reality. The problem for the constructivist account of method 
is the manifest reliability of the technological products of scientific advance:
It is ... evident that theory dependent technological progress (the most striking example of the
instrumental reliability of scientific methods as well as theories) cannot be explained by an appeal to
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social construction of reality. It cannot be that the explanation for the fact that airplanes, whose design 
rests upon enormously sophisticated theory, do not often crash is that the paradigm defines die concept 
of an airplane in terms of crash resistance. (Boyd [1984], p.60)
Realism, in contrast, can both motivate the methods and explain their instrumental 
reliability. According to the realist, background theories suffuse the very methods of 
science. If such ‘collateral’ theories are (approximately) true, it is easy to see how they 
contribute to the likelihood that new theories—constructed and appraised in line with the 
methods—will be approximately true, and therefore instrumentally reliable. The planes we 
make reliably fly because they have been designed with the help of reliable theories. We 
have reliable theories because we appraise theories in the light of criteria of appraisal that, 
although theory dependent, are reliable. Our criteria of appraisal are reliable because we 
have background theoretical knowledge.
Do the premises of the explanationist methodological argument, even if true, allow us to 
infer the conclusions intended by their authors? Among the premises were two claims: (i) 
that realism is embodied in scientific practices; (ii) that these practices have met with 
instrumental success. Realism is then inferred as the best explanatory (meta-)thesis. 
Opponents of realism object to this argument at every possible juncture. Firstly, one can 
dispute whether realist strategies of theory construction like ontological conservatism 
(Laudan [1984], pp.235-9) or selection for unity and explanation (Cartwright [1983], 
pp.44-53) generally are followed, and where followed, whether they have typically issued 
in success. In effect, one might doubt whether the ‘reliability’ of realist methods requires 
explanation (I will return to these issues in 2.5). Secondly, one might provide a motivation 
for supposedly ‘realist’ methodological principles that appeals only to empirical adequacy 
as aim and epistemic attitude. These first two objections attack the premise- 
methodological realism—directly.11 One might, however, admit the realist motives but 
attack the explanation (as van Fraassen has also done), supplying an alternative explanation 
of the success of the realist methods.12 Lastly, one can object to the very structure of the 
argument: an inference to scientific realism as the best explanation of methodological 
realism.
The structural objection runs as follows: realists present theories—literally construed—as 
the best explanations of the phenomena they explain. Anti-realists object to inferences-to- 
the-best-explanation where the best explanation in question ‘traffics in unobservables’ (as
11 See for instance Fine on the ‘small handful’ strategy ([1984], pp.87-9), and van Fraassen on the 
conjunction argument ([1980], pp.83-7). See also 2.5, below.
12 See van Fraassen [1980], pp.93-4 and 2.3, below.
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Lipton [1991] has put it), for the following reasons. Explanations that traffic in 
unobservables are underdetermined by empirical evidence. In making an inference to the 
best explanation, we must choose the best explanation from among a necessarily restricted 
but historically contingent pool of theories: those that happen to have been constructed. The 
point is that there will always be further explanatory theories that we have not considered.
If providing a good explanation were to provide a reason to believe, we would need (i) a 
reason to think that the correct explanation must be among those that have been proposed,13 
and (ii) a reason to think that what we count as the best explanation is the likeliest to be 
true. We have neither. If the anti-realist objection to realism rests on the evidential 
underdetermination thesis, it is easy to see why anti-realists fail to be impressed with the 
classic defence of realism in which the truth (or successful reference) of a theory is 
presented as the best explanation of its predictive success. The best explanation again 
‘traffics in unobservables’—this time the (approximate) truth of a theory’s claims about 
unobservable entities and processes—and is as subject to underdetermination as its ground- 
level counterpart. 14 The explanationist methodological argument has the same objectionable 
inference at its heart, arguing as it does to realism as the best explanation of the reliability of 
realist methods, and so it need not trouble the anti-realist who rejects inference to the best 
explanation.15 Compare the realist explanatory claims at different levels:
Level O'. The best explanation of the behaviour of cloud chambers is provided by the
existence of electrons as described in our best theories.
Level 1: The best explanation of the success of our predictions of the behaviour of cloud
chambers is provided by the (i) successful reference to real entities and (ii) 
approximate truth of our best theories about electrons.
Level M: Aspirational version: The best explanation of our successful use, in learning 
how to manipulate the world to our advantage, of methods that are appropriate 
to discovering truths about real entities is provided by the (i) successful 
reference and (ii) approximate truth of our best theories.
Semantic-epistemic version: The best explanation of the reliability of methods 
that presume our best theories to be referentially successful and approximately 
true is provided by the (i) successful reference and (ii) approximate truth of our 
best theories.
13 *We can watch no contest of the theories we have so painfully snuggled to formulate, with those no one 
has proposed. ’ van Fraassen [1989], p. 143.
14 Even supposing that the truth of a theory can explain anything.
15 See Fine [1984]: Laudan ([1984], pp.242-3) puts the same argument in trenchant style, although 
Laudan *s reasons for rejecting inference to the best explanation do not turn on underdetermination (see 2.1).
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Anti-realists deny that a claim about explanation like that at level 0—even if accepted— 
could launch an inference to the existence of electrons. The arguments at levels 1 and M are 
of the same foim, and will not convince there, either: they are parasitic on the argument at 
level 0. Evidently the main issue is not the methodological claim, but the argument’s central 
inference. No matter how good our evidence for methodological realism, we cannot launch 
an argument for realism that would convince anti-realists from this pad.16 If this sounds 
like acquittal on a technicality, I think there is a substantive point here: to the anti-realist— 
convinced of the underdetermination thesis—it is axiomatic that the world would look just 
the same if all our presently-accepted theories and background assumptions were false, and 
some other—empirically adequate, yet perhaps unborn—set true. This includes the history 
of advances in science, and the application of theory-dependent methods in the achievement 
of those advances. Thus the anti-realist could just re-apply the underdetermination thesis to 
the realist’s explanation at the methodological level.17
2 .3 . THE VINDICATIONIST ARGUMENT
In ‘The Bohr Atom, Models and Realism’, R.I.G. Hughes presents a methodological 
argument for scientific realism that replaces the inference to the best explanation with a 
direct vindication. Central to Hughes’ argument is the use of physical models in probing 
the content of theories: he makes a distinction between ‘surface’ models, which merely 
‘map...the phenomenal terrain’ ([1990], p.74) and those that (in Hughes’ analogy) are 
more like subway maps for those without a ticket, positing unseen underground 
connections between isolated surface phenomena. A historical example of this distinction is 
then given: Kepler’s ‘purely kinematic’ (p.74) model of planetary motions, contrasted with 
Newton’s dynamical model.18 Now surface models are comparatively rare and less
16 Such arguments could appeal only to those who already entertain realist intuitions. Now Lipton ([1991], 
chapter 9) sees some value in arguments that have this property: convinced realists might justifiably use 
such arguments to preach to those who accept the premises and rules of inference. This is a sad end for an 
argument of high ambition.
17 If the realist objects that the evidential underdetermination diesis has been refuted by Boyd, the anti­
realist could point out that Boyd’s argument showed only how pragmatic considerations dissolve die 
practical underdetermination ‘problem’. Boyd’s argument that these considerations are truly evidential rather 
than merely pragmatic employed something like the inference to the best explanation at level M. That, of 
course, begs the question at issue here.
18 This contrast is open to a historical objection: Kepler cfid embed his model in a wider cosmological 
framework (see Kuhn [1957], pp.209-19). Nor was his model kinematic in the technical sense: his second
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successful, which indicates to Hughes that the enhanced explanatory and predictive power 
enjoyed by the Newtonian (compared to the Keplerian) model arises from its embedding 
within a wider dynamical theory that is interpreted realistically.
In keeping with his paper’s title, Hughes’ central example is the development by Bohr of 
the atomic model that bore his name. Bohr constructed his atomic model within a generally 
classical framework, his chief explanatory problem being a theoretical one: how could a 
‘sun and planet’ picture of the atom like Rutherford’s be stable with respect to mechanical 
disturbance? Bohr was able to explain this, but at the expense of assuming ad hoc that only 
a countable infinity of orbits around the nucleus were available to an electron: in classical 
mechanics there is no reason why a continuum of allowed trajectories should not be 
possible. From the start, Bohr used his rhodel to construct qualitative explanations and 
predictions covering a wide range of physical and chemical phenomena. Unfortunately, the 
quantitative versions of these theories turned out to be unforthcoming (the calculations were 
too difficult or problematic) or else empirically inadequate. However, at an advanced stage 
in the writing of his 1913 papers, Bohr added a new feature to the theory: a mechanism for 
the emission of radiation, and therefore an account of atomic spectra (as late as January 
1913, Bohr explicitly excluded such a development). When Bohr performed the relevant 
calculations for the hydrogen atom, he was able to predict the gross structure of the 
absorption spectrum for atomic hydrogen—including several previously unobserved series 
of spectral lines—and the Rydberg constant for hydrogen Rh to within 7% of its empirical 
value.
Hughes makes much of the fact that it was predictions that were unforeseen at the time of 
the model’s construction that were—famously—corroborated. Now Bohr would not, 
perhaps, have so eagerly extended the explanatory domain of his model from the intended 
problem area (atomic stability) to include unrelated phenomena (spectroscopy), had there 
not been the possibility that it captured some aspect of reality. However, it would have 
been entirely reasonable to expect such a model—realistically interpreted— to furnish 
explanations of apparently unrelated phenomena that were, at the time, thought to be atomic 
in origin.
Now Hughes rejects the traditional argument from the empirical success of a model to the 
existence of the entities appearing therein: such an argument must appeal to an inference of 
the form ‘same phenomenal structure, therefore same internal structure’. This would be 
unjustifiable given that two entities with different internal structures may exhibit the same
law was derived by considering the action on the planets of a driving force originating in the sun. Perhaps 
these aspects are ignored because only the surface of his model lived on as an advance.
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behaviour: To take an obvious example, behind the same software can lurk many different 
kinds of hardware.’ (Hughes [1990], note 26) A conclusion that can be drawn, he claims, 
is the existence of the subject of the model—the atom—rather than its purported 
constituents (the electrons and nuclei). The argument runs as follows: the practice of 
model-building presupposes the existence of its subject Model-building is sometimes a 
successful scientific endeavour. Where successful, model-building is vindicated. The 
building of Bohr’s model was successful, and was therefore vindicated. So, therefore, is 
the assumption on which this activity is predicated: to wit, (in this case) the existence of 
atoms. Hughes eschews the explanationist argument, preferring what I have called the 
vindicationist variant
I am proposing a simple criterion of justification, applicable in all spheres of practical reason. If by 
adopting a certain practice we are led to success, then in this case the practice is justified. If not, not. 
([1990], p.81)
Now we see why the existence of the constituents is not inferred: the activity of model- 
building does not presuppose that.
The practice we are looking for is that of building a constitutive model. It involves two things: (1) 
assuming that an entity exists; (2) modelling its behavior in a particular way. If the model is 
successful, then both elements of the practice have been justified. The justification extends no further 
than die actions described. ([1990], p.81)
He concludes that
what has been justified is precisely the assumption that a particular kind of entity, exhibiting a certain 
kind of behavior, exists. ([1990], p.81)
Now the strength of the realist thesis that would be justified by this argument is unclear. 
There are two possible readings of the phrase ‘exhibiting a certain kind of behavior*: the 
weak reading makes the conclusion uncontroversial (but not an especially realist one), but 
on the strong reading it is obviously false. Hughes baulked at the inference to a realist 
thesis about the inner structure of a model from its external—observable—structure. 
Perhaps what has been justified, then, is the existence of something that exhibits the 
observable behaviour of the model. The weak version is this: let us infer that something 
exists and call it ‘atoms’, where ‘atoms’ invokes only the regularities that realists cite as 
evidence for the existence of something behind the phenomena.19 Thus Hughes quotes 
Suppe:
19 In toms of the semantic view of theories, the weak view of what is justified is that part of reality is
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A theory has as its intended scope a natural kind of class of phenomenal systems.... In propounding a 
theory, one commits oneself to the existence of the phenomenal systems within the theory’s scope. 
(Suppe, quoted in Hughes [1990], note 28)
Would this commitment be peculiar to the realist? Surely not: the conclusion would be 
banal, because knowledge that ‘atoms’ existed would not imply our possession of any 
knowledge that could be subject to empiricist objections. For to say that the empirical sub­
model of the model of a theory has a counterpart in reality is just to say that the theory is 
empirically adequate. Hughes stresses the realist credentials of his conclusion, indicating a 
stronger reading:
Simply put,... the assumptions at work in Bohr’s theory, and justified by its success, are that atoms 
exist, that they are stable, that those of a given dement are uniform in size, etc.—and that only an 
anti-realist axe-grinder would describe matters otherwise. ([1990], p.81)
Now there is no evidence that Bohr himself saw any distinction between the non-essential 
(internal) structure of his model, and the existential assumptions that were presupposed by 
its very construction. Nor do we have any reason to think that the facts about atoms— 
stability, uniformity of size—that have been established to Hughes* satisfaction were 
presupposed by Bohr’s model constructing. Maybe what Bohr presupposed was that atoms 
under his theoretical description existed, but it has been clear for some time that no set of 
real entities do have all the required properties.20 These, however, are relatively minor 
matters, for there is a more serious problem: whatever its strength, the conclusion cannot 
follow from the premises of the argument, for it trades on a conflation.
The conflation concerns two notions of justification. Hughes’ ‘simple criterion of 
justification’ acts in the field of practical reason, and justifies a practice—in this case the 
building of models and using them realistically—as efficient means to some such desirable 
end as instrumental success. This criterion is eminently reasonable: we are surely justified 
in pursuing our ends via means that have previously satisfied those aims. In the argument, 
however, the justification is transferred to the realistic presuppositions of the practice, and 
read as epistemic justification. Even supposing the transfer to be possible—that having a 
belief or making a presupposition is the kind of thing that can be vindicated with respect to 
an aim as if it were a voluntary action—it is the wrong kind of justification. In practical
correctly described by the empirical sub-model of the successful model.
20 In contrast to the causal arguments for entity realism advanced by Hacking [1983] and Cartwright [1983], 
we are given no special feature that picks out some subset of our theoretical claims about atoms for special 
attention.
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reasoning, we judge the rationality of a practice by the degree to which it helps us to 
achieve some given aim. So the vindication has to be with respect to some desired aim.21 
That is why Hughes’ argument cannot work: when we achieve our aims by actions that 
only make sense if we have certain beliefs, it does not follow that the presuppositions are 
true.22 We could at best conclude that we had to have those beliefs in order to achieve those 
aims by those means, not that we must have those beliefs simpliciter.23
2 .4 . METHODOLOGICAL REALISM
So far, my conclusions have been predominantly negative, neither the explanationist nor the 
vindicationist attempts to fill out the methodological argument for realism straightforwardly 
support their intended conclusion. In this section, however, I will explore the common 
premise of these arguments (methodological realism, henceforth: MR), remaining neutral 
on scientific realism (henceforth: SR). MR is the claim that the adoption—by scientists—of 
realist aims, methods and inferences is (or has been) central to their construction and 
acceptance of (what turned out to be) successful theories. It is a small step from this to a 
recommendation that scientists be realists. This raises two groups of issues. Firstly, what 
is the logical relation between MR and SR? Does MR make sense as a recommendation 
outside the realist view of science?24 Secondly, there is MR itself: I noted at the end of the 
first section that some non-realist critics (Fine and Laudan, for instance) chose to attack the
21 Giere [1989] seems to offer an argument with a similar structure: he raises die issue of realism, giving a 
methodological answer (in DNA research, a realist programme yielded the greatest ‘payoff’). What is unclear 
is whether we are meant to conclude that therefore DNA exists and has the structure attributed to it by Crick 
and Watson, or just that, with hindsight, their methods yielded the greatest payoff.
22 Unless, of course, we know more about the mechanism by which the means are appropriate to the ends. 
If we knew the mechanism, and it required that the presuppositions were true, we could say that the truth of 
the presuppositions was the best explanation of our achieving our aims. That, however, is another 
argument.
23 As ever, Duhem provides an apposite quote: ‘Chimerical hopes may have incited admirable discoveries 
without those discoveries embodying the chimeras that gave birth to them. Bold explorations which have 
contributed greatly to the progress of geography are due to adventurers who were looking for the golden 
land—that is not a sufficient reason for inscribing “El Dorado” on our maps of the globe. ’ (Duhem f 1914], 
pp31-2)
24 Leplin [1986] defends a position that is similar to MR (see 2.5 below), but does not consider its logical 
relation to scientific realism.
68
REALISM AS A METHODOLOGICAL THESIS
premises of the methodological arguments (MR, that is). So is MR in fact a plausible claim 
when applied (for instance) to the history of science?
Consider first whether we can defend MR independently of a realistic view of the aims, 
methods and products of science. The problem is this: even though we have seen the failure 
of some of the arguments for SR from MR, isn’t MR in some sense incoherent given an 
anti-realist view of science? According to SR the aim of science is truth, so that success in 
science is the possession of theories that are (approximately) true. Not only that, but SR 
claims those aims to be achievable: in all probability we advance toward their fulfilment 
with every new predictively successful and explanatorily powerful theory. MR is then 
almost trivial: it recommends the adoption of methods that are appropriate to realist aims. In 
the conjunction of SR and MR, then, we have an agreeable confluence of aims and 
methods. Anti-realists, in contrast, deny that we could have good reasons to think any but 
the empirical claims our best theories make are true. Our aims should be limited to what we 
can achieve. Now MR commends methods that are appropriate to realist aims, methods that 
also presume that those realist aims can be (and in fact have been) partially achieved by 
previously successful theories. Surely it is folly to adopt methods that are reasonable only 
on the assumption that we can know what—in principle—we cannot know.
This, however, is too quick: all that the harmony between MR and SR can show is their 
consistency (or perhaps that MR is a natural consequence of SR), but the methodological 
arguments seek to establish SR on the basis of MR. To the earlier criticisms of these 
arguments I would like to add the claim that SR is in fact independent of MR. This I will 
argue for by showing that MR can be motivated within either realist or anti-realist views of 
science.25 If the consistency of MR and SR has already been established, it remains only 
for me to remove the air of paradox from the adoption of MR within an a/tfz-realist 
framework. This proves to be surprisingly easy, for in van Fraassen’s empiricist account 
of science we have a ready-made candidate.
First consider again the three realist theses set out in 2.1, concerning: (i) aims; (ii) 
semantics; and (iii) epistemic attitude. How might these theses, adopted by scientists, affect 
their practice? Realists often claim that, at the level of practice, realist aims counsel a search 
for theories that explain, rather than merely save the phenomena. The semantic and 
epistemological claims work together a realistic construal of our best theories directs our 
interest to the consequences of conjunctions of theories covering disparate domains, and 
also licenses univocality assumptions and intertheoretic plausibility considerations (see
25 In effect I will take a cue from elementary logic: if I exhibit models of (A & B) and (A & ->£), I have 
shown that B is independent of A.
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2.2). The epistemological claim rationalises the retention of (portions of) previously 
successful—but now refuted—theories in future theories.
Compare this with van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism: ‘Science aims to give us 
theories that are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that 
it is empirically adequate’ ([1980], p. 12). Now van Fraassen accepts the realist’s semantic 
claim: ‘After deciding that the language of science must be literally understood, we can still 
say that there is no need to believe good theories to be true, nor to believe ipso facto that the 
entities they postulate are real’ ([1980], pp. 11-12). So van Fraassen rejects realist theses (i) 
and (iii), but accepts (ii). Now for van Fraassen, epistemology is unlike totalitarian codes 
of law: it allows what it doesn’t specifically prohibit, and it does not prohibit what it does 
not specifically allow ([1989], pp. 171-6). The content of the realist’s belief in a theory is 
logically stronger than the constructive empiricist’s acceptance of it,26 but belief in the extra 
content is not irrational, for the contents of the two beliefs are empirically equivalent, the 
extra realist belief could not make us more vulnerable to empirical surprises, and that is 
what counts ([1985], p.255).
This covers only static (epistemic) features of acceptance, but the happy effects of realist 
commitment outlined by Boyd and Putnam concerned dynamic features of science: how 
would our previous acceptance (in van Fraassen’s sense) of a theory affect the shape of 
theories that we build and accept in future! Here van Fraassen turns to the pragmatics of 
theory acceptance: acceptance of a theory may involve not only the belief that it is 
empirically adequate, but also a commitment to a research programme, and to framing 
future explanations in its terms. Acceptance of a theory may also involve immersing 
ourselves in its world picture, letting it constrain the vocabulary and grammar of our 
theoretical discourse. Thus: ‘to some extent, adherents of a theory must talk just as if they 
believed it to be true’ ([1980], p.202). A survey of van Fraassen’s answers to particular 
realist arguments concerning scientific practice underlines this methodological 
indistinguishability of acceptance and belief.27 However, one does get the curious feeling 
that the actions of the realist are here just re-described in empiricist terms rather than 
explained or motivated—here we are talking, theorising and predicting as if we are realists, 
but with our anti-realist hearts pure. I will return to this point in 2.5.
26 In terms of the semantic view of theories: belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is just the belief 
that part of one of its models—the empirical sub-model—corresponds to part of the world.
27 See his discussion of acceptance ([1980], pp. 12-13), and of Putnam on conjunctions and Boyd on 
experimental design ([1980], chapter 4).
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In any case, a more interesting consequence of van Fraassen’s separation of evidential and 
pragmatic aspects of theory choice (and therefore of epistemology and methodology) 
allows him to endorse the realist search for explanatory theories. The problem is this: the 
history of science is littered with highly successful theories for which their creators sternly 
held out, seeking explanation, when there were extant theories that saved the phenomena. 
Answering Feyerabend’s charge that a search for empirical adequacy alone might therefore 
hinder scientific progress28—the search for explanation has ‘paid off handsomely’—van 
Fraassen argues:
Paid off handsomely, how? Paid off in new theories we have more reason to believe empirically 
adequate. But in that case even the anti-realist, when asked questions about methodology will ex 
cathedra counsel the search for explanation! We might even suggest a loyalty oath for scientists, if 
realism is so efficacious ([1980], p.93).
In effect, van Fraassen admits that if realist aims (in particular, the aim to explain) 
contribute to the possession of empirically adequate theories, then one who rejects the 
adoption of explanation as an aim in favour of empirical adequacy might nevertheless 
endorse its adoption by scientists.
The anti-realist then has a choice: faced with some successful feature of scientific practice 
whose plausibility appears to depend on acceptance of aspirational realism, she can either 
construct an alternative empiricist rationale for the practice or accept its apparent realistic 
commitment, but endorse the method as conducive to empiricist aims. But does not the 
second strategy collapse into the first? No: the force of Feyerabend’s argument was that the 
search for explanation might not be so fruitful were it not pursued as an end in itself. There 
is a parallel in ethical theory: utilitarians endorse the acceptance by others of a non­
utilitarian rule if its compliance utility is higher than that of a corresponding utilitarian 
rule.29 In both ethical and methodological cases, the possibility of such an endorsement is a 
consequence of the consequentialist’s separation of motivation and appraisal. Now van 
Fraassen accommodates only the realist motives by this mechanism, but perhaps it is
28 Feyerabend [1964] cites the impetus to developments in dynamics provided by difficulties encountered by 
the Copemican system—realistically construed—against the background of the prevailing Aristotelian 
dynamics.
29‘Thus a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should 
be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in 
so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results 
in their hands’ (Sidgwick [1877], pp.448-9).
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possible that anti-realists who reject other elements of the realist position—concerning 
semantics and patterns of commitment—might endorse their adoption in the same way.30
Take the epistemic component of realism first: the anti-realist must weigh up the positive 
and negative pragmatic consequences of scientists’ having beliefs that (according to the 
epistemic anti-realist) are unsupported by evidence. Now van Fraassen himself argues 
convincingly that anyone who accepts the thesis of the underdetermination of theories by 
evidence must accept that there could be no negative consequences (in terms of nasty 
empirical surprises) to which scientists will be subject because they believe a theory to be 
true on account of its predictive success, rather than empirically adequate. On the other 
hand, there may well be positive heuristic consequences of believing a theory to be true or, 
perhaps more accurately, there might be negative heuristic consequences associated with 
the scientist’s limiting her commitment to the empiricist’s weaker belief that the theory is 
empirically adequate: that is the force of the next section.
Turn now to the semantic component of realism: MR does seem to be consistent with some 
forms of semantic anti-realism. The consistency (or otherwise) depends on the closeness of 
the relationship that the particular anti-realist sees between meaning and use. On the one 
hand there are the logical positivists who were willing to admit that, besides cognitive 
significance, a statement might have emotive significance.31 For the positivist, the cognitive 
meaning of a theory T is given by its translation into statements concerning actual or 
possible observations. The extra-empirical ‘content’ that the metaphysically minded 
interpreter of T claims it to have could not be propositional, given the verifiability criterion 
of meaningfulness, and so must be emotive: associated feelings and images. It is perfectly 
consistent within this view (although perhaps unlikely) for the associated images to be 
suggestive in heuristically fruitful ways, and therefore for the super-empirical ‘content’ to 
play a positive role in science. In contrast, for the anti-realist who, like Dummett, gives a 
genetic account of the connection between meaning and use (that is, one in terms of 
language learning), it is difficult to see how a stable set of connotations could become 
associated with a sentence, or set of terms appearing therein, such that these connotations 
contribute to an understanding of the sentence in terms of extra-empirical truth conditions. 
Since it would be from such stable connotations that any positive heuristic consequences 
would flow, we might conclude that a Dummett-style semantic anti-realism does seem to
30 This need be no self-defeating attempt at self-deception: the appraiser can stand outside the community— 
scientists—whose beliefs are appraised on their effects. There is a parallel here with the functionalist 
explanation of religion in primitive societies (also drawn by Elkana [1981], pp.42-4).
31 See for instance Carnap [1932], section 7.
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rule out MR Thus there are forms of semantic anti-realism with which MR is consistent, 
and others with which it seems to be inconsistent.
In conclusion, both the realist and the anti-realist might accept MR’s recommendation: in 
both settings, the plausibility of MR depends crucially on claims about past and present 
scientific practice, although the appraisals will differ with respect to aims and the efficacy 
will be explained by different mechanisms. Anyone who takes discovery and explanation to 
be the aims of science will find it probable that the best way to achieve those aims is for 
them to be pursued directly. In Boyd’s account of science in particular, however, the 
plausibility of the realist view of science as a whole depends on its explanatory power with 
respect to the reliability of realist methods. The key evidence for the picture as a whole 
would be a historical record showing the successful application of Boyd’s realist methods 
in science. For the anti-realist (of whatever stripe), the plausibility of MR must depend 
more directly on a meta-induction. So have realist methods been widely adopted? Where 
adopted, have they been associated with success? In 2.51 will explore some realist 
methods, and provide a few examples of their successful application along the way. In 
chapters 3,4 and 5 1 will pursue some lengthier case studies. However, if these examples 
provide a relatively poor base for induction, one could at least claim that MR is supported 
by historical counterfactuals: had realist methods not been adopted by the creators of 
theories in some key episodes in the history of science, then some of the theories32 which 
have been the basis of great progress over the last century would never have appeared in 
the form that they did.
2 .5 . The Content o f  v eth o d o lo g ica l  Realism
In this section I will explore the content of MR: the methods that, it is argued, are open 
only to realists. In an article whose spirit is very close to the present project, Leplin [1986] 
has argued that many research efforts would have no obvious rationale if the aims of the 
researchers were those endorsed by empiricists: to test the empirical adequacy of theories. 
His examples include Millikan’s determination of electronic charge (the electron was not 
tied to any particular theory) and the investigation by contemporary astronomy of open 
versus closed models of the universe (general relativity is consistent with all current 
models). Modem particle physics is another case:
The motivating idea of the search for new particles had nothing to do with theory assessment. It was 
simply that if there really are these quarks then there ought to be combinations of them with properties
32 Such as Bohr’s atomic model (see chapter 3) and quantum mechanics (see chapter 4).
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different from those of known particles. So there was an opportunity for discovery. The purpose of the 
search was not to test or extend theory, but to learn how quarks combine. (Leplin [1986], p38)
More helpful than examples, however, is Leplin’s separation of two explananda for MR: 
the ‘realist* practices and their success. He claims explanatory power for methodological 
realism only with respect to the former, arguing that empiricist criticisms of the 
methodological arguments for realism too often ‘confuse methods with results’ (p.39). To 
see the distinction more clearly, it would be helpful to examine Leplin’s two intimately 
related types of ‘realist* activity: (i) attempts to replace sets of theories that are empirically 
adequate over disparate phenomenal domains with a unified successor; and (ii) the 
ontological conservatism of amendments to theories in the face of empirical refutation.
First note that ‘Attempts at unification pervade science.’ (p.39) Aspirations to empirical 
adequacy cannot be the motive, because the previous theories were empirically adequate.
If, however, the previous theories were true, it is obvious that a theoretical unification will 
be successful over their joint domains. So SR explains the strategy and its success. 
Problem: moderate realists admit that successful theories might only be approximately true:
Truth, but not necessarily approximate truth, is preserved undo' the operation of unification. A true 
unifying theory should be as successful or more so than the collection of theories unified. But the logic 
of approximate truth suggests that the unifying theory will, if anything, be less successful. Why 
should not the degrees to whidi the theories unified fall short of truth be additive or worse?
([1986], p.40)
This blocks the argument for SR, but the interest in unification remains to be explained:
The attribution of realist assumptions to the theoretician purports to explain not the success of the 
theory he produces but the existence of a methodological prescription to seek a unifying theory where 
our current theoretical account of a domain of phenomena is far too eclectic to be believed. 
Methodological realism appeals to truth as a goal. ([1986], p.40)
The unifying impulse is not amenable to an empiricist rationale however, for it is far from 
clear that candidate pragmatic theoretical virtues (like convenience, simplicity or economy) 
in fact do increase under unification; mathematical tractability almost certainly will not 
Another typical realist move is ontological conservatism across theory change. The 
methodological arguments for SR assume that only the approximate truth of the old theory 
can explain the empirical success of this type of response to anomaly. Unfortunately, anti­
realists point out that approximate truth doesn’t explain anything of the sort, and that the 
argument is circular if the putative conclusion is SR, because the realist first has to show 
that we can infer the old theory’s approximate truth from its predictive success. Leplin 
therefore shrinks the explanandum:
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The fact that theoreticians attack anomalies by means of natural extrapolations of successful 
ontologies, distrusting solutions involving radical changes, is evidence of their realist aims. If the 
incumbent ontology is but convenient fiction, there is no reason to expect better results from its 
extension and refinement than from revolution. ([1986], p.42)
The instrumentalist’s rationale for ontological conservatism is mathematical convenience: 
old, familiar theories yield old, familiar equations with old, familiar solutions. Leplin’s 
reply is more adamant than cogent:
The point, however, is that short of realism there is no reason to suppose outstanding problems 
tractable in terms of the incumbent ontology, however successful it may be in other areas. If a 
theoretical mechanism works as well as it does just by chance rather than in virtue of its reflecting the 
actual mechanisms responsible for predicted effects, it is simply irrational to believe in its 
extendability. Yet it is the practice of science to assume the extendability of successful mechanisms, to 
assume that outstanding problems are more likely to be solved by means of existing mechanisms than 
by means of alternatives that do not yet claim empirical success. ([1986], p.42)
Now two issues have been run together here: the discussion started with (i) theoretical 
responses to anomaly ('outstanding problems’), but then turned suddenly to (ii) the 
extension of successful theories into new areas (‘extendability’). These are better separated.
Ontological Conservatism: Leplin has given no reason why an old (refuted) theory should 
not—with empiricist blessing—be fixed with a ‘ fudge-factor’ to cover refutation. A further 
problem is that, sometimes, radical changes in ontology do occur, with great success. 
Leplin’s rationale for ontological conservatism seems to leave no room for this second kind 
of change. The first problem is at the heart of Fine’s [1984] criticism of the realist 
motivation for ontological conservatism, which he calls the ‘ small handful’ strategy. Fine 
claims that while realism fails to explain (and therefore motivate) the ‘ small handful’ 
strategy, instrumentalism succeeds in providing such a motivation. At any given time, so 
the (realist) argument goes, instead of the infinite host invoked by underdetermination 
arguments, only a small handful of possible theories are considered by scientists: those that 
are related to the most successful refuted theory in certain special ways. This is reasonable 
because the old theory was approximately true, and our attention might fruitfully be 
confined to those theories which stand in some correspondence relation or have a ‘family 
resemblance’ to it at the ontological level. If one is a realist, one can expect that the new 
theory will inherit the happy characteristic of approximate truth. The explanationist claim is 
that SR both rationalises the strategy and provides the only explanation of its success. Fine 
counters that SR doesn’t, in fact fulfil either of these claims. The explananda are three: the 
small size of the handful, the family resemblance, and the success of the strategy. On the 
first question, the realist would still be faced with an infinity of choices. On the second
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question, SR again fails, because we can’t infer the approximate truth of the old theory 
from its previous empirical success: that is as suspect as any other realist inference. 
Therefore the new theory’s success cannot be explained on the basis of its transferred 
approximate truth: for all we know there is none to transfer. Worse, even if the old theory 
was approximately true, the element of truth that it captured might not be passed on to the 
new theory, such is the logic of approximate truth. The third explanandum requires no 
explanation, because it is false: the small handful strategy too often fails.
On the first two questions, Fine claims, the methodological instrumentalist—one who 
claims that successful theories are mostly constructed with purely pragmatic virtues in 
mind—has an explanation that enjoys the virtues of the realist’s, while dispensing with the 
dubious allusion to approximate truth. Consider the ‘small handful* part constructing 
theories that conform to known empirical constraints is difficult, but we might as well 
focus on the few theories that satisfy the following pragmatic considerations. Firstly, it is 
quite reasonable to keep the highly confirmed bits of an old theory, while tacking on some 
new bits to cover any evidence that refuted it. Retention of familiar and tractable 
mathematical structures has the same rationale, which explains the family resemblance.
Thus the conservatism of the small handful strategy is easily explained given that empirical 
adequacy is the aim. If it often fails, this reflects the ‘trial and error’ nature of the exercise. 
SR, meanwhile, has ‘struck out* ([1984], p.89).
Now Fine does not distinguish between SR and MR, and some of his criticisms of the SR 
explanation of ontological conservatism need not threaten MR, as Leplin has pointed out it 
doesn’t matter whether we think that the old theory was approximately true, for what 
counts is whether the scientist thinks that it is (in some specified respect). But what of 
radical theory changes? The instrumentalist version of the ‘small handful’ strategy is shown 
to be too permissive: it indicates that the instrumentalist, like the bad builder, will opt for 
the easy, patched-together option. Thus it falls foul of Feyerabend’s objection: so much the 
worse for subsequent science if the Copemicans had been happy with one of Fine’s 
botched-together theories instead of holding out for a unified theory that was capable of 
explaining the phenomena it saved. Now one typical reply here (advanced by Duhem, for 
instance), invokes convenience: when so many patch-jobs have been carried out that the 
theory begins to be mathematically unwieldy, it might be time for radical change. That 
answer will not work for the creators of quantum mechanics: if Pauli, Heisenberg and the 
rest had acted like the instrumentalists they are often portrayed as, they should have been 
perfectly satisfied with the old quantum theory, which could be made empirically adequate 
with suitable ad hoc adjustments. Instead they waited for the long-heralded quantum 
mechanics. Nor is there any reason to think that mathematical convenience could have been 
a very important factor in their reception of the new theory: Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics
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was famously intractable, but was nevertheless hailed by Pauli—the arch-critic of the old 
quantum theory—as the long-awaited advance.
Thus there is a realist response to Fine’s instrumentalist rationale for ontological 
conservatism, but more complex methodology is required than Leplin deployed: a two- 
track methodology. Sometimes, an ontologically conservative theory change is the right 
move to make: such moves can be given both realist and instrumentalist rationales. 
However, such responses to anomaly are not always appropriate: where a series of 
conservative moves seems to have produced a regressive series of ad hoc adjustments, it is 
time for a radical change. But the choice of when to make the radical change seems to be 
governed by realist criteria of theory choice—coherence and explanatory power—for the 
instrumentalist analogues—simplicity and predictive power—will not necessarily favour 
the radical new theory, at least in the short run. So although an empirically adequate but ad 
hoc theory is better than none if there is no alternative, the instrumentalist rationale for the 
‘small handful’ strategy is too permissive.
The above reasoning is subject to a two-pronged criticism. Laudan [1984] directly 
confronts the realist’s contention that ontological conservatism is a common feature of 
theory construction: he denies that new and old theories are generally related in ways that 
are consistent with the realist rationale for retention. Cartwright, taking as her examples 
quantum-mechanical models that are actually used, urges that models—the vehicles of 
scientific achievement—rarely bear the right relations to the fundamental theories in which 
they are purportedly embedded. Theories don’t explain within models, and the success of 
the models won’t support the theories as factual claims.33 Thus the realist tells the wrong 
story about the majority of cases of model-building. If Laudan is right, ontological 
conservatism is a myth. If Cartwright is right, explanatory power is a myth (for theories) 
and coherence is a myth (for models). Two responses are possible here: either (i) get into 
an argument about the relative numbers of cases of theory-construction that fit the realist 
and non-realist templates, or (ii) limit the realist claim to the ‘commanding heights* of 
theorising. The rationale is as follows: when applying quantum mechanics to lasers, 
numerical accuracy is important: model-building will be a messy and pragmatic business. 
However, think of the contrast with the initial introduction of the same theory in 1925: 
would we really have counselled Pauli, Heisenberg and the rest to be content with the old 
quantum theory? Instead of numbers, the methodological realist turns to historical 
counteifactuals: would we have had the Newtonian synthesis, Bohr’s atom or matrix 
mechanics without stem demands for explanation?
33 Cartwright [1983], pp. 100-27.
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Extending Theories: Leplin failed to give a convincing reason why the instrumentalist 
cannot see how mathematically-tractable theories should be extended into new domains. 
Leplin correctly argues that there is no reason for the instrumentalist to expect theories to be 
successful (see the last-quoted passage), but no reason why is not the same as a reason 
why not, and the latter is what Leplin’s inappropriate use of the word ‘irrational’ implies. 
Leplin also provides no insight into what it is about a theory that makes it a promising 
candidate—to one who construes it realistically—for extension into a given area. He does 
cite metaphysical uniformity of nature assumptions, but uniformity of what? Would it be 
rational to substitute the dynamics of banana prices into the kinematics of electrons? Some 
theoretical connection is surely required between otherwise disparate phenomenal areas to 
motivate the extension of a theory associated with one into the other, at least something 
more substantial than vague ‘principles of the long-term reliability of evidence, and the 
underlying unity of nature and concordance of natural law’ (Leplin [1986], p.43). In fact 
the required connection can be identified given a realistic interpretation of the theory whose 
domain of applicability is to be extended: part of the theoretical structure of the theory to be 
extended might (for instance) invoke some process or entity that is relevant to another 
domain, given other theories in that domain; alternatively, common terms might appear in 
two theories associated with different domains, leading to a transfer of theoretical structure 
between the two domains. I will explore these possibilities below.
In 2.2, we saw Putnam and Boyd claim that certain uses of scientific theories implied their 
realistic interpretation by scientists. Putnam pointed to the communicability of scientific 
results, and the closure of scientific theories under deduction. Boyd raised the assumed 
univocality of occurrences of the same term in different theories. Are these features of 
scientific practice explicable only for the realist? How do they contribute to scientific 
progress? First consider closure under deduction: scientists, a realist might argue, would 
only be interested in the logical consequences of theories if they thought the premises— 
theories—to be true. Why would empiricists be interested in deduction rather than some 
other inference engine? After all, deduction is sound for truth, rather than empirical 
adequacy. An instrumentalist might reply that science is primarily concerned only with the 
observational consequences of theories. We might design theories that tersely summarise a 
large number of observation conditionals, but a largely fictional non-observational edifice 
might facilitate the deductions and make the theoiy simpler to use and easier to remember.
But there is a problem here: the methodological instrumentalist’s picture could surely only 
rationalise an interest in the intended empirical consequences of theories, but it has often 
happened that the greatest successes for theories as instruments for prediction have been in 
unintended domains, Bohr’s extension of his atomic theory of 1913 to cover spectroscopy 
being a particularly clear example. Now the prediction of hitherto unknown kinds of facts
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is extension into unintended areas par excellence: Popper has emphasised this kind of 
prediction. Instrumentalism accounts for prediction of events of a kind which is known, 
but theory-led discovery of new types of fact is a mystery to the instrumentalist, because
if theories are instruments for prediction, then we must assume that their purpose must be determined 
in advance, as with other instruments. Predictions of the second kind can be fully understood only as 
discoveries. (Popper [1963], p. 118)
In similar vein, Zahar ([1989], pp.38-9) has catalogued some of the ways that a realistic 
interpretation of even quite exotic parts of a theory’s mathematical structure can lead 
directly to the discovery of new kinds of facts, one example being Dirac’s physical 
interpretation of the negative energy solutions to his relativistic equation, and the 
subsequent discovery of the positron. If realistic interpretation fosters an interest in the 
unintended consequences of one’s theories, it thereby increases their empirical content, 
suggesting the formulation of new conjectures, thereby promoting new discoveries. It 
might be objected that new uses may be found for old instruments, but if ‘instruments* are 
things that are re-employed as often as theories are fruitfully extended into new domains, 
methodological instrumentalism must lose its distinctiveness as a methodology. Interpreted 
thus loosely, there may be nothing in methodological instrumentalism to prohibit extension 
into new areas, but that is the problem: no positive reason is provided by a theory’s success 
in one area to think that it might be successful in another. On an instrumentalist 
interpretation of a theory, the correctness of its unintended empirical consequences would 
be supererogatory, while on a realistic interpretation, the correctness of unintended 
consequences would constitute a criterion of adequacy. Thus where scientists are found 
worrying about the correctness of the empirical consequences of their theories outside the 
domain for which the theory was constructed, we have evidence that the theories in 
question are interpreted realistically and realist aims pursued.
So is univocality a realist phenomenon? In 2.2, we saw Boyd claim univocality for realism: 
where two distinct theories are taken to invoke the same entity, we can no longer say that 
their non-observational content is mere theoretical superstructure, whose only role is the 
internal one of supporting deductions of observational consequences. Instead, theoretical 
terms must refer to theory-independent entities. Consider again Bohr’s use of his atomic 
model to derive a theory of line spectra: (i) The initial theory of the Rutherford atom’s 
stability, 7a, and the background observational theories concerning atomic spectra, 7#, 
both mention ‘atoms’, (ii) Now unless the ‘atoms’ in 7a can be identified with those in 7#, 
there is no reason to expect that Ta might explain 7# (or exhibit any other cognitive 
connection), (iii) Taking both the TA-atoms’ and the ‘7#-atoms’ to be references to real 
atoms—rather than fictions particular to those two theories—would suggest their 
identification. Thus Bohr’s extension of his theory suggests that he assumed the
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occurrences of the term ‘atom* in his own theory and in spectroscopy to refer univocally to 
theoretical entities of independent status. Since it was the extension that earned the model 
its plaudits, even the instrumentalist must admit that Bohr was instrumentally vindicated.
A possible counter is that the identification was between two episodes of the observed 
behaviour of hydrogen gas. This will not do: there was no obvious observational 
connection between the evidence for Rutherford’s structure—the statistics of a-particle 
scattering by thin gold foil—and the spectroscopic experiments on hydrogen in discharge 
tubes to which Bohr later turned his explanatory attentions. In any case, Bohr’s initial 
calculations on the Rutherford structure sought to answer a theoretical puzzle concerning 
stability, rather than an empirical one. The connection assumed by Bohr’s extension of his 
theory must have been at a deeper theoretical level: the enduring atoms that individuate the 
elements and whose properties explain their chemistry. In contrast, for the methodological 
instrumentalist the natural vision for the unity of science is surely Neurath’s: unification at 
the point of application.
A subtler example of the heuristic utility of realistic construal—connected with univocality 
assumptions—is provided by Zahar [1989]. Suppose some equation H is re-expressed in a 
suggestive—but equivalent—mathematical form H*(t). Under a realistic interpretation, 
term t falls under a philosophical category which is subject to some philosophical opinion 
(such as a symmetry or conservation principle) held in high regard by the theoretician. If 
H*{t) violates the principle in question, we can expect her to modify the theory so that it is 
satisfied. Zahar contends that it is moves such as this—that assume univocality at an 
altogether more abstract level—that typify the heuristic behind Einstein’s relativistic 
research programme, and that it was this heuristic that differentiated this programme from 
its (empirically equivalent) contemporary rivals. Another striking example of this kind of 
theoretical constraint on the acceptance of theories—inspired by a realistic construal—is 
provided by Heisenberg’s supposedly instrumentalist construction of matrix mechanics. On 
the same night that he wrote down the equations that were to become matrix mechanics, 
Heisenberg checked that they satisfied the principle of the conservation of energy.
Now it would appear that most of these criticisms of methodological instrumentalism 
would be relevant only to those forms of instrumentalism that reject semantic realism for 
theories, on the basis that theories are just tools for prediction rather than factual statements 
about the world. Given this appearance, van Fraassen might reply that since he accepts 
semantic realism, the above arguments could not show that the adoption by scientists of the 
above methods of theory construction would constitute evidence against the thesis that 
scientists are constructive empiricists (this latter thesis being methodological constructive 
empiricism). Under van Fraassen’s account of acceptance, the only belief involved in 
acceptance is in the empirical adequacy of a theory, but pragmatic features of the acceptance
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of a theory include scientists immersing themselves in its world picture, committing 
themselves to using it to answer requests for explanation, and allowing its terms to suffuse 
scientific discourse ([1980], pp.12-13). For van Fraassen, acceptance includes a 
commitment to the (non-observational) structure of present theories being a constraint on 
the construction of future theories (no matter what the domain, it seems). It is this last 
commitment that would underwrite the methodological constructive empiricist’s ability to 
explain features of theory construction such as ontological conservatism and the extension 
of theories into new domains. As I noted in 2.4, the problem is that this commitment- 
crucial as it is to van Fraassen* s ability to give a plausible account of theory construction— 
seems to be entirely unmotivated. Given that the empiricist’s acceptance of a theory 
involves only the belief that it is empirically adequate, we can see why the empiricist would 
wish to preserve the structure of the empirical sub-models of the models of a theory, but 
why should the non-observational structure of those models provide a constraint on future 
theorising? Just because we know that a theory is empirically adequate over one domain, 
why should we think that it (rather than its empirical equivalents in that domain) should be 
empirically adequate in another domain, when the alternatives may be incompatible with 
respect to the new domain? Although methodological constructive empiricism is consistent 
with the application of methods that are founded on these assumptions, it hardly explains 
them. The same goes for the search for explanation: van Fraassen countenances the search 
for explanatory theories as reflecting a pragmatic requirement This would appear to make 
explanation supererogatory, but explanation is often a duty of theory. Methodological 
realism, in contrast seems perfectly able to explain these features of scientific practice.
2 .6 . Intended  interpreta tions: Methodological Rea lism  and  MSRP
In this section I will draw on further historiographical support for MR by showing that 
Lakatos’ MSRP embodies MR. Now Lakatos was committed to a normative version of MR 
in an uninteresting way in so far as he accepted what in 2 . 1 1 called aspirational realism. 
Normative aspirational realism is associated with MR as any aim is associated with 
methods that are directed towards that aim. However, the commitment to MR I would like 
to explore here is a deeper one: MSRP embodies the content of MR (explored in the last 
section), because one of the central notions of its apparatus of appraisal—the positive 
heuristic—can be explicated in terms of explanatory power and theoretical unity, the 
theoretical virtues that—according to MR—are directly pursued in successful research. In 
so far as MSRP is supported as a descriptive account of scientific research by its relation to 
the history of science, MR will also be supported if MSRP does in fact embody MR. In 
1.2 , it was argued that the construction of refutable variants in line with the positive 
heuristic of a research programme could be identified with model construction using
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analogical reasoning. On this reading, a feature of a theory is ad hoc3 if it fails to ‘fit’ with 
the analogies that underwrite the positive heuristic. It now remains to explore the ways in 
which realist commitments can be implicit in the use of analogies to extend theories.
A model is a theoretical representation of a particular kind of system. For Hesse, models 
are based on analogies with more familiar theories or structures, and are indispensable 
devices for the pursuit and understanding of less familiar theories. They also provide the 
‘open texture’ by which the equations which express physical theories are tested, extended 
and modified (Hesse [1953], [1961] and [1966]). A model is an indispensable heuristic 
tool because it
can be generalised, extended and tested, and if necessary modified, as a purely deductive system cannot. 
The model can be tested, because it is a system of entities and processes whose behaviour is already 
known apart from die new experimental facts which it is being used to explain. ([1961], p.21)
Where a theory is interpreted through an analogy that is known to hold in some respects, 
we can ask how much further the analogy obtains. Answering theoretical questions of this 
kind—suggested by the analogy—enables the model to be ‘fleshed out’. A good example 
of this heuristic role is the ‘billiard ball* model for gases:
Further questions can be asked, such as ‘Are gas molecules like rigid balls or like elastic ones?, ‘What 
is their diameter?, and so on, and the theory is tested and developed by devising experiments to answer 
questions like these suggested by the model. ([1961], p.21)
Now models need not be quite so concrete, and indeed may operate at quite abstract levels, 
for example the analogical interpretation of Riemannian geometry in general relativity 
through an analogy with the ‘geodesic’ of two-dimensional geometries projected onto 
spherical surfaces. An analogy need not be perfect to be useful, and Hesse distinguishes 
positive and negative analogy: structural similarities and dissimilarities between the 
analogue and the system to be described. There is also neutral analogy: those features of the 
analogue that are not presently known to have counterparts in the real system. Two aspects 
of Hesse’s account are crucial to the present discussion. Firstly, an analogy can encode 
factual information about a system that is described with its help: what was ‘precarious 
theory’ suggested by analogy can be elevated by the passage of successful research to the 
status of accepted fact. The crucial logical point is that models can be known to be false:
And if they were, in fact, false then they could, logically, have been true, and this is sufficient to place 
all such theory-models in the category of factual statements, and to enable us to make finer distinctions 
between those which were better or worse approximations to the truth. ([1961], p.26)
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The second point of importance follows from this: the distinction Hesse makes between 
models that are used realistically to extend or modify a mathematical theory, and those that 
are designed for, or consigned to, non-realistic use, aiding the understanding or 
manipulation of mathematically intractable theories.34 To make distinctions between more 
and less realistic analogical models suggests that models—and the analogical relations 
through which they are filled out—are appraised for their representational content, not only 
their heuristic value. This is further underlined if certain kinds of model are identified 
explicitly as /ion-representational, for it would not make sense to mark off non- 
representational models if ad models were non-representational.
This distinction—and its relevance to methodological realism—is supported by a closer 
examination of model construction in science. Redhead [1980] supplies a realist analysis 
and descriptive account of the use and status of physical models. An important distinction 
Redhead makes is between ‘impoverishment’ and ‘enrichment’ models. An enrichment 
model is the vehicle for the application of a general theory to a particular case: extra 
information about the case at hand is added to what the general theory says by virtue of its 
applying to any system. Take for example the ‘filling in’ of dynamical details—the form of 
the potential function—within quantum mechanics’ kinematical framework. The ‘filled-in’ 
detail comes from background knowledge of the entities and interactions that are present in 
the subject system. Thus when a quantum-mechanical model of a molecule is constructed, 
the Hamiltonian is written down in terms of the charges and masses of constituent species, 
and the forces taken to govern their interactions. Another example is the Newtonian model 
of the solar system, in which (in the first, idealised instance) a system of point masses is 
specified, dynamical details (gravitational interaction) filled in, and the kinematics (the three 
laws of motion) applied. Such a model does not necessarily misrepresent the subject 
system, or contradict the general theory, but it will often be idealised in the interests of 
mathematical tractability: thus non-electrostatic interaction terms in molecular Hamiltonians 
(that quantum mechanics qua general theory ‘says’ will occur) are often neglected, as are 
gravitational interactions between planets in the solar-system case. Redhead also notes that 
those parts of a model that are fixed by the general theory (and are therefore model- 
independent) are more ‘highly regarded’ than model-dependent parts, an observation that is 
in line with the Lakatosian distinction between hard core and auxiliary hypotheses. If the 
process of enrichment produces insoluble equations, an impoverished model can be 
proposed, playing a role similar to Hesse’s analogue machines. Impoverished models are 
assumed not to correspond to reality: such models will (for instance) not satisfy the 
equations for an exact model. Redhead also notes that such approximate theories specify
34 Hesse [1961], pp.26-7 describes four types of non-realistic model. See also Leplin [1986], pp.44-9.
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different sets of possible points in the relevant state space to the general theories they 
ostensibly approximate, and are therefore different theories in a technical sense outlined 
elsewhere (see Redhead [1975]).
Redhead also distinguishes between ‘floating models’35—and the ad hoc adjustments that 
are needed to bring them into line with experiment—and models that do have a theoretical 
rationale. An example of this distinction is the use of models of molecular structure in 
calculations of the infrared spectra of organic molecules. The ‘received’ view of how to 
apply a theory mirrors Hempel’s ‘covering law’ account of explanation: we apply a theory 
to a particular system by seeing how the system ‘falls under* the laws of the theory, as if 
the representation of the system were already given. Thus, in the case of quantum 
mechanics and molecules, we write down the Hamiltonian for the molecule, solve the 
resultant eigenvalue equation, and separate out wavefunctions for different motions. One 
major difficulty makes this approach impracticable in real life: the eigenvalue equations for 
interesting molecules are insoluble. Instead, the Hamiltonian for particular motions of the 
molecule are filled in piecemeal via idealised molecular models drawn from classical 
chemistry. Such models are analogical in so far as we interpret them through our 
knowledge of macroscopic systems of balls and springs, and use our knowledge of these 
analogues to extend the models (for instance to account for stearic hindrance in reaction 
mechanisms). They are, moreover, well motivated (see 5.4): even where we are forced by 
intractable mathematics to use impoverished models, we can see how some such models 
are motivated, and can therefore make distinctions between representational and non- 
representational impoverished models. Note, however, that the rationale that grounds the 
use of a well-motivated model need not be internal to the general theory in which the model 
is embedded: its justification may arise from background theories, although background 
theories will impinge on the construction of the model via constraints that are expressed in 
terms o/the general theory.
Redhead observes that a pejorative distinction is often made by scientists between ‘theories’ 
and ‘models’: what begins as a ‘model’ can, if successful, come to be regarded as a proper 
‘theory’ (the history of stereochemistry being a case in point). Conversely, an over­
simplified, unsuccessful theory can be downgraded: thus, for example, the early kinetic 
theory later became a mere “billiard-ball model of a gas”. Now this usage of the word 
‘model’ differs from that previously adopted in the present discussion, in which models are 
structures representing real systems within general theories. However, the pejorative usage 
aligns with the above distinctions between different types of ‘model’ in the standard sense: 
(i) those whose positive analogy to the system to be described is taken to be merely
35 The teem, due to Post [1974], applies to models that are free of either empirical or theoretical grounding.
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suggestive—that is, an aid to the understanding or manipulation of a theory’s mathematical 
structure (Hesse calls this ‘dead metaphor’); and (ii) those whose structural analogy could 
be deeper than is presently known to be the case, and might therefore be used to extend the 
theories that are interpreted through them. Now if this kind of distinction is made between 
the two types of analogy in the context of theory construction—the fact that there have been 
transitions between them implies this—and if analogies that are at the heart of progressive 
research do thereby earn the status of type (ii) analogies, it is hard to see how this would be 
rationalised by the instrumentalist. For the instrumentalist, all models should be of type (i): 
why would one extend a theory based on ‘mere’ analogy? Model-use for the instrumentalist 
(such as Duhem) is an external matter of suggesting equations to weak minds that cannot 
manipulate a bare mathematical formalism without heuristic aid.36 The realist, however, can 
have analogies at the heart of theory construction.
To conclude the discussion of model-building: the use of analogies provides a mechanism 
for the extension of theories that explains the open texture of physical theorising. Only if an 
anologue is thought to provide clues as to the deep structure of the target system could it 
make sense to use that analogy to extend or enrich a model of the target system, in the hope 
that neutral analogy becomes positive analogy.37 Also, if scientists make methodological 
distinctions between representational and non-representational models, and if these 
distinctions are reflected in their use of such models, the challenge is for the instrumentalist 
to rationalise this distinction if—on general arguments—no analogical models are taken to 
be representational. Of course it is consistent for scientists to extend models using 
analogical reasoning, and perhaps even to make distinctions between different analogical 
models while keeping their instrumentalist hearts pure, but this leaves their behaviour 
unmotivated and unexplained. The methodological realist can challenge the methodological 
instrumentalist to give a positive rationale for these methods that would explain their 
systematic deployment
How do these observation relate to MSRP? In response to the Duhem-Quine thesis,
Lakatos suggested that theory change be modelled on the diachronic appraisal of series of 
theories rather than the synchronic appraisal of single theories. The new scheme of 
appraisal was methodological, in that attention was focused on the motivation of 
amendments to refutable variants, which is a function of the context of theory-construction. 
Methodological appraisal of individual theories is the process of applying the Lakatos-
36 See Mdlor [1968] for a discussion of Duhem’s attitude to models.
37 The instrumentalist might reply here that analogies are just one tool for theory construction among 
many, but the point here is that analogies are used systematically to extend theories. An instrumentalist 
rationale would give analogies only a trial and error application in theory construction.
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Zahar criteria of ad-hocness (Lakatos [1971a] ; Zahar [1973] and [1978]). The definitions 
of what it is for a theory to bead hocl and ad hoc2 invoke a direct relation between a theory 
and the phenomena it was designed to save: a theory is ad hocx if it can explain no more 
than that for which it was constructed; it is ad hoc2 when its excess content over the 
problem situation for which it was constructed has not yet been corroborated, or has been 
falsified. The definition of what it is for a theory to be ad hoc3 is qualitatively different, in 
that it turns on its relationship to the positive heuristic of the research programme of which 
it is a product a theory is ad hoc3 if it is not constructed in the spirit of the positive 
heuristic. This last notion has enjoyed more examples than explication. Now the first two 
pejorative categories—ad hocx and ad hoc2—concern the circumstances of the proposal of 
individual refutable variants. For ad hoc3 theories, however, the problem concerns a 
standing relationship between the individual theory and the positive heuristic. If we 
explicate the notion of the positive heuristic in terms of analogy, then one way that a theory 
can be ad hoc3 is that it fails to fit the analogies that drive the positive heuristic. Now for a 
refutable variant to ‘fail to fit’ the analogies that drive the positive heuristic is for some 
feature of that theory not to have a natural interpretation in terms of those analogies. To 
require that a research programme is theoretically progressive is therefore to require that, 
associated with the research programme, there is a set of analogies through which (features 
of) individual theories that arise in that research programme are interpreted:
the—well planned—building of pigeon holes must proceed much faster than the recording of facts
which are to be housed in them. (Lakatos [1970], p. 188)
Now in 1.2 it was noted that the positive heuristic can work at different levels. It would be 
worthwhile exploring the operation of interpretive analogies at these different levels and 
inter-relations between them. On the one hand—at the level of theories concerning specific 
systems—we have Lakatos’ example of the Newtonian model of the solar system, and 
quantum-mechanical models of molecules. Given an analogical model at this level, we have 
a recipe for applying the equations of the general theory to a particular system that fixes 
both the initial (idealised) treatments and (possibilities for) further refinements. Individual 
refinements at any particular stage will be executed through the application of a stock of 
mathematical methods (or exemplars) that are found to be associated with presentations of
r
theories in textbooks of the mathematised sciences.38 What governs the application of these 
mathematical methods will be the view of what the target system is like. This is encoded in 
the positive heuristic’s analogies. If we were to isolate any particular stage in this 
refinement, it might not be clear from the mathematics alone what kind of system the 
equations represent, and therefore how more refined versions are to be obtained, for that is
38 Compare the notion of exemplar used by Kuhn ([1977], p.229), and Giere ([1989], pp.68ff).
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determined by the positive heuristic. Thus the positive heuristic encodes an intended 
interpretation for the refutable variant. As an example, the motion of a pendulum-type 
system might be treated—to a first approximation—as the undamped harmonic motion of 
the bob (that is, as simple harmonic motion). However, when further refinements are to be 
considered—such as the effects of friction—we need to know about the arm of the 
pendulum, which was absent from the initial equation. We can also explain distinctions 
between explanatory and /ion-explanatory theories on this account: a theory explains a 
phenomenon if calculations concerning that phenomenon draw on features of the theory 
that are interpreted via the positive heuristic and as such invoke causal processes that are 
relevant to the phenomenon. Otherwise we have only a calculation, not an explanation. 
Hence the realist intuition that intra-theoretic coherence and explanatory power are linked.
There are also analogies that operate through the general equations of the theory. I have 
already mentioned non-planar models of subsets of Euclid’s axioms and non-Euclidean 
geometry. Another example—to be followed up in chapter 4—is Schrodinger’s wave 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. How the equations are interpreted at the general level 
will determine relations with other general (physical or metaphysical) principles. In the case 
of quantum mechanics, although wave and matrix mechanics had (purportedly) been 
shown to be mathematically equivalent, Schrodinger constructed a mechanism for the 
interaction of matter and radiation that was distinct from that envisaged by Heisenberg et 
al.39 Different mechanisms for radiation implied different relations between quantum 
mechanics—the kinematics of the microphysical world-and (for instance) electromagnetic 
theory and spectroscopy. The different mechanisms were the direct expression of the 
different interpretations of what (given the equivalence proofs) might be the ‘same* general 
equations (see 4.4 for further details).
So we have seen how intended interpretations drive the positive heuristic—constraining 
theory-construction and intertheoretic relations—at the specific and the general levels. What 
of the interplay between the levels? The interpretation of the general equations will of 
course constrain how they are to be applied, that is, the specific form of equations that are 
written down for specific systems. But constraints run both ways: successful applications 
are the cash value of a particular interpretation of the general equations. In a sense a general 
interpretation lives or dies by its ability to motivate particular models: Schrodinger’s wave 
interpretation, for instance, was discarded at least partly because of its inability to provide a 
mechanism for radiation that worked in detailed examples. So the intended interpretation of
39 Schrodinger’s mechanism involved resonant vibration of matter and field, and avoided the * damned 
quantum jumps* of the Copenhagen camp.
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the general equations may change under the influence of insights gained through particular 
applications of the general equations.
In terms of Lakatos' apparatus of appraisal, a specific application is ad hoc3 if it fails to 
cohere with the intended interpretation of the general equations, while the general 
interpretation can be criticised if too many (successful) applications are ad hoc3 with respect 
to it: the search would be on for a more helpful interpretation. Of course a particular 
refutable variant can be ad hoc3 in another way: by failing to fit with the intended 
interpretation of features of a model that are peculiar to the model at hand.40 The 
requirement that models not be ad hoc3 therefore comes down to two requirements of 
model building: (i) that the model ‘fits' the (general) intended interpretation of the equations 
(although this may change as research progresses); (ii) that the model Tits' the (specific) 
view of what the target system is like (as given by the interpretive analogies) and therefore 
of what an entirely accurate model of the target system would be like (although this may 
change as research progresses). These requirements presuppose that there are such 
intended interpretations, and that they are not themselves incoherent.
Making a connected point, the early Feyerabend [1964] argued that we should expect 
theories and models to be amenable to realistic inteipretation against background 
knowledge—effectively that entire theoretical schemes should be non-ad hocst in Lakatos’
terminology. This requirement governs both the construction of physical models and their 
relationships to their predecessors and background theories. Feyerabend also cites 
examples that illustrate the value of this requirement: Copemicans, faced with Aristotelian 
objections that objects would fly off the surface of a moving earth, might make one of two 
possible responses, (i) The Bellamdne-Osiander option is to accept that the inconsistency 
with observation only arises if the Copemican system is interpreted realistically in 
conjunction with (realistically-interpreted) Aristotelian physics, and retreat to an 
instrumentalist interpretation of the Copemican system, (ii) The realist option is to work 
towards the overthrow of the Aristotelian mechanics, according to which birds would be 
left behind by a moving earth, and search for a terrestrial physics that explains their failure 
to do so. Given the subsequent history of science, surely the realists were vindicated. 
Contrast Feyerabend’s requirement with the much weaker Duhemian requirement of logical 
consistency, and with Laudan’s [1984] directive to accept any empirically adequate theory 
([1984], p.235) and the instrumentalist rationale constructed by Fine for the ‘small handful' 
strategy (see 2.5). For realists, explanation and intra-theoretic coherence are duties, not 
supererogatory virtues that reflect our pragmatic interests. Where there are scientists
40 This distinction between different ways of being ad hoc3 follows immediately from the distinction 
between heuristics at different levels.
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holding out for either (in the face of empirically-adequate theories that do neither), there are 
scientists acting like realists.
CONCLUSION
This chapter began, in 2.2 and 2.3, with an examination of two specific arguments for 
scientific realism. These were methodological arguments, because their premises were that 
the methods of science presuppose scientific realism, while they were intended to support 
realism conceived of as incorporating the semantic and epistemological components of 2.1. 
Reasons were found to reject those arguments as arguments for realism,, but in 2.4 their 
premises—versions of methodological realism—were separated out and appraised in their 
own right. My claims concerning methodological realism were as follows, (i) Scientific 
realism is independent of methodological realism: perhaps then the unsatisfactory nature of 
the methodological arguments was to be expected (ii) The non-realist who rejects a 
particular realist thesis (be it semantic, epistemological or aspirational) can nevertheless 
endorse the corresponding methodological realismy if a. suitable pragmatic rationale can be 
found, (iii) What realists tend to think of as methodological evidence for realism, anti- 
realists who accept the endorsement in (ii), above, will see as providing an inductive- 
pragmatic rationale for the adoption by scientists of realism. In 2.5. and 2.6, the content of 
methodological realism—the specific methods that are available only to the realist—was 
explored Wherever these methods are used successfully, methodological realism is 
supported inductively. In 2.6, it was argued that Lakatos* methodology of scientific 
research programmes (MSRP) embodies methodological realism, in that the methods 
endorsed by MSRP can be rationalised as the pursuit of realist aims. Thus methodological 
realism inherits any historiographical support enjoyed by MSRP. If this is a poor base for 
induction, methodological realism is supported by historical counterfactuals: there have 
been episodes in the history of science in which the application of realist methods produced 
theories that have been the basis of progress during long subsequent periods of research. 
Were realist methods not to have been adopted, there is no reason to think that these 
important theories would have emerged in the way they did. Specific historical 
counterfactuals of this kind will be the subject of the following chapters.
APPENDIX 1: MODELS IN PRACTICE AND IN LOGIC
In 2.6, the Lakatosian positive heuristic was explicated in terms of the intended 
interpretation (or model) of the equations that express theories, either at the particular level 
of the refutable variants or the general level of the hard core. The phrase ‘intended
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interpretation’, however, suggests an identification that need not have been made: the 
notion of model explored in 2.6 was the practice-centred notion from Hesse and Redhead, 
while ‘intended interpretation’ invokes the models of metamathematics. These are different 
notions. Under the practice-centred conception, a model is individuated by its (intended) 
representation of a real system, much as a model of the Eiffel Tower is a model of the Eiffel 
Tower because of the intention of its maker to represent the Eiffel Tower. The model of 
metamathematics is individuated by the axioms or equations it satisfies. The relations are 
different (representation versus satisfaction), as are the relata (things, processes or events 
versus axioms or equations). The logician’s notion is applied to the understanding of 
scientific theories in the semantic and structuralist conceptions of theories. Applying this 
conception of theories to the description of actual scientific practice (rather than to the 
‘reconstruction’ of science) has often involved identifying the models of practice with the 
models of logic.41 This identification—although non-trivial—does seem plausible given 
(for instance) Giere’s insights into the models that are found in textbooks of the 
mathematical sciences: the harmonic oscillator does satisfy well-defined sets of equations, 
and it is possible to see how it might also play a role in a representative model. But playing 
a role in a representational model and being one are different, as are textbooks and 
empirical research. Cartwright’s [1983] account of the construction of models presents an 
argument against the identification: Cartwright urges that the models that embody our 
causal knowledge of concrete systems (the models that would do any representing) do not 
in general satisfy the equations of the general theories of which, ostensibly, they are 
applications. This suggests that models of theories do not represent real systems directly.
However, in what follows it will be assumed for the sake of an argument that the practice- 
centred notion can be explicated in terms of the logician’s, so that a theorem of 
mathematical logic might be appended to the discussion of models in 2.6. In 2.6, physical 
theorising was characterised as the production of series of equations which, with increasing 
closeness, capture something which is not itself an equation, but which guides the writing 
down of equations. Could this process in principle come to an end with the capture of the 
model by the equations? According to the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, every satisfiable 
first order theory (of finite or infinite length) that admits infinite models has models of 
different infinite cardinalities. Since models with different cardinalities are non-isomorphic, 
every satisfiable theory with infinite models will have non-standard models: those that are 
not isomorphic to the standard model, and yet satisfy the axioms. Call the set of models 
that satisfy a theory its satisfaction set. The isomorphicity relation is reflexive, symmetric 
and transitive; it can therefore be used to partition the satisfaction set into equivalence
41 As do, for instance, van Fraassen [1980] and Giere [1988].
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classes. The Lowenheim-Skolem theorem shows that there is more than one such non­
empty equivalence class in the satisfaction set of any interesting theory.42 This can be put in 
terms of categoricity: consistent first order theories fail to be categorical, for no matter how 
many their axioms, there is always something about the intended model that they will fail to 
‘capture*. Thinking back to the earlier process—of the interpretation successively 
augmenting the theory—at any finite stage of the development of a theory, constraints that 
issue from the intended interpretation are formalised (if formalisable), and pick out a new 
satisfaction set The new satisfaction set will be a proper subset of its predecessor the 
intended interpretation encodes excess or extra-theoretical content over the theory version it 
augments. The Lowenheim-Skolem theorem shows, however, that the process of 
augmentation will never end in a categorical theory.
Now theories are not developed in isolation, for their authors are influenced by opinions of 
all kinds: metaphysical, epistemological or aesthetic. Theorists also entertain other scientific 
theories, and will subject their models to empirical constraints. For example, among the 
interpretations of quantum mechanics are some that involve instantaneous action-at-a- 
distance, which would be unacceptable in conjunction with the special theory of relativity. 
Thus many possible interpretations of one’s favourite theories, although logically 
permissible, could be rejected on other grounds. When all the unacceptable interpretations 
are discarded, there will still be non-isomorphic models, even if it is possible to have an 
infinite number of empirical, methodological, scientific and metaphysical constraints. This 
would follow from the consistency of their formalisation in the first order predicate calculus 
and addition to the axioms of the theory: the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem will still apply, 
invoking a new underdetermination.
If there is a privileged interpretation, only the interpreter could have access to it: theories are 
public property, while an intended interpretation could never be captured by anyone’s 
description of it, supposing that natural languages suffer the same limitations as first order 
logic. What is it, then, to understand and accept a physical theory qua set of equations? To 
interpret it via a member of its satisfaction set. It follows that there is more than one non­
equivalent way to understand any theory. To accept a theory as true o f a. particular system 
is to take it that the satisfaction set has a member that correctly portrays the system in 
question. Therefore two scientists may accept the same equations but different theories, by 
interpreting the equations via non-isomorphic models. If the formal theory were to be 
conservatively extended in order to capture some aspect of the models on which it was 
hitherto silent, the two theorists might propose mutually incompatible extensions. To speak 
of the intended interpretation, however, could be misleading, suggesting something static.
42 In order to simplify what follows, let a model stand for others to which it is isomorphic.
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In 2.6, it was argued that the intended interpretation at the general level could change under 
the influence of particular applications. This could be the consequence of an empirically- 
inspired amendment to a set of applied equations, such that the new equations are no longer 
compatible with their intended interpretation. The new equations would be ad J10C3 if the 
situation were left there, but a change in the intended interpretation at the specific level— 
and a consequent change at the general level if necessary—would remove the problem. 
Thus an intended interpretation itself may evolve under empirical or theoretical selection as 
research continues.
APPENDIX 2: PUINAM ON SKOLEMISATEON
In Appendix 1, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem was used to illustrate the failure of 
categoricity. In his [1980], Putnam extends Skolem’s [1922] reading of the same theorem 
in a way that seems to rule out my use of the notion of an intended interpretation to 
explicate theoretical development, unless access to the intended interpretation is thought to 
involve access to Platonic forms. Putnam’s question is: how is reference fixed? A theory of 
reference provides a relation that holds between referring terms and referents, and Putnam 
presents three alternatives: extreme Platonism (reference is a special kind of relation that 
allows the mind to ‘grasp’ the referent), moderate metaphysical realism (referential relations 
are grounded in ordinary physical facts) and his own internal realism (referential relations 
are relative to theory). His conclusion is that only moderate metaphysical realism is in 
trouble from the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.
The argument runs as follows. Consider the totality of constraints that could be placed on 
theory-acceptance by all possible experiments and theoretical opinions. Then consider the 
first-order axiomatisation of an ideal (i.e. complete) total theory 7 /that would satisfy such 
constraints.43 If 7 /is consistent, its axiomatisation would be subject to the Completeness 
and Lowenheim-Skolem theorems. There will therefore be a denumerable infinity of non- 
isomorphic interpretations which satisfy 7/. This is because 7 /is an interesting theory, and 
‘no interesting theory (in the sense of first order theory) can, in and of itself, determine its 
own objects up to isomorphism’ (Putnam, [1980], p.442). Metaphysical realists posit a 
mind-independent world of which theories can be true or false independently of our 
knowledge, their truth and falsity being determined by referential relations between terms 
that appear in them and entities that populate the world. This is why they divorce the
43 If there is doubt about die possibility of such a formalisation, Putnam invokes schemata that purportedly 
‘first-orderize’ any other logic in which 7 /did turn out to be formalisable.
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notions of truth and rational acceptability: a rationally acceptable theory can be false in 
virtue of referential relations, and the way the world is. In particular, the metaphysical 
realist has it that 7 / could be false.
This, claims Putnam, is where the problems arise. Firstly, 7/ encodes all physical facts (the 
realist will want to add: to which we could possibly have epistemic access). If 7/ doesn’t 
fix reference, nothing else that is epistemically accessible will do so. Thus we are forced 
either to admit that reference is fixed by non-physical facts (presumably ones to which we 
could have no ordinary empirical access), or to relativise referential relations to theory. But 
if reference is relativised to theory, metaphysical realism is in trouble, for we must then 
internalise truth also. On Putnam’s view, 7 /maps out—within its own models—referential 
relations for itself. According to the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, 7 /will have non- 
isomorphic models. If 7 /comes out true in some model, it doesn’t make sense to say that it 
could be false. Thus metaphysical realism is false. If the realist replies that the reference 
relations under which 7 /is true might not be the intended ones, since the model in question 
is not the intended one (so that 7/ might be false), Putnam will ask what else fixes 
referential relations: it would have to be some special class of facts to which the language 
user must have access independently of the usual methods embodied in the epistemic 
constraints that helped to select 7/.
As we saw, Putnam’s argument against metaphysical realism is blocked if ‘object- 
grasping’ powers are attributed to minds—allowing theories to be understood by the direct 
apprehension of their intended interpretations—to fix reference in addition to operational 
and theoretical constraints. All that the Lowenheim-Skolem result would then show was 
that Platonic heaven was not amenable to precise formal capture. For naturalistic 
philosophers, however, ‘the postulation of unexplained mental faculties’ is ‘unhelpful 
epistemology and almost certainly bad science’ (Putnam, [1980], p.433). Overall, the 
‘Skolemization of absolutely everything’ (p.434)—including an ideal, complete science— 
forces the theory of meaning onto a fork: accept Platonism or drop metaphysical realism. 
Moderate metaphysical realism is untenable. If Platonism is unsavoury, the utopian idea 
that science investigates entities that populate a reality independent of our conceptual system 
should be dropped. Instead truth itself must be relativised to 7/, and truth equated with 
rational acceptability. It is not conceivable that 7 /could be false, since it satisfies (by 
hypothesis) all operational and semantic constraints.
Some objections can be raised to Putnam’s argument.44 Firstly, it fails to address the 
extemalism implicit in his own causal theory of reference. It doesn’t matter how users of
44 Lepore and Loewer [1987] provide a survey of objections.
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terms understand referential relations if these are causal relations that hold independently of 
7/. Secondly, Putnam seems to beg the question against (moderate) metaphysical realism in 
his claim that there could be no physical facts that could render 7 /false. In any case, one 
line of thought suggests that the account of model building given in Appendix 1 is 
untouched by Putnam’s argument, indicating that the methodological realism embedded in 
that account is compatible with Putnam’s internal realism. Opinions—whether general and 
central or particular and peripheral—impinge on theory construction in ones and twos. In 
practice, a scientist’s views will never be exhausted in the way that Putnam’s easy 
quantification over ‘empirical and theoretical constraints’ indicates. We need not attribute 
non-natural Platonic ‘object-grasping’ powers to the minds of the authors of theories in 
order for intended interpretations to play a role in theory construction, for dispositions to 
augment the equations (i.e. enrich the formal theory) would suffice. Putnam’s argument 
might indicate (if one accepted its conclusion) that there was no fact of the matter which of 
the models of the final (completed) theory that would end all theoiy-development represents 
‘the world’ in that theory. There might even be no fact of the matter which model we are 
presently using to develop our equations. This still presents no problem: suppose there are 
different non-isomorphic models that satisfy our equations. Either we have opinions about 
which is the model we are presently using, or we do not If we do, we can use them to 
select one or another, building this selection into our equations. If we do not, the 
underdetermination cannot affect our practice.
However, there is a possible reply to Putnam’s sceptical use of the Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorem that is analogous to a Lakatosian response to empirical underdetermination. In the 
case of the empirical equivalence of incompatible theories, MSRP looks to the heuristic 
power of the research programmes in which the two theories are embedded. This is 
reflected in the retrospective judgements as to whether the programmes’ refutable variants 
are ad hoc or well motivated. Instrumentalists sometimes argue that the existence of 
empirically equivalent theories shows that we can have no (evidential, rather than 
pragmatic) reason to prefer one over another, but the Lakatosian can reply that one of the 
theories will be embedded in our scientific history: the one that lead us to discover some of 
the empirical regularities that constitute its supporting evidence. We can prefer it because 
fr—rather than any of the hordes with which it is empirically equivalent—directed us to 
new knowledge. This preference can be read as either a pragmatic choice—we prefer this 
theory because it has a proven track-record in leading us to new discoveries—or as 
providing further evidence that the theory is true. The instrumentalist might argue that any 
of the empirical equivalents would have had a similarly illustrious role in scientific 
progress, for they made the same predictions. However, this isn’t a fair comparison. When 
we started out on the research during which all the valuable discoveries were made, the 
well-developed theory we have now—which is empirically adequate—was not available.
94
REALISM AS A METHODOLOGICAL THESIS
There would only have been a sketch of an empirically inadequate theory, plus some ideas 
on how to improve it. Applying these ideas to the sketch (that is, following the programme 
of research) led us systematically to new discoveries. The instrumentalist must therefore 
argue that the empirically equivalent theories cited in the underdetermination argument 
would have occurred within equally fruitful research programmes, if they are to be real 
alternatives.
Given underdetermination at a higher (semantic) level, one can similarly invoke previous 
extensions of the equations that embody our theories. Given that the Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorem applies, there will of course be an infinite array of unintended models which 
satisfy the equations we currently accept, analogously to the empirical underdetermination 
case, so theoretical underdetermination will always, in principle be with us. That doesn’t 
mean, of course, that we have to throw up our hands in horror, and forsake all reference 
and all ontological commitment. ‘Snapshot’ views of ‘total constraints’—like Putnam’s— 
should be ruled out altogether. Other interpretations can be ignored because they did not, as 
a matter of historical fact, give rise to the formal theory as it presently stands. This kind of 
historical specificity perhaps explains why no-one realty adopts denumerable models as 
their interpretation of axioms that were ‘really’ designed for the real numbers, even though 
the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem shows this to be logically permissible. The real numbers 
are whatever was associated with the historical process that was the investigation of the 
mathematics of real numbers.
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3THE BOHR ATOM, REALISM AND INCONSISTENCY
The quantum theory gives me a feeling very much like yours. One really ought to be ashamed of its 
success, because it has been obtained with the Jesuit maxim “Let not thy left hand know what thy right 
hand doeth”. (Einstein: Letter to Bom)
Introduction
In the hope that history of science may enlighten their discourse, philosophers of science 
have often chosen Bohr’s 1913 model of the atom to illustrate their diverse methodological 
lessons. A common theme in the growth of this folklore—the roots of which can be traced 
back to the methodological judgements of Bohr’s contemporaries—has been that the theory 
suffered from some sort of inconsistency. Conclusions of two opposing kinds were drawn: 
firstly that the inconsistency explained the adverse methodological judgements passed down 
on the theory by contemporaries; secondly, that a theory could contribute to scientific 
progress despite being logically inconsistent. Taking the latter view, Lakatos argued that 
because the theory bore so much heuristic fruit, a ‘logician’s proof of inconsistency could 
not provide a knock-down reason for the rejection of a research programme, although 
scientific honesty would demand its public recording. Feyerabend agreed that logical 
dogmas may hinder growth in knowledge:
Scientists proposing theories with logical faults and obtaining interesting results with their help (for 
example:... the predictions of the older quantum theory and of early forms of the quantum theory of 
radiation—and so on) evidently proceed according to different rules. (Feyerabend, [1988], p. 15).
Lakatos’ methodology was subsequently declared to be empty, because it placed no 
significant constraints on scientifically honest behaviour: only the ornament of rationalist 
rhetoric distinguished it from his own epistemological anarchism. Philosophers have not 
been alone in spotting an inconsistency: in a standard historical text, Jammer has claimed 
that the quantum theory of poly-electronic systems that grew out of Bohr’s atomic model 
‘lacked two essential characteristics of a full-fledged scientific theory, conceptual autonomy 
and logical consistency’ (Jammer [1966], p. 196).
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This scientific episode has been the subject of an extensive historical literature, and I 
introduce no new historical facts. Rather, the historical content of the chapter is heavily 
indebted to two key secondary texts: Rosenfeld [1963] and Heilbron and Kuhn [1969], as 
well, of course to Bohr’s papers. What this chapter does hope to offer is a new 
interpretation of Bohr’s progress, and therefore fresh narrative. In 3.1 to 3.4,1 will cover 
the background to Bohr’s construction of the most celebrated part of his theory: the model 
of radiative emission in one-electron atoms. This is central to the appraisal because it was 
the theory’s success in this phenomenal region alone that ensured its fame. In 3.5, the 
accusation of logical inconsistency will be assessed: I will argue that there is no 
historiographical motivation for Lakatos’ indulgent attitude to contradictions. Since the 
bgical arguments against inconsistency are as strong as ever (even if 'childish’, according 
to Feyerabend), there seems no reason to free the growth of knowledge from the ‘tyranny 
of logic’. Instead, an inconsistency of interpretation will be identified as the perceived 
problem. Ad-hocness will occupy 3.6, where a careful reading of Bohr’s progress will 
reveal his theory to fall under one of Lakatos* subdivisions of the notion of ad-hocness, 
which can, however, be thought of as a (weaker) form of inconsistency after all. Although 
many sections of the chapter are historical in character, they are present as substrate for a 
traditional philosophical project: hunt the inconsistency.
3.1. Background
Extensive empirical information on the emission and absorption spectra of the elements was 
gathered during the nineteenth century, following the discovery of dark lines in the solar 
spectrum in 1802. By 1860 it was recognised that each element emits a characteristic 
discrete spectrum. Attempts were made to discern some order among the phenomenal 
chaos, notably in 1884, with Balmer’s representation of the wavelengths A of the first four 
lines in the visible spectrum of hydrogen as the difference of two integer terms:
A = k n2
n2 -  4
(k is a constant, n -  3,4,5,6)
This formula can be expressed in a more familiar form in toms of radiation frequencies v (v 
= c/A, c is the speed of light in vacuo and Rh  is the Rydberg constant for hydrogen) as:
v = Rh d _ JLi
4 rfl j
Runge (in 1888) and later Rydberg (in 1890) produced more general formulae designed to 
accommodate the more complicated spectra of the alkali metals, among other elements:
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Balmer’s formula was a special case of these. In fact Rydberg claimed to have been in 
possession of Balmer’s formula prior to its publication. In later years, Rydberg (1900) 
speculated that every spectral line of every element could be captured as the difference 
between two integer ‘spectral’ terms, as did Ritz (1908: the ‘combination principle’).
At the beginning of this century, there were many competing attempts to elucidate atomic 
structure following the negatively charged electron’s discovery in 1897. According to 
classical electromagnetic theory, the emission of radiation originated in the acceleration of 
charged particles, and so it was natural to expect any viable atomic model to account for 
spectral phenomena. However, the complexity and variety of spectral equations and the 
rough qualitative status of most atomic models inspired a certain pessimism about the 
prospects of such explanation. Gassically, it was thought that line spectra arose from the 
natural periodic oscillations or vibrations of electrons in atoms occupying stable states: it 
was a consequence of electromagnetic theory that oscillating charged particles would emit 
radiation at an optical frequency equal to the mechanical frequency. In 1907, Conway 
contended that single atoms could produce only a single spectral line at one time requiring a 
large number of atoms in a range of states to produce the whole spectrum. Also, Conway 
argued that spectral lines arose from atoms remaining in excited states long enough for a 
single electron to be stimulated to produce the requisite wave trains. Conway’s assertion 
was supported by Bevan’s (1910) work with the anomalous dispersion of certain red lines 
in the potassium spectrum by potassium vapour, the explanation of which would require 
the presence of far too many electrons per atom if each were to produce all the lines in the 
relevant spectrum at the same time.
A connection had also been made between the discrete frequencies of spectral lines and the 
old quantum theory’s ascription of integral multiples of energy packets to oscillators. At the 
first Solvay conference Lorentz conjectured a relationship between atomic structure and the 
quantum of action h, amid inconclusive debate about what form this relationship might 
take. In 1910, Haas attempted to introduce quantisation into a theory based on Thomson’s 
model of the atom, in which positive and negative charge were distributed throughout the 
atom. Haas showed the Rydberg constant to be expressible in terms of the constants e, m 
and h, obtaining a value R = 16jt2e*mlh3 which differed by a simple numerical factor from 
the empirical one. However, Whittaker [1953] points out that since e*mlh3 is the only 
product of powers of these quantities with the correct dimensions, the result was perhaps 
merely fortuitous. Nicholson published a pair of papers in 1911 in which he outlined a 
rather arcane theory invoking a set of otherwise elusive new elements, although it appeared 
to meet with some rather impressive quantitative empirical success. Notable in the theory 
was the quantisation of electron ring angular momenta in units of hJ2n  and its basis in 
Rutherford’s proposed atomic structure of the same year. Rutherford’s atom consisted of
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negatively-charged electrons orbitings a small and dense positively-charged nucleus, in 
which most of the atomic mass was concentrated However, although influenced by 
Conway in his notion of atoms existing in distinct states corresponding to Planck’s 
oscillatory energy levels, Nicholson failed to employ the idea of single spectral lines arising 
from single electrons, instead studying vibrations of sets of electrons grouped in rings. 
Nicholson was not the only researcher to quantise angular momentum prior to 1913: 
Bjerrum explained the absorption spectra of gaseous hydrogen bromide and chloride by 
introducing that assumption into his 1912 theory based on a conjunction of vibrational and 
rotational molecular motions.
3.2. Bohr’s Thinking 1911-1913
The development of Bohr’s thinking in the period up to the publication of his famous 
trilogy has been well documented elsewhere, notably in Heilbron and Kuhn [1969] and 
Rosenfeld [1963], the latter benefiting from the author’s long friendship with Bohr. In 
what follows, I will summarise the developmental stages of Bohr’s atomic models in order 
that the inspiration of his novel assumptions is clear.
According to Heilbron and Kuhn, it was clear from Bohr’s (1911) doctoral thesis—on the 
electron theory of metals—that he was aware at the time that a coherent theory of atomic 
structure would require a radical departure from classical mechanics. He had also identified 
Planck’s quantum theory as the basis for this departure and was ready to require of the new 
theory some limiting relation of correspondence with classical description. However, Bohr 
was not particularly interested in atomic models at this stage, preoccupied as he was with 
subjects closer to his thesis area. After acquiring his doctorate, Bohr travelled to Cambridge 
to work with Thomson in September 1911. Following a period there during which he failed 
to achieve the publication of his doctoral thesis in English, Bohr moved to Manchester in 
March 1912. Working at first on some laboratory exercises regarding the absorption of a- 
and /3-rays, Bohr began some experiments involving radium that had been suggested by 
Rutherford. The long-term value of this work, claim Heilbron and Kuhn, was social rather 
than scientific: it threw Bohr into regular contact with other researchers, notably Hevesy 
and Darwin. Bohr’s mental efforts, however, still centred on the electron theory of metals.
It was on 12 June 1912 that the first surviving record of an interest in atomic models on 
Bohr’s part was written: a letter to his brother Harald. On reading a paper of Darwin’s on 
the content of Rutherford’s model with respect to the energy lost by a-particles passing 
through thin metal sheets, Bohr was critical of some of the simplifying assumptions that 
had been made. From then on, work on Rutherford-type atomic models successively
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replaced his earlier preoccupations. Just one week later (19 June), Bohr again wrote to his 
brother, giving an indication that he had achieved some useful results in his atom-model 
work: ‘It could be that I’ve perhaps found a little bit about the structure of atoms’ (Bohr, 
quoted in Heilbron and Kuhn, pp.238-9). This ‘little piece of reality’ was a product of his 
criticisms of Darwin’s paper: Bohr’s use of the phrase indicated his new-found 
commitment to the Rutherford model.
So what initially fired Bohr’s interest in the Rutherford atom? Rosenfeld attributes the 
interest to Bohr’s ‘dialectical turn of mind’ ([1963], p.xv), since ‘the stability of the 
Rutherford atom was beyond the scope of classical theories’, but Heilbron and Kuhn point 
out that radiative instability would have afflicted any classical model postulating elections in 
motion. Since mechanical stability is a problem for the Rutherford atom only, Heilbron and 
Kuhn attribute to it the relevant heuristic role in Bohr’s reasoning ([1969], p.241, fn.81). 
We shall see that both the radiative and the mechanical stability questions turned out to be 
heuristically important.
In June and July 1912, Bohr hand-wrote a memorandum to Rutherford in which many of 
the qualitative aspects of the published model are anticipated (for a partial reprint see 
Rosenfeld [1963], pp.xxi-xxviii). Present in this document are prototype versions of 
arguments presented in parts II and m  of the trilogy. On the first page of the memorandum, 
Bohr compares the mechanical stability of the Rutherford and Thomson atoms. The 
solution to the Rutherford atom’s mechanical stability problem, notes Bohr, suggests an 
explanation of chemical periodicity, but in a footnote he claims:
The difference in this respect between the atom-model considered, and J J. Thomson's atom-model is 
very striking, and seems to make it impossible, to give a satisfactory explanation of the periodic law 
from the last mentioned atom-model. (Bohr [1912], p.Al)
The heuristic importance of the Rutherford atom’s mechanical stability problem is then 
clean its solution suggests a promising explanation of chemical periodicity. On the second 
page of the memorandum, another explanandum is raised. Considering the Rutherford 
atom, Bohr notes
that a ring, if only the strength of the central charge and the number of electrons in the ring are given, 
can rotate with an infinitely great number of different times of rotation, according to the assumed radius 
of the ring. (Bohr [1912], p.A2)
In other words, on the basis of the Rutherford atom classically treated there is no hope that 
characteristic orbital quantities can be calculated, so that some constraint on their allowed 
values is necessary. The required constraint, Bohr promises, will take the form of the 
“hypothesis” that there be a definite ratio between the kinetic energy and frequency of
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rotation for any stable ring. Furthermore there will be no ‘attempt of a mechanical 
foundation (as it seems hopeless)’ (Bohr [1912], p.A2). The constant of this 
proportionality, k, had not yet been fixed; to yield the final, published form of the theory, 
Bohr would need to put k = hJ2. Rosenfeld ([1963], p.xxxi) calculates that Bohr was 
working with an implicit value of k « 0.6h, and Heilbron and Kuhn ([1969], p.262) note 
that an empirical source cited elsewhere by Bohr—the resonance frequency of helium 
atoms—could have yielded k  « OAh. The passage quoted indicates the heuristic importance 
of the radiative stability problem: its solution (which also, of course, solves the problem of 
the continuity of ring radii) is the inspiration for the introduction of the quantum condition, 
from which the heuristic power of Bohr’s model flows. Bohr then sets out an explanatory 
agenda, the main items being the periodicity of atomic volume, the relative stability and the 
heats of combination exhibited by the ‘single compounds’ (i.e. homonuclear diatoms) H2 , 
[Hed1 and 02- Much of the rest of the memorandum is taken up with some promising 
calculations connected with these topics. Entirely absent, however, is any mention of 
emission spectra, which figure so large in the first section of the published trilogy. Up to 
this point, Bohr had been pessimistic about the prospect of constructing a theory of 
emission spectra on the basis of atomic structure.
So if Bohr was working with a particular atomic model, why was he now committed to it? 
There were three positive arguments for the Rutherford structure (and against the Thomson 
one) alluded to by Bohn a natural explanation of the large-angle scattering of a-particles 
(Rutherford’s work), heuristic promise with respect to periodicity (mentioned above) and 
isotopy. The Rutherford atom, in which the notions of atomic number (equal to the number 
of electrons, determining chemical behaviour) and atomic weight were naturally separate, 
would be amenable to an account of chemically-identical atoms with different atomic 
weights. According to Thomson’s model, however, the number of electrons determined 
both an atom’s weight and its chemical properties, so no such account would be available.
After writing the memorandum, Bohr returned to Copenhagen, got married and taught a 
course in thermodynamics. Towards the end of 1912, or in early 1913, Bohr read the 
papers of Nicholson mentioned in the last section: the spectral aspect of his atomic model 
was bom. At first dismissive of Nicholson’s theory (as he had been on earlier contact with 
Nicholson), Bohr was later to be impressed by its strikingly accurate predictions of spectral 
lines. Initially, Bohr thought this model to be incompatible with his own, but lata, in a 
letta to Rutherford of 31 January 1913, he argued that the two were consistent, but 
described different states of the same system:
1 The brackets indicate the non-existence of this species, qualitatively explained by Bohr.
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... the state of the systems considered in my calculations is to be identified with that of the atoms in 
their permanent (natural) state.
... the states of the systems considered by Nicholson are, [on the] contrary, of a less stable character, 
they are states passed during the formation of the atoms, and are the states in which the energy 
corresponding to the lines o f the spectrum characteristic for the element in question is radiated out.
From this point of view systems of a state as that considered by Nicholson are only present in sensible 
amount in places in which atoms are constantly broken up and formed again; i.e. in places such as 
excited vacuum tubes or stellar nebulae. (See Rosenfeld [1963], ppjcxxvi-vii, my italics)
This letter illustrates Bohr’s original mechanism—inspired by Nicholson’s model—for the 
production of spectral line emissions: they arise from the combination of positive ions and 
electrons to reform neutral atoms. As the electron ‘M s’ from infinity to a permanent stable 
orbit, it passes through many (Nicholson-type) excited states, corresponding to different 
modes of vibration of a Planck oscillator, it either causes electrons in the higher energy 
orbits to release discrete quanta of radiation at their resonance frequencies, or itself 
resonates at these frequencies. This mechanism, likened to ‘a finger drawn across the 
strings of a harp’ in Heilbron and Kuhn’s colourful phrase ([1969], p.263), is still 
essentially classical in that radiation of a given frequency must be emitted by a mechanical 
oscillator of the same frequency. While not uncontested, the connection between radiative 
emission and reformation of atoms from ions was widely accepted. Although it would 
preclude the derivation of the Balmer formula which made his name, Bohr still entertains 
this mechanism in Part I of the trilogy. Also of interest in the letter is Bohr still ruling out a 
theory of atomic spectra:
I must however remark that the considerations sketched here play no essential part of the investigations 
in my paper. I do not at all deal with the question of calculation of the frequencies corresponding to the 
lines in the visible spectrum, (see Rosenfeld [1963], p.xxxvii)
In the next five weeks, Bohr acquainted himself with the spectral equations described above 
(3.1). In particular, his reaction to Balmer’s formula is recorded in his oft-quoted 
recollection ‘As soon as I saw Balmer’s formula, the whole thing was immediately clear to 
me’ (Rosenfeld [1963], p.xxxix). Bohr now recognised that radiative emission must arise 
from transitions between stationary states, which can themselves be identified with the 
spectral terms appearing in the Balmer formula. The correct constant of proportionality (k = 
h/2) between kinetic energy and frequency of radiation was also now in place. These points 
were not settled until Bohr had seen the Balmer formula, which must therefore have played 
a more significant role in Bohr’s working than that attributed to it by Lakatos (see for 
instance his [1970], p. 147), who was more interested in rubbishing the Baconian 
‘inductive ascent’ account of Bohr’s reasoning than in strict historical accuracy. In early
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March, Bohr sent Rutherford a draft of Part I of the trilogy which differed only in minor 
respects from the published version. The speed with which the paper was completed is 
reflected in a curious—but revealing—ambiguity in the paper, as we shall see in the next 
section.
3.3. The H ydrogen  Atom
The first section of Bohr’s [1913] attacks the stability problem associated with Rutherford’s 
atomic structure. Bohr considers a completely classical treatment and deduces the inevitable 
radiative collapse of such a system. In Bohr’s version, electrons were assumed to move in 
elliptical orbits around positively-charged nuclei A one-electron system was considered in 
the first instance, and the treatment made a number of simplifying assumptions: firstly, that 
the nucleus is stationary (nuclear mass being large compared to electronic mass, m); 
secondly, that the electron velocity v is small compared to the speed of light; and thirdly that 
elections describe circular orbits (this makes no difference for one-electron systems). If no 
radiation was emitted, the election would describe a stable orbit (radius r) and there would 
be no net forces on the electron, allowing the equation of inward (electrostatic) and outward 
(centrifugal) forces, the former described by Coulomb’s Law. So we could write, for 
circular orbits:
(1) -  ?£ (where Z = nuclear charge)r j2
but Total Energy Etot -  Kinetic Energy + Potential Energy
„ mv2 r Ze jEtot = — + ! — dri.e. £.0
Integrating and substituting from (1):
J I*
(2) Etc = - § p  = = -W,
where W is the energy that needs to be added to the system to remove the electron to an 
infinite distance from the nucleus. Rearrangement of (2) gives:
™ &   ^ r2 Wi 1/2(3) r = m  and v = j-jjj-j .
Now if the frequency of oibit is co, then for circular orbits:
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(4) o) =
2 nr
and substitution of (3) into (4) gives:
m mnm Ze
So far so classical, but if we follow classical electromagnetic theory, the continually- 
accelerating electron will radiate energy, so Etot will decrease continuously and W will 
increase, as will orbital frequency co. From (2) we can see that r will gradually decrease and 
the electron will spiral into the nucleus: this is the famous radiative collapse. Furthermore, 
the above equations hold out no hope for the calculation of characteristic atomic values for 
the dynamical variables. So if atoms are stable and exhibit constant characteristic 
dimensions far greater than those of the nucleus (as we have seen, Rutherford provided the 
evidence for this), the selection of a denumemble set of allowed orbits would be required of 
a viable atomic model. Also, an entirdy classical treatment would predict a continuous 
emission spectrum, since the frequency of emitted radiation depends on the continuously 
varying frequency of orbit. Over the large number of atoms in a sample of the gas, electron- 
nucleus distances (and therefore frequencies of orbit) would be distributed over all values. 
The discreteness of spectral lines requires again that these quantities assume characteristic 
discrete values for the system.
So far, the structure of Bohr’s argument has been clean (1) Full electromagnetic theory 
predicts the radiative collapse of the atom. (2) Therefore consider a model in which only 
Coulomb’s law is applied, rather than full electromagnetic theory, according to which 
Coulomb’s law holds only approximately. (3) In such a model, if the frequency of emitted 
radiation depends on frequency of dectronic orbit (a hitherto mathematically continuous 
quantity), a continuous spectrum will be predicted. Also, characteristic atomic dimensions 
will be difficult to explain. (4) Therefore, a characteristic discreteness should be introduced 
into the mechanical model.
In Part I of the trilogy, Bohr presents two different and incompatible ways to introduce the 
required discreteness. In the first, characteristic energy values are spedfied as the answer to 
the stability problem. He does this by considering the process of an electron moving from 
infinite distance (for which, trivially, W = co=0) to a stable orbit of radius r, for which 
equations (1) to (5) hold. According to Planck’s theory, an oscillator of frequency co will 
radiate an amount of energy nhco (where n is integral) in a ‘distinctly separated emission’. 
The energy lost in this process is assumed to be emitted as radiation of homogeneous 
frequency v. He secondly assumes that this frequency is equal to half the frequency of the 
final, stable orbit, so v= co/2. Bohr then argues ‘If we assume that the radiation emitted is
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homogeneous, the second assumption concerning the frequency of the radiation suggests 
itself, since the frequency of revolution of the election at the beginning of the emission is 
0.’ (Bohr, [1913], p.5) I can only take this to mean that Bohr saw the emitted radiation 
frequency an ‘average* of the initial and final oibital frequencies: it could be a natural 
consequence of the rather obscure harp analogy. Now Planck’s formula is:
W = nhv , (where n is integral)
so we can put:
(6) W = nhm
Bohr’s use of Planck’s formula as an analogical precedent, and his argument for 
introducing (6), suggest that (6) is to be interpreted (for the purposes of this derivation) in 
the same way that Planck interpreted his formula. It therefore represents a process in which 
an oscillator emits n quanta of energy hco/2, the total emission having energy W. 
Rearranging (6) for co, equating the result with (5) and solving for W gives:
(7) W =
n2h2
Different integer values for n yield a hierarchy of energy states with corresponding values 
for co and r. Furthermore, we can now calculate the atom’s characteristic dimensions. For 
instance, by equations (3) and (7) we can write:
n2h2r =
4jt2mZe
Putting n = 1, Bohr calculates the radius of the atom (among other characteristic constants) 
in the lowest energy state, a value which was ‘of the same order of magnitude’ ([1913], 
p.5) as that obtained by other means. He has therefore solved the problems associated with 
the atom’s stability and characteristic dimensions.
Before Bohr can go on to derive the Balmer formula, however, he must amend his 
mechanism of radiation and therefore his interpretation of (6), so that it represents the (more 
familiar) emission of one quantum of frequency nhwtl. In so doing the connection between 
optical and mechanical frequencies is broken at last. This he does in a passage in which he 
criticises Nicholson’s theory and, implicitly, his own earlier assumptions. He notes that 
Nicholson’s model ‘does not seem to be able to account for the well-known laws of Balmer 
and Rydberg’ ([1913], p.7). A more serious objection to Nicholson’s atom is that:
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systems like those considered, in which the frequency is a function of the energy, cannot emit a finite 
amount of a homogeneous radiation; for, as soon as the emission of radiation is started, the energy and 
also the frequency of the system are altered. (Bohr, [1913], p.7)
If this is the case, the system could not emit n quanta of the same frequency, because as 
soon as one was emitted, the mechanical frequency of the system would change and the 
next quantum would have to have a different frequency. The answer is to drop the 
connection between mechanical and radiative frequencies and re-interpret equation (6), 
which until now has meant that ‘the different stationary states correspond to the emission of 
a different number of Planck’s energy-quanta’ (Bohr, [1913], p.8). Bohr then promises 
that (7) can be arrived at using ‘special assumptions’ of ‘somewhat different form’, and that 
this second derivation will be given later (section 3 of his paper). Bohr’s presentation of all 
this illustrates his awareness that the radiation mechanism behind his first derivation of the 
energy levels was not compatible with the account of the Balmer lines he wanted to give.
A picture emerges of Bohr’s atom bring a quasi-classical system which for some reason 
has a restricted set of possible stationary states: instead of a continuum of them, there 
would only be countably many. To these stationary states would correspond a set of stable 
orbits in which no radiation would be emitted, contrary to riectromagnetic theory. So when 
and how does radiative emission happen? Before answering this question, Bohr expresses 
a version of the agnosticism of the later principle of complementarity, arguing:
(1) That the dynamical equilibrium of the systems in the stationary states can be discussed by help of 
the ordinary mechanics, while the passing of the systems between different stationary states cannot be 
treated on that basis.
(2) That the latter process is followed by the emission of a homogeneous radiation, for which the 
relation between die frequency and the amount of energy emitted is the one given by Planck’s theory. 
(Bohr [1913], p.7)
These considerations allow derivation of the Balmer formula. We ignore the question of the 
detailed mechanics of the emission process and consider only the energy change, AW, 
which accompanies an atom’s transition between states. For a transition between states with 
n = n\ and n = W2, we can write:
Dividing through by Planck’s constant to give the frequency of emitted radiation yields:
AW = Wm - W m
2jr2mZ2e2 1 l i
■
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2jr2mZ2e2 1 1
(8) V =
which can be compared with the formula for the Balmer series:
r l  1v = Rh
(where Rh is the Rydberg constant for hydrogen), suggesting that, since Z = -e for 
hydrogen:
27t2m2Pe2 2  n2me*
«   5 ------- —
The second derivation of the energy levels is supplied as promised in section 3 of the paper, 
where Bohr presents what he takes to be a more rigorous discussion of the assumptions 
required to derive the above equations. First, he explicitly rejects the previous interpretation 
of (6), and therefore the analogy with Planck’s theory, on the grounds stated above. He 
therefore has the problem of fixing the ratio of the energy of the system to the electron’s 
frequency of revolution by some other means. The argument starts with the requirement of 
discrete energy states of the atom (see the argument from stability and constant atomic 
dimensions, above). Bohr now wants a formula expressing the discreteness generally, 
rather than in any particular form, because its exact form will be filled in later. To this end, 
instead of (6), he writes:
(10) W = f(n)hco
By substitution into (5) as before, he gets:
__ j&mZZe2 - Jt2m7^e2= and c% =
2h2f 2(n) 2  h3f 3(n)
If we again consider the change in the system’s energy due to a transition between two 
states and divide the resultant equation through by Planck’s constant to give the frequency 
of the radiation emitted in this process, we have:
nZmZPe2 1 1(12) v =
2 h3
The energy states can then be identified with the integer terms in the Balmer formula, which 
allows the derivation of the form  of function f(n): by inspection it must be f{n) = cn. 
Constant c can be calculated using an argument which applies an early but recognisable
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form of the famous correspondence principle. Consider the system passing between two 
neighbouring stationary states, n = N and n = N - 1. Calculated from (11), the frequency 
of emitted radiation will be:
/ia\ _ nt-mZZe1 2N -  1
V ~  2 <?h3 N 2 ( N -  l ) 2  ’
whereas the mechanical frequencies for the two states are:
„  jfimZPe2 ji2mZ!2-e2'(14) (on = —- ■■ - and aw-l = —— -----------
2c*hHN- 1)3
Bohr then argues:
If N  is great the ratio between the frequency before and after the emission will be very near equal to 1; 
and according to the ordinary electrodynamics we should therefore expect that die ratio between the 
frequency of radiation and die frequency of revolution is very nearly equal to 1. This condition will only 
be satisfied if c = 1/2. (Bohr [1913], p.13)
Substituting f(ri) = n/2 into (10), it is easy to see that Bohr has re-derived equation (6), by
(i) working backwards from the Balmer formula to yield the correct form  of quantisation,
(ii) invoking the correspondence principle in order to fix the constant. Note also that in 
order to reach (12), Bohr has already re-interpreted the emission process so that (6) now 
represents the emission of one Planck energy quantum of frequency nhwl2; in subsequent 
papers the quantum condition will always be interpreted similarly. This, together with the 
use of the correspondence principle, illustrates that this second derivation is in much closer 
conformity to the lata: development of the old quantum theory.
Now Bohr’s quantum condition, equation (6), is famously equivalent to the quantisation of 
angular momentum (for circular orbits) conjectured by Nicholson and Bjerrum. Bohr, 
however, doesn’t make this observation until later in the paper ([1913], p.15), where he 
presents it as a ‘simple interpretation’ of his quantum condition. It is easy to see why Bohr 
would want a simple mechanical expression of his quantum condition, rather than a 
condition restricting radiative emission (although he rules out a u mechanical foundation”). 
Firstly, only a mechanical quantum condition will answer the stability and atomic size 
problems. Secondly, if the quantum condition could be simply expressed mechanically 
(although its exact form was derived with the hdp of the Balmer formula), the theory might 
appear to be a coherent atomic model from which an adequate spectral theory is derivable. 
Otherwise, his explanation of line spectrum formulae would look irredeemably ad hoc (or at 
least semi-empirical), because he would be using an ad hoc restriction on radiative emission
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from an otherwise classical atom to explain radiative emission. So how does Bohr attempt 
to derive this mechanical quantum condition? He writes, for circular orbits:
(15) xM  = -  ,
00
where T is kinetic energy, M angular momentum and co as before. Equation (2) gives:
T = W,
by equation (6) it is easily seen that:
(16) M = —
2  Jt
Thus Bohr’s derivation of the quantisation of angular momentum from equation (6) relies 
on the previous quantisation of another constant of circular motion: kinetic energy. Only 
average kinetic energy is a constant of elliptical orbits, however, and Bohr thought 
electronic orbits in general to be elliptical Since quantising the average value of a variable 
quantity makes much less sense than quantising a constant proper, it seems clear why, in 
later expositions of his theory, Bohr continued to express the quantisation via equation (6), 
even though he might have preferred (for the above reasons) to quantise a mechanical 
quantity. This approach, Heilbron and Kuhn point out, lasts until Sommerfeld’s 
formulation, in 1915, of phase-integral quantum conditions applicable also to elliptical 
orbits. For these reasons, Heilbron and Kuhn label the importance of Bohr’s quantisation 
of angular momentum in the derivation of the Balmer formula as a ‘myth’ (Heilbron and 
Kuhn, [1969], p.280). Whether or not Heilbron and Kuhn are right about this, Bohr’s 
aspiration to quantise angular momentum is surely significant. I will return to this later.
In later accounts of his theory, Bohr entirely drops the close analogy with Planck’s 
radiation process and constructs the system more in line with the second derivation. 
Significantly, it will be noticed that in the first derivation, Bohr gives no compelling 
rationale for introducing the particular form of equation (6) that he did, apart from the rather 
lame aside that it was ‘suggested’ by the homogeneity of emitted radiation and the analogy 
with Planck’s theory. Indeed, Rosenfeld’s account of Bohr’s working seems to indicate the 
first derivation to be something of a post-hoc rationalisation on Bohr’s part. Heilbron and 
Kuhn similarly downgrade the first derivation. However, a brief summary of Bohr’s 
progress towards the published version of his atomic model will invite a different 
conclusion.
As we saw in the last section, Bohr had good reasons to begin work on the Rutherford 
atom. Once he had done so, the arguments from the stability and characteristic constant
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dimensions of the atom suggested the introduction of discrete stationary states, but their 
exact form was unclear. On reading Nicholson’s papers, Bohr was led to the correct 
quantisation via an argument akin to the first derivation of the energy levels, therefore 
invoking the earlier radiation process based on the reformation of atoms from ions. At this 
stage, Bohr did not envisage a theoretical account of spectral lines. Sight of the Balmer 
formula would immediately have suggested the identification of his energy levels with the 
famous integer terms. Explanation of the Balmer formula, however, required the revision 
of this process of radiative emission and the final cutting of the (classical) link between 
optical and mechanical frequencies. The energy levels would then have to be obtained on 
the basis of the correct radiation theory via the second derivation, the (now derived) 
quantum condition being re-interpreted in the process. The price of this theoretical 
correctness was that the Balmer formula became a vital stage in the derivation, and his 
reasoning had a consequent ad hoc air. On the plus side, Bohr was forced to drop the 
heuristic analogy with Planck’s interpretation, instead using the much more powerful 
correspondence principle to take him from the classical equations to their quantum 
successors. The first derivation was no 'post hoc rationalisation’, but a genuine stage in 
Bohr’s reasoning, albeit one which was incorrect from the point of view of the later theory.
3.4. Success
Bohr’s derived optical frequency equation predicted a series of spectral series, 
corresponding to integer values n2 = 1,2, 3, etc. and n\ = (712 + 1), t e  + 2), etc. 
Calculations in which empirical values were put in for constants appearing in his equations 
would have yielded two previously observed spectral series: the Balmer series in the visible 
region (with 712 = 2); and the other (with nz = 3) observed by Paschen in the near infra-red 
in 1908. More interestingly, unobserved series were predicted: putting 712 = 1 gave a series 
in the ultra-violet region (observed by Lyman in 1914); putting 712 = 4 and 5 gave two infra­
red series (observed by Brackett in 1922 and Pfund in 1924 respectively). Furthermore, the 
theoretical value for the empirical Rydberg constant suggested by equation (9) was found to 
be fairly accurate; Bohr gave figures of 3.1 x 1015 and 3.290 x 1015 respectively, the 
difference being within the limits of observational error in the values of the relevant 
constants (Bohr [1913], p.9).
More striking (and, for Lakatos, methodologically revealing) empirical success came with 
Bohr’s application of his model in the same paper to singly-ionised Helium, He+. A series 
of spectral lines, observed by Pickering in the spectrum of the star t, Puppis, had 
previously been identified by Rydberg (1896) as the sharp subordinate series of atomic 
hydrogen. Reasoning by analogy with the spectra of the alkali metals, the Balmer series
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would have been its diffuse counterpart. From Rydberg’s spectral equation, the 
wavelengths of the corresponding principal series could therefore be calculated. A line close 
to the first line of the predicted series was observed in the spectrum of t, Puppis and the 
solar chromosphere (Fowler, 1898). In 1912, Fowler used a hydrogen-helium mixture in a 
discharge tube to produce lines close to the required wavelengths for the rest of the series, 
as well as a series in the ultraviolet region identified as the second principal series of 
hydrogen. There remained the unexplained problem of small but systematic differences 
between the predicted and empirical wavelengths.
The failure of Bohr’s model to predict these lines would have been problematic, were they 
really to have arisen from hydrogen transitions. However, Bohr calculated that the lines 
could be accounted for using a version of equation (9) for helium (i.e. by putting Z = 2e), 
removing the hydrogen model’s apparent omission. This contention was supported by 
Evans, who, at Bjerrum’s suggestion (related by Bohr) produced the lines in question in a 
tube filled only with helium and chlorine (present to catalyse the ionisation of the helium). 
Fowler, however, objected that the accuracy of Bohr’s calculations was no better than 
Rydberg’s (hydrogen based) account, there still being discrepancies. These objections were 
withdrawn when Bohr improved the accuracy of his electronic energy values by replacing 
electronic mass m in the formula for the Rydberg constant with reduced mass p, to give:
where p = • (m^r= nuclear mass)
This replacement amounted to taking into account the motion of the helium nucleus, the 
original formula corresponding to the (counterfactual!) infinite nuclear mass approximation, 
and, when supported by the experiments of Evans, Fowler and Paschen, corroborated 
Bohr’s theory and destroyed the generality of Rydberg’s spectral equations. Lakatos’ 
famous [1970] interpretation of this sequence of events was that Bohr’s new improved 
model corrected a ‘lower level’ empirical law, converting a possible ‘refutation’ into 
predictive success. As significant, however, was the way that Bohr achieved this success. 
An apparent anomaly was explained by making the model more accurate. The increased 
accuracy was achieved by correcting an idealisation that was already known to make the 
original model counterfactual. Thus the correction would have been made at some point 
anyway, for reasons internal to the theory: this is the autonomy o f theoretical development 
that Lakatos claimed was so typical of research driven by powerful heuristic. The heuristic 
power of a research programme arises in part from the illustrative analogies that are drawn 
between structures known only by mathematical description and those of more familiar 
acquaintance. That Bohr was readily able to calculate the difference that would be made by
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a moving nucleus underlines the close analogy between his atomic model and the 
Newtonian picture of the solar system. It was this analogy and the mathematical techniques 
developed for the latter that provided the former with its heuristic power. (For further 
discussion on this point see 3.6).
Parts II and HI of the trilogy were much in line with the programme outlined in Bohr’s 
memorandum to Rutherford of 1912, and had therefore been conceived much earlier. 
However, compared with the startling success of Part I, the lata* instalments were mostly 
qualitative and programmatic, with figures and calculations appearing mainly in the form of 
order-of-magnitude plausibility arguments. The chief problem was, of course, the extreme 
difficulty of the calculations. Most of the support the model publicly enjoyed arose from the 
explanations it allowed of the line spectra of simple atoms.
3.5. Was the Bohr Atom  Inconsistent?
In what follows, I will consider some of the methodological judgements pronounced on the 
Bohr atom. Firstly, there is the inconsistency accusation, stated by Einstein (among many 
others) at the time, Jammer in a historical account, and Lakatos and Feyerabend in 
methodological contexts. The natural strong sharpening of the charge of ‘inconsistency* is 
to one of logical inconsistency. Lakatos makes this accusation a number of times (for 
instance [1970], [1971a] and [1974]), and even draws a methodological lesson from it, in 
his attempt to falsify Popperian falsificationism:
[T|his does not mean that the discovery of an inconsistency—or of an anomaly—must immediately 
stop the development of a programme: it may be rational to put die inconsistency into some 
temporary, ad hoc quarantine, and cany on with the positive heuristic of the programme.
(Lakatos, [1970], p.143)
There can be no ‘instant rationality’. Neither the logician’s proof o f inconsistency nor the experimental 
scientist’s verdict of anomaly am defeat a research programme at one blow. (Lakatos [1974], p.249)
Taking Bohr’s atom as historiographical evidence, Lakatos judged it scientifically honest to 
‘quarantine’ an inconsistency—its existence publicly recorded, of course—while further 
developing the research programme. This relaxation of what is usually taken to be a fairly 
weak requirement of rationality—that of logical consistency—seems itself inconsistent with 
Lakatos’ own comment that in a progressive research programme, theories ‘should be 
largely built according to a preconceived unifying idea, laid down in advance in the positive 
heuristic’ (Lakatos [1974], p.249). Unless, of course, an inconsistent set of assumptions 
can serve as the ‘unifying idea’, in which case his requirement is not the strict one he
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claimed it to be. Feyerabend [1988] likewise saw the Bohr atom (along with the early 
infinitesimal calculus) as evidence of the growth of knowledge flouting the “tyranny of 
logic”. In fact, Lakatos’ judgement on inconsistency formed part of Feyerabend’s [1976] 
critique of the standards of scientific honesty embodied in the methodology of scientific 
research programmes. Feyerabend observed that to countenance as honest the 
‘quarantining’ of an inconsistency or empirical anomaly, given that its presence is recorded, 
is to do the same for a thief who openly declares his thievery.
To be quite fair to Lakatos, he did go to some trouble in his [1970] to distinguish strong 
and weak inconsistencies. According to this distinction, two propositions are inconsistent 
in the strong sense if their conjunction has no model. Two propositions are weakly 
inconsistent if they are inconsistent when the terms appearing therein are given a fixed 
interpretation, but do share some (unintended) models. The importance of the inconsistency 
depends on whether the relevant terms reformative or merely descriptive. For Lakatos, 
Bohr acknowledged the inconsistency by formulating the (in)famous complementarity 
principle, according to which there are parts of the world whose complete understanding 
requires different incompatible descriptions. Lakatos then accused him of elevating 
inconsistency to the status of a heuristic principle. He also declared that
consistency—in the strong sense of the term—must remain an important regulative principle ... and 
inconsistencies (including anomalies) must be seen as problems. The reason is simple. If science aims 
at truth, it must aim at consistency; if it resigns consistency, it resigns truth. To claim that ‘we must 
be modest in our demands’, that we must resign ourselves to—weak or strong—inconsistencies, 
remains a methodological vice. (Lakatos, [1970], p. 143)
On the other hand, Lakatos drew no methodological distinction between the temporary 
toleration of strong and weak inconsistencies, claiming that proof of inconsistency—weak 
or strong—could not provide grounds for ‘instant rationality’. Furthermore, he never 
explicitly claimed that Bohr’s theory suffered from weak (rather than strong) inconsistency, 
and often cited it as a historiographical example in the same paragraphs as the inconsistency 
of the early infinitesimal calculus and Fregean logicism after Russell’s paradox (see for 
instance Lakatos [1971a], p.l 12-3 and [1974], p.248). I think that the distinction between 
the strong and weak forms of inconsistency is crucial, and that there is a fundamental 
disanalogy between the methodological standing of the Bohr atom and the early 
infinitesimal calculus on the one hand, and Fregean logicism at the time of Russell’s 
paradox on the other.
It is not clear on what grounds Lakatos would have identified a logical inconsistency in 
Bohr’s theory, apart from its being the natural reading a philosopher would give to 
Einstein’s oft-quoted suspicions of incoherence behind Bohr’s assumptions:
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That this insecure and contradictory foundation was sufficient to enable a man of Bohr's unique instinct 
and tact to discover the major laws of the spectral lines and of the electron shells of the atoms, together 
with their significance for chemistry appeared to me like a miracle—and appears to me as a miracle 
even today. (Einstein, [1951], p.83)
Now Lakatos set out to explain the intuitive judgements of scientists; to rationalise an 
Einsteinian judgement must have been of primary importance. There is, however, no trace 
of a contemporary “logician’s proof” of the inconsistency of Bohr’s atomic model. Such a 
negative existential statement cannot of course be proved, but I will make, as a pedantic 
point of elementary logic, the observation that from any logically inconsistent set of 
sentences can be derived p & -ip, for any proposition p. In particular, this means that for 
any observation statement that was seen at the time to be hypothetico-deductive evidence for 
Bohr’s theory, both it and its negation would have been derivable from Bohr’s 
assumptions. This would have been well known in 1913, a number of years after Russell’s 
deep ‘intellectual sorrow’ (Russdl [1959], p.73) at the detection of antinomies at the heart 
of Frege’s logicist edifice. It therefore seems inconceivable that the corroborating evidence 
cited in 3.4 would have been recognised as such, were there to have been a proof of the 
logical inconsistency of the theory. As it stands, this is a weak historical argument based on 
(what I take to be) intellectual standards in force in 1913. The weakness is that it merely 
assumes that the communities of logicians and physicists would share such a desire for 
consistency. However, the argument can be turned round: one starts with the ‘principle of 
charity’ when interpreting other people’s statements. Thus contemporary methodological 
utterances are interpreted in such a way that they express at least partial truth, where 
possible. To this is added the observation that there is no evidence that the community of 
physicists of 1913 would have tolerated logical inconsistency in general. The clinching 
argument would be that there is no evidence for either of the following particular historical 
theses: (i) that Bohr’s theory actually was logically inconsistent; and (ii) that it was thought 
to be so at the time.
So where did the logical inconsistency claim come from? Lakatos [1970] characterised 
Bohr’s theory as quantum stipulation ‘grafted’ on to Maxwell’s theory of 
electromagnetism. He was mistaken, however, in thinking that the whole Maxwell edifice 
was required for Bohr’s successful predictions. As their derivation in 3.3 shows, one can 
get by with just the electrostatic Coulomb’s Law to give the initial equation of forces. This 
point is crucial, because it might explain the otherwise incomprehensible inconsistency 
accusation. If, onto a theory which predicts p  (i.e. radiative collapse of the Rutherford 
atom) one grafts some assumptions, and the extended theory allows deduction of —\p 
(imodulo auxiliaries, of course), then prima fade one has a case of logical inconsistency. It 
depends, however, what you mean by ‘grafting on’. If Lakatos meant simple conjunction
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he was right about the inconsistency, but wrong if he thought he was still referring to 
Bohr’s theory. In the crucial derivation of the optical frequencies, Bohr needed to assume 
only an approximation to full electromagnetic theory—Coulomb’s Law—that was 
furthermore strictly inconsistent with it (see equation 1). Furthermore, as we saw in 3.3, 
Bohr explicitly rejected the application of classical electromagnetic theory to his model.
Thus historical thesis (i) is false, but one can see why Lakatos might have believed it. The 
strong reading of the inconsistency charge is historically groundless: wherever the 
inconsistency in Bohr’s theory lies, it is surely not in its logical structure.
Physical theories are not, however, uninterpreted syntactical structures. When a physical 
theory is constructed, the author has in mind an intended interpretation. If she did not, it 
would not be possible to make the theory predictive, since there would be no explanatory 
domain; it would not be about anything. The intended interpretation encodes the general 
theoretical framework through which the theory ‘says something’ about the world. Its 
content arises from background theories, the author’s metaphysical prejudices and any 
mathematical analogies that can be drawn between the theory at hand and better-understood 
theories. Therefore this intended interpretation will have excess content (I do not mean 
empirical content) with respect to the mathematical theory which is an attempt to formalise 
it This is provable if the theory is formalisable in the first order predicate calculus. From 
the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem it follows that every first order system which allows 
infinite models has non-standard models—models which satisfy sentences which are false 
in the standard interpretation. There are, of course, more interesting ways to prove the 
failure of categoricity than via cardinality, as the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem does, but 
cardinality suffices. A natural interpretation of this theorem is that the formal theory fails to 
characterise fully the structure of the standard model, which therefore has some excess 
content not captured by the theory. In other words, the theory fails to be categorical. What 
the formal theory does capture, of course, is just that structure which the standard and non­
standard models share. Quine, of course, is another precedent for this view of ontology and 
sentences, although he would no doubt be impatient with the mentalistic connotations of the 
phrase ‘intended interpretation’.
If, as I argued above, the Bohr atom’s perceived inconsistency does not lie in its syntactical 
structure—the equations—then perhaps it is located in the intended interpretation. The 
excess content account of the Bohr atom’s failings would be that the mathematical part of 
the theory was inspired by two different and incompatible intended models, one being the 
mathematically continuous world of classical electrodynamics and the Newtonian solar 
system, the other the (rather ill-formed as yet) Planck-Einstein ontology of quantised 
oscillators. On this story, the perceived inconsistency occurred when equations arising 
naturally as formalisations of the two informal theories were conjoined to yield a theory
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which, although logically consistent (there being a logical interpretation which satisfied it), 
was not satisfied by any single physical model available at the time, or at least had no single 
natural associated interpretation. Bohr’s theory must have appeared unfounded and 
fantastic—when realistically interpreted—against the towering theoretical edifice that was 
classical electromagnetic theory. There was, as yet, no suitable theoretical background in 
which to embed it, although efforts to construct one were an important part of the historical 
process that eventually overthrew Maxwell’s theory.
The perceived inconsistency then turns out to be semantical and historically bounded. It is a 
historical fact about the context of the theory’s proposal, rather than a timeless property of 
the theory’s logical structure. It might be pointed out that any consistent first order theory 
has a model, and so interpretations would have been there for the constructing (if Bohr’s 
theory was consistent: see above). However, not all of them would have been permissible 
as physical models against the background of available (meta-)physical theories. Logical 
constructibility implies neither possession nor scientific viability. This account, I think, is 
corroborated by Bohr’s search for a coherent interpretation of his quantum condition. He 
re-interpreted it when he changed the theoretical radiation process, meanwhile keeping the 
same equations. This reinterpretation allowed him to explain the Balmer formula, an 
explanation that would have been unavailable under the previous interpretation. In a sense, 
Bohr was changing his theory at this point, but the change was between two theories that 
shared the same equations.
Feyerabend makes a useful connected point in his [1964], at a time when he was collecting 
the historical exceptions to methodological rules that later convinced him that there are no 
exceptionless methodologies. He begins by observing that as far as he is concerned, the 
general methodological arguments against instrumentalism are telling and conclusive. It is 
therefore preferable (for heuristic and predictive reasons) to interpret a theory realistically. 
However, there are times when, given background theories, the theory one accepts 
becomes false when this is done. The bulk of his paper is spent in consideration of two 
historical examples held to bear out this thesis. The first of these is quantum mechanics, 
which is false if considered in conjunction (interpreted realistically, of course) with General 
Relativity—hence the (apparent) instrumentalism of Copenhagen. His second example, the 
heliocentric Copemican cosmology against an Aristotelian background, is even more telling 
for a realist, because of the final outcome of the historical process. At the time of that 
episode, it will be remembered, the motion of the earth was widely considered to be 
physically laughable, because the prevailing Aristotelian physics—in which an object left to 
itself will remain at rest—predicted that objects thrown into the air would get left behind by 
the earth’s motion and would therefore appear to fly off into space. Given that they don’t, 
the natural response to this theoretical-empirical argument would be to give an instrumental
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interpretation to a theory which assumed the earth’s motion. Thus in a certain restricted 
sense Osiander and Cardinal Bdlarmine were correct. However, Feyerabend argues that
a realist cannot rest content with the general remark that theories just are descriptions and not merely 
instruments. He must then also revise the accepted physics in such a manner that the inconsistency is 
removed; i.e. he must actively contribute to the development of factual knowledge rather than make 
comments ... about die results of this development. In addition he must offer methodological 
considerations as to why one should change successful theories in order to accommodate new and 
strange points of view. An excellent example of this situation is provided by the arguments against the 
realistic interpretation of the Copernican hypothesis and by the attempts that were made in order to 
overcome these arguments. (Feyerabend, [1964], p. 177)
Thus if one does wish to interpret one’s favourite theories realistically, one will not be 
content with sets of theories which are not consistent when so interpreted. Realist 
Copemicans should therefore have endeavoured to replace the Aristotelian kinematics, 
which is just what they did over the next few centuries. The fact that Bohr strove for a 
theoretical background which would allow his equations to explain atomic line spectra is 
evidence that he put the same constraint on his own theorising.
Now we can draw a connection between Feyerabend’s comments, Lakatos’ promulgation 
of weak consistency as a regulative principle, and my central argument. Each of 
Feyerabend’s historical examples cited a theory which, when interpreted realistically, 
contradicted relevant accepted background theories. I have been arguing that the Bohr 
atom’s spectral explanations and predictions were seen as methodologically suspect at the 
time just because there was no readily-available interpretation of the mathematical theory 
that was either consistent with—or capable of entirely replacing—relevant background 
theories and their associated interpretations. Instead, different parts of the theory were 
drawn from theoretical edifices with contradictory interpretive traditions. Whatever the 
reason, the Bohr theory’s lack of a natural interpretation was methodologically problematic 
at the time, and made its eventual replacement (or that of the background theories) 
inevitable: in Lakatos’ terminology, the Bohr atom was weakly inconsistent with the 
background theories of the time. The similarity between Feyerabend’s account and mine is 
obvious when we note that they share a fundamental methodological intuition.2 The 
common intuition is the requirement that every theoretical complex has a coherent intended 
interpretation in line with which it was constructed. Furthermore, this favoured model 
should be consistent with any (suitably interpreted) background theories which impinge on 
its domain of applicability. This last requirement is not, of course, a nascent criterion of
2 Given that Feyerabend entertained such things in 1964.
117
THE BOHR ATOM
demarcation, but rather a cross between pious hope, historiographical thesis and human 
necessity. Neither is it original: Lakatos formulated the same thing in the vocabulary of his 
methodology (see bdow). The intuition—a realist adage of long standing—is that 
instrumental interpretation can only ever be a temporary response to interpretive 
incoherence, never an end in itself. Instrumentalism as an end would be the enemy of 
progress; it is the push to overcome interpretive and theoretical (as much as empirical) 
difficulties that drives theoretical development.
3.6. W as t h e  B o h r  A tom  Ad  Hocf!
Having located the inconsistency in Bohr’s theory, another methodological issue arises: 
was it ad hod  Heilbron and Kuhn ([1969], p.266) say so, but don’t expand on the claim or 
comment on its methodological import. In this section I will answer the question with 
reference to the precise formulation of the phrase tad hod provided by Lakatos, in the 
process unearthing another precedent for the interpretive requirement outlined at the end of 
the last section. In his [1971a], Lakatos attempted to formalise the intuitive notion of ad- 
hocness in line with his methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP), in the 
process distinguishing three distinct varieties. This classification was amended by Zahar 
[1973]. Originally defined by Lakatos to be a relationship between a theory and its 
predecessors in the research programme of which it is a product, ad-hocness was later 
redefined (Zahar, [1978]) so that it corresponded to a three-place relation between a 
problem situation, a theory and a heuristic. Although philosophically novel, this 
redefinition makes no difference at the historical level, because the heuristic is mainly 
identified as a historical item through its influence on the construction of a series of 
theories. My main interest in this aspect of Bohr’s reasoning will be in this historical sense 
and the redefinition anyway makes my task easier. A theory is said to be ad hoc\ if it has no 
empirical content over the problem situation which it was constructed to explain. A theory 
is ad hoc2—with respect to a particular explanandum or problem situation—if it does have 
such excess empirical content, but this contort has not, however, been empirically tested, 
or has been found to conflict with some observations. Lastly (and most crucially for this 
chapter) a theory is ad hoes if the assumptions brought in to deal with the problem situation 
'sit uneasily’ with the hard core, invoking a different (perhaps inconsistent) metaphysics to 
it Thus they are not constructed in the spirit of the explanatory technique of the relevant 
research programme and therefore ‘violate the heuristic’. One example of this last might 
include ascription of wave-like properties in a theory arising from a corpuscularist research 
programme, as in Newton’s famous ‘fits’ of easy transmission, used by him to explain the 
increased (rather than decreased) speed of light inside solid objects. Another example of an
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ad hoc3 move relevant to this chapter is the quantisation of hitherto continuous dynamical 
quantities in a mathematically continuous research programme.
The above definitions of what it is for a theory to be ad hoc allude to a 'problem situation’, 
a ‘heuristic’ and the ‘relevant research programme’, therefore to answer the question in 
hand, one must identify these items. Bohr knew that his theory was a decisive break with 
the classical tradition and constantly referred to the ‘limited validity of ordinary mechanics’. 
However, his starting point in the 1913 paper was the classical instability of the Rutherford 
model. Furthermore, this was no mere rhetorical device, because we saw in 3.3 that 
stability initially was Bohr’s chief perceived explanandum. So it is surely reasonable to 
infer that the perceived problem situation, which Bohr’s theory was to explain, was the 
instability (both radiative and mechanical) of the classical Rutherford atom. Heilbron and 
Kuhn argue that the Balmer formula (along the rest of radiation theory) was also 
heuristically important, or, in the present terminology, that it was among the perceived 
problem situations the theory was constructed to accommodate. However, although 
historically correct, in that Bohr arrived at the final form of his theory only after seeing the 
Balmer formula, the role the empirical formula played isn’t that great, since the only formal 
difference it made was fixing the form of a quantum condition whose necessity had already 
been argued for on independent grounds. On the other hand, Lakatos is clearly mistaken 
when he claims that ‘Bohr had not even heard of these formulae before he wrote the first 
version of his paper’ (Lakatos, [1970], p. 147), because according to Bohr’s own 
testimony (and the timetable of the trilogy’s writing bears this out), the Balmer formula was 
instrumental in his coming to the final interpretation of the quantum condition. Hitherto, as 
I argued in 3.4, Bohr had been working with a radiation mechanism which was in far 
closer analogy to Planck’s conception, but the sight of the Balmer formula led him to the 
‘correct’ interpretation, in which transitions between stable stationary states were the origin 
of spectral emission. The assumption brought in to deal with the original problem situation 
is then easily identified as the quantum condition, which after all was what was necessary 
to avoid the problem of radiative collapse.
So what was the relevant research programme? This is a more difficult question to answer, 
because Lakatos’ methodological superstructure becomes rather cumbersome in just those 
situations where there is no clear candidate for this role, defined as it is in tarns of 
‘heuristic’ and ‘hard core’. These items regulate the construction of theories in a research 
programme, being the MSRP answer to tadting-type paradoxes, among other problems. As 
I argued earlier, the problem with the Bohr atom is just that it lacked such unifying 
principles which would (ideally) supply the extra-theoretical content in line with which 
later, more sophisticated, versions were to be constructed. However, some information on 
this point can be gleaned from Bohr’s reply to Fowler’s reference to the Pickering lines (see
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3.5, above). Bohr, it will be remembered, improved the accuracy of his model with the 
typically classical replacement of electron mass by reduced mass, indicating that he had 
Keplerian orbits in mind for the stationary states. Furthermore, there is nothing in Bohr’s 
equations themselves that would indicate how they might be made more accurate, but 
central to the Rutherford model of the atom was the analogy with the solar system. Bohr 
applied mathematical techniques (for instance perturbation theory) that had been developed 
over the previous centuries as a by-product of the construction of extremely accurate 
planetary orbits. Of course, this classical and continuous structure is overwritten by the 
quantum condition. Overall, the theory has a classical flavour mitigated by the agnostic 
stance towards the mechanism of transition between the stationary states which hid behind 
the correspondence principle. Although he was aware that classical mechanics was ripe for 
replacement, Bohr’s research programme had this classical aspect just because in 1913 
there was no appropriate theoretical background with which to motivate his theory- 
construction, apart from the (higher order) correspondence principle. The metaphysical 
background, then, is classical by default and the theory’s truly novel content—the quantum 
condition—was physically uninterpreted. Although Bohr made a number of comments 
about the breakdown of classical concepts, this breakdown had, as yet, only a limited 
application in a formal mathematical theory. So Bohr simply had no choice but to advance 
his programme according to a classical plan.
We can now answer the question of whether Bohr’s theory was ad hoc under any of the 
above categories. It is obvious that Bohr’s theory was neither ad hoc\ nor ad hoc2. Firstly, 
it could not have been ad hoc\, since it did have excess empirical content beyond 
assumptions (the quantisation of electron orbits) brought in to deal with the problem 
situation for which the theory was constructed (the radiative collapse of the classical 
Rutherford atom). This excess empirical content was, of course, embodied in the 
spectroscopic predictions for non-Balmer hydrogen series and the spectral series of other 
one-electron atoms. So was it ad hocfl The equation for the energy differences between 
states, which invites comparison with the Balmer formula, follow—in the first derivation— 
from the assumptions introduced by Bohr to solve the stability problem (i.e. for 
independent reasons). We saw in 3.3 that the other derivation used the Balmer formula to 
fix the exact form of the quantisation, although Bohr had independent reasons for 
introducing a quantum condition of some form: the problem of stability. However, this is to 
ignore the heuristic importance of the sight of the Balmer formula in bringing Bohr to the 
correct radiation process. But this is all beside the point, because there was excess empirical 
content (the Paschen series and the value for the Rydberg constant) even beyond the Balmer 
formula. This information played no part in the construction of the theory and was 
furthermore confirmed before Bohr even constructed his theory, so it was bom
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corroborated even if it was constructed via ad hoci reasoning from the Balmer formula. 
Bohr’s theory was not ad hoci from the moment it hit the page.
So was the theory ad hocfl Its structure—Coulomb’s Law, classical kinematics and 
quantisation—is a curious and certainly not unified, mix of the continuous and the discrete. 
Via the correspondence principle, Bohr quantised only those quantities for which continuity 
was thought to fail: no overarching rationale for quantisation was produced. The theory 
consequently looks ad hoes. At this point, the connection can be drawn between my 
account of the inconsistency in Bohr’s theory lying in its excess content and its being ad 
hoc3. The two are intimately connected. To be ad hoes is to lack a coherent guiding 
metaphysics. Where is this guiding metaphysics located? In the excess content of the 
intended interpretation over the formalised theory.
Conclusion
So what was the promised methodological principle which the Bohr atom transgresses, 
which was expressed in the adverse methodological comments directed at Bohr’s theory 
and which ensured its eventual replacement? Bohr’s theory lacked a unified guiding 
metaphysics in line with which the formal theory was interpreted and further theory 
versions constructed. Therefore the sensible thing for Bohr to do, as the Feyerabend of 
1964 argued, was to interpret part of his theory—the quantisation and consequent jumps 
between states—instrumentally, although Bohr later added a philosophical superstructure to 
this stratagem. This instrumental interpretation amounts to the ‘quarantining’ alluded to by 
Lakatos. So in the ideal limit, a powerful—progressive in Lakatos terminology—research 
programme will be one that enjoys the heuristic resource of and understandable and unified 
metaphysics superimposed on the bare formal theory. However, mindful of the heuristic 
role that this metaphysics is supposed to play, we can see that not just any ontology will do: 
there are constraints on useful interpretations. My guess is that the research programmes 
that progress fastest are those which impose a realistic interpretation on their successive 
theories. It is significant that Bohr expended much time and effort ensuring that the 
derivation he supplied for the quantum condition was consistent with the physical process 
he thought it represented. He already had the equation and knew that it could account for 
the Balmer formula if interpreted correctly, but this was not good enough: he wanted the 
equation to arise naturally from its interpretation. This suggests that he was implicitly 
applying a rule much like that presented here: interpret your equations in coherent fashion.
A historical prediction follows: when no such coherent interpretation is available and 
(partial) instrumentalism is necessary as a temporary response to theoretical difficulty, it
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will be recorded as a failing by contemporaries (cf. Einstein’s comments). In the long run, 
the interpretational problem will inspire either the overthrow of the background theory or 
the construction of a suitable interpretation, which might facilitate a new overarching theory 
(viz. quantum mechanics). This realist requirement is entirely methodological: it is a 
recognition that the aspiration to interpret one’s favourite theories realistically motivates the 
construction of unified pictures of the world, and that these have constituted some of the 
best examples of the growth of scientific knowledge. It does not imply the truth of such 
theories.
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4SCHRODINGER VS. HEISENBERG 
OR
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTENDED INTERPRETATIONS
After a further ten minutes of hard climbing we were standing in the sun—at saddle height 
above the sea of fog. To the south we could see the peaks of the Sonnwend Mountains 
and beyond them die snowy tops of the Central Alps, and we all breathed a sigh of relief.
In atomic physics, likewise, the winter of 1924-1925 had obviously brought us to a 
realm where the fog was thick but where some light had begun to filter through and held 
out the promise of exciting new vistas. (Heisenberg [1971], pp.59-60)
Introduction
The circumstances surrounding the proposal of the two formalisms of quantum mechanics 
in 1925 and 1926 have inspired many a critique of scientific realism. Fine [1984] makes his 
attack a methodological one. The chief thrust of the argument is that the progress that has 
been achieved in the quantum domain since the 1930s might not have happened had 
physicists in general held up the development of the theory until Einstein and other 
dogmatic realists were satisfied that the theory was consistent with a metaphysics that 
realists would find attractive. Not only was realism illegitimate, it was also unhealthy.
In this chapter, I will take issue with Fine's historical claim that quantum mechanics was 
the product of a research effort with purely instrumentalist aims. In 4.1, Fine’s argument 
will be examined and the historical theses identified. These will be compared with the actual 
history in 4.2 and 4.3, which deal with the progress of Heisenberg and Schrodinger 
towards their respective formalisms. Neither these developments nor the authors’ 
subsequent attitudes to their creations, it will be argued, make sense given a purely 
instrumentalist rationale Section 4.4 can be read as an existence claim for intended physical 
interpretations, especially on Schrodinger’s part, in that the calculi of the two theories were 
equivalent, but the theories themselves could be distinguished by their authors’ intended 
interpretations. It is argued that Schrodinger in particular envisaged developments of his 
theory that were peculiarly dependent on his interpretation.
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4. l . F ine, Abducitve Inferences an d  Twentieth-Century  Phy sics
What has killed realism, argues Fine in his [1984], is not only the neopositivists’ ability to
accept all the results of science, including all die members of the scientific zoo, and still declare that 
the questions raised by the existence claims of realism were mere pseudoquestions. (Fine [1984], p.83)
There was an accomplice in quantum mechanics:
Its [i.e. realism’s] death was hastened by the debates over the interpretation of quantum theory, where 
Bohr’s nonrealist philosophy was seen to win out over Einstein's passionate realism. Its death was 
certified, finally, as the last two generations of physical scientists turned their backs on realism and 
have managed, nevertheless, to do science without it. ([1984], p.83)
In other words, the history of quantum mechanics shows that scientists need not construct 
and interpret their theories in accordance with realist claims. It is one of the chief aims of 
this chapter to take issue with Fine’s brief portrayal of the history of twentieth-century 
physics as an enterprise whose aims and methods are primarily those of the instrumentalist. 
First, however, it would be useful to reiterate Fine’s attack on realism, so that the 
differences between ‘realist’ and ‘non-realist’ methodological claims are manifest.
In 2.2, we saw Fine validate the death certificate for realism by pointing to the poverty of 
the expkmationist argument that realism is the best explanation of the success of science, 
which he argued to require an inference that itself is at the heart of anti-realist worries 
concerning realism. The methodological twist—that realism provides the best explanation 
of the success of realist strategies of theory construction—was argued by Fine to be subject 
to the same objection. Thus even i/the premises of the methodological arguments were 
correct, they would still be of no use: realism would be no more attractive to sceptical eyes. 
Call this the circularity objection. Fine added to this the claim that the strategies invoked by 
the methodological twist—the ‘ small handful’ being the example—could not in any case be 
rationalised on the basis of realism, in other words that methodological realism (MR) could 
not explain the prevalence of such strategies. The thesis that theories might be constructed 
with purely instrumentalist virtues in mind—methodological instrumentalism—was held to 
explain the small handful strategy more efficiently (see 2.4 to 2.6 for a rebuttal).
Concluding that MR cannot support scientific realism (SR), and that MR cannot explain 
scientific practice, Fine goes on to argue that ‘realism has not always been a progressive 
factor in the development of science’ (Fine [1984], p.91). In other words, MR is actually 
false. Two historical examples are cited that purportedly refute MR. Firstly, there is 
Einstein’s much-cited Machian construction of relativity. The young Einstein, according to 
Fine, applied Occam’s razor to absolute space and time with a zeal only available to paid-up
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positivists. Einstein’s ‘Machist line’, which was ‘always used to deny that some concept 
has a real referent’ ([1984], p.92), was indispensable to Einstein’s discovery of special 
relativity. As this young Einstein got older, he underwent a ‘philosophical conversion’, so 
that by 1920
Einstein wanted to claim genuine reality for the central theoretical entities of the general theory, the 
four-dimensional space-time manifold and associated tensor fields. ([1984], p.92)
This leap of faith cannot be a precondition of the development of relativistic theories, 
however, because
the majority opinion among working, knowledgeable scientists is that general relativity provides a 
magnificent organizing tool for treating certain gravitational problems in astrophysics and cosmology. 
([1984], p.92)
Fine concludes that
For relativistic physics, then, it appears that a nonrealist attitude was important in its development, 
that the founder nevertheless espoused a realist attitude to the finished product, but that most who 
actually use it think of the theory as a powerful instrument, rather than as expressing a ‘big truth’. 
([1984], p.92)
Fine’s second example is Heisenberg’s construction of matrix mechanics, and 
Schrddinger’s of wave mechanics. Heisenberg, of course, began his [1925] paper with a 
famously positivistic abstract:
In this paper an attempt will be made to obtain bases for a quantum theoretical mechanics based 
exclusively on relations between quantities observable in principle. (Heisenberg [1925], p.261)
Heisenberg consciously rejected ‘the very idea that one should try to form any idea of a 
reality underlying his mechanics’ (Fine [1984], p.92). Schrodinger, meanwhile, briefly 
entertained a ‘vague picture of an underlying wavelike reality for his own equation.’ 
([1984], p.92-3), but difficulties and objections forced him to abandon ‘the attempt to 
interpolate any reference to reality.’ ([1984], p.93) Heisenberg’s and Schrddinger’s 
‘instrumentalist moves, away from a realist construal of the emerging quantum theory’ 
([1984], p.93) were capped by the triumph of Bohr’s interpretation of the new theory at the 
Solvay conference of 1927. This ‘quantum nonrealism’ has provided the ‘conceptual 
backdrop’ for fifty years’ progress in microphysics. Furthermore, it is now standardly 
imbibed by students with the milk of their lecture notes, and must therefore have inspired 
the growth of physical knowledge from 1927 onwards.
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For Fine, the subsequent debate between Bohr and Einstein over the correct interpretation 
of quantum theory was more than just an ‘idle intellectual exercise* ([1984], p.93); it was 
‘an important endeavor undertaken by Bohr on behalf of the enterprise of physics as a 
progressive science.’ ([1984], p.93) Now Fine refers to the dispute in a sweeping 
historical story whose chief aim is to provide an argument against realism and its 
methodological place in science. Elsewhere in the article, Fine took the problem with 
realism to be the invalidity of abductive inferences. For the reference to Bohr and Einstein 
to be relevant in that context Fine must be making a distinction between two possible 
readings of their debate, (i) On the one hand, consider a history in which Bohr and Einstein 
argue over which interpretational superstructure should be superimposed on a true quantum 
mechanics: in Fine’s terms, this would have been ‘just a sideshow’ ([1984], p.93), 
because both would have been making abductive inferences, and the dispute would have 
concerned extra-scientific—interpretational—matters, (ii) On the other hand, if the 
protracted exchanges signalled a disagreement over the legitimacy of any inference at all 
about reality, they would be a crucial part of the methodological fight between progressive 
instrumentalism and reactionary realism: a fight for the hearts and minds of the practitioners 
of the new physics. Note that, according to history (ii), Heisenberg, Bohr et a l should not 
have made any abductive inference to the (approximate) truth of a theory from its empirical 
adequacy. Now Fine takes Bohr’s victory in the ‘war between Einstein, the realist and 
Bohr, the nonrealist’ ([1984], p.93)—and the subsequent history of progress in physics— 
to be both relevant—i.e. to be a good stick with which to beat realism—and to have been 
‘an important endeavour’ on Bohr’s part: (ii) must therefore be Fine’s favoured reading.
This second reading is supported by the nature of the conclusions drawn by Fine. The 
nonrealists have been vindicated historically, he claims, because realist programmes— 
Einstein’s fields, de Broglie’s pilot waves and Bohm’s hidden variables—have been 
relatively sterile when compared with the smooth progress inspired by Copenhagen 
agnosticism. Instead of seeking foundations for quantisation, the nonrealists of twentieth- 
century physics have taken the quantum as basic, and teased out its consequences:
The task of ‘explaining* the quantum, of course, is the realist program for identifying a reality 
underlying the formulas of the theory and thereby explaining the predictive success of the formulas as 
approximately true descriptions of this reality. ([1984], p.93)
In contrast, the agnostic or nonrealist attitude has been methodologically vindicated'.
One can hardly doubt the importance of a nonrealist attitude for the development and practically infinite 
success of the quantum theory. Historical counterfactuals are always tricky, but the sterility of actual 
realist programs in this area at least suggests that Bohr and company were right in believing that the
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road to scientific progress here 'would have been blocked by realism. The founders of quantum theory 
never turned on the nonrealist attitude that served them so well. ([1984], p.93)
At an earlier point in the article, Fine remarks that he and Putnam have ‘fought a battle to 
show that the quantum theory is at least consistent with some kind of underlying reality’ 
(Fine [1984], p.94), despite the ‘charybdis of realism’ that is the problem of Bell 
correlations. As an aside, I think this comment indicates that two realist issues have been 
run together. The first issue concerns SR and abductive inferences: whether or not the 
predictive success of the quantum mechanical formalism—or any other theory—licenses 
any view about the world beyond its empirical adequacy. The second issue concerns the 
consistency with the formalism of a particular type of interpretation. It is a realist issue 
because the interpretations in question are those in which quantities that correspond to 
certain physical concepts (such as position and momentum, or trajectory) possess 
determinate values, which values may therefore be considered physically real, if possession 
of determinate values be the criterion of reality. The second question surely becomes 
interesting only if the first is settled in favour of SR.
Let us return to the central issue, that of SR and MR: anti-realists were people who worried 
about the (invalidity of abductive inferences. Realists, on the other hand, would typically 
see inferences to the approximate truth from previous success of even refuted theories as 
necessary in specific cases, even though they may not be amenable to a general justification 
(ithat would be to solve the problem of induction). Now of course Fine did not separate MR 
from SR: MR was merely a dubious lemma in an invalid argument. When they are 
separated, however, the argument is clearly directed at both. Fine’s argument against MR 
turned on the failure of the abductive inference to rationalise the small handful strategy. MR 
being the thesis that scientists often act like realists, an argument that mentions abductive 
inferences in this way can only make sense as an argument against MR if abductive 
inferences are, in fact, typically realist moves. Thus Fine—and leading anti-realists who 
make an issue of the validity of the abductive inference (see for instance Laudan [1984])— 
cede this ground to the methodological realist. This suggests a historiographical hint: if one 
wishes to look to scientific practice or history for support for MR, one might look out for 
abductive inferences. Now Zahar [1989] has doubted the depth of the young Einstein’s 
positivism. There is a realist rationale for Einstein’s progress. Removing absolute space 
and time from the scientific ontology might be metaphysically motivated: one cannot believe 
that nature contains entities whose existence is concealed by physical conspiracy. In other 
words, Einstein might have been applying metaphysical constraints on the acceptability of 
scientific theories.
To sum up, Fine attacks methodological arguments for SR on two separate counts: their 
validity and the soundness of the premises, (i) He has shown that the inference from MR to
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SR must be invalid: this much follows from their logical independence, (ii) He has argued 
that methodological instrumentalism can better explain typically 'realist’ strategies of theory 
construction and choice, (iii) Finally, he has argued that the discoverers of relativity and 
quantum mechanics did not act in accordance with MR anyway, so MR is false. I will 
remain silent on the first group of claims, but to demonstrate the falsity of the last group of 
claims is the main aim of this chapter. In the next two sections, I will therefore attempt to 
sketch the background to the construction of the formalisms of matrix and wave mechanics. 
The ease of the explanation in (ii) will turn out to be the explanatory downfall of the 
instrumentalist account, because neither Schrodinger nor Heisenberg were satisfied with 
mere empirical adequacy. They restricted their attention to those theories which could give a 
non -ad hoc explanation for relevant theoretical facts.
4.2 . Heisenberg’s Probabilistic Agnosticism
Heisenberg had been interested in the quantum theory of the atom since his earliest 
postgraduate work under Sommerfeld in Munich. One of the failures of the old quantum 
theory had always been its inability to yield the intensities of atomic spectral emission lines: 
Bohr had more or less rendered the frequencies of the principal spectral lines of simple 
atoms in 1913. Heisenberg, among many others, attempted—unsuccessfully—to derive 
expressions for line intensities by constructing quasi-mechanical orbital models of the 
atom, and modelling their interaction with radiation via the classical perturbation theory that 
had been developed for the gravitational interactions between planets (see Cassidy [1979] 
and Hendry [1984], chapter 4).
In his [1913], Bohr required of the quantum-theoretic equations he was endeavouring to 
derive that in the limit of large quantum numbers they approach the relevant classical laws. 
This was the first proto-formulation of the correspondence principle. This principle, further 
elucidated in Bohr [1918], turned out to be a powerful heuristic device in that it put 
constraints on the equations of the old quantum theory, allowing "systematic guessing” of 
their correct form. Another important conceptual strand—the roots of which can be traced 
back to Planck’s early model for black body radiation—begins in 1900 with Drude’s 
classical theory of dispersion. In order to capture the atom’s interaction with incident 
radiation, Drude modelled the atom as an array of oscillators with frequencies v,-, the v; 
being the atom’s characteristic absorption frequencies. The classical dispersion equations 
were obtained by modelling these oscillators as oscillating charged particles, deriving and 
solving a second-order differential equation for the electric moment vector P for each 
frequency, then summing over frequencies to get the expression for the whole atom:
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P = aE,
where a = 2 ; ~ —  • —  ----4jfim Vi2 — v2
The constant// appearing in the derived expression represents the strength of the oscillator, 
and is therefore a measure of the atom’s absorption at this frequency.
Ladenburg [1921] produced a quantum-theoretic re-interpretation of Dnide’s equations, 
again modelling the atom as a set of 'virtual' oscillators of frequencies equal to its 
absorption frequencies. Since Bohr’s 1913 theory, such absorption frequencies had been 
understood to represent transitions between two stationary states of the atom. Ladenburg 
therefore represented the oscillator strength/; as a measure of the 'transition amplitude’ 
between the two states, which would be a measure of the probability of a transition 
between them. His formula, however, described only absorption processes, and was 
therefore fully applicable only to atoms in their ground state.
In the January 1924 edition of Nature, Slater published a letter outlining an extension of the 
virtual oscillator idea: the virtual radiation field. The most interesting part of the letter reads:
Any atom may, in feet, be supposed to communicate with other atoms all the time it is in a stationary 
state, by means of a virtual field of radiation originating from oscillators having the frequencies of 
possible quantum transitions and the function of which is to provide for statistical conservation of 
energy and momentum by determining the probabilities for quantum transitions. The part of the field 
originating from the given atom itself is supposed to induce a probability that that atom lose energy 
spontaneously, while radiation from external sources is regarded as inducing additional probabilities that 
it may gain or lose energy, much as Einstein has suggested. (Slater [1924], pp.307-8)
Now Slater’s idea was built in to the ill-fated Bohr-Kramers-Slater (BKS) theory (see 
Hendry [1981]). The refutation of BKS, via the Bothe-Geiger experiments of 1924, was 
blamed on an assumption that Bohr and Kramers persuaded Slater to conjoin with his 
innovation, namely statistical (rather than strict) conservation of energy and momentum. 
Slater’s idea was originally that the virtual field would guide quanta of energy emitted and 
absorbed by atoms—conservation of quanta would guarantee conservation of energy. 
However, Bohr and Kramers persuaded Slater, against his “better judgement” that light 
quanta shouldn’t enter the theory as real entities. However, the BKS theory should be 
credited with two important developments: the advancement of Kramers’ quantum theoretic 
dispersion theory, and the endowment of the concept of probability with physical reality.
In later papers, Kramers developed a theory of dispersion based on Slater’s idea only, that 
amounted to another quantum-theoretic version of Drude’s theory. Kramers [1924] noted
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that the earlier quantum version of Drude’s theory, although empirically adequate, failed to 
satisfy the correspondence principle, in that it did not converge to classical theory in the 
limit of large quantum numbers. In an attempt to generalise Ladenburg’s formula to atoms 
in states other than the ground state, he introduced a set of terms in the dispersion 
expression which represented “negative oscillators” with negative strengths, corresponding 
to emission frequencies. A more rigorous derivation of the formula followed in later 
papers, including a joint paper with Heisenberg. Kuhn and Thomas, meanwhile, proved in 
separate papers that the transition amplitudes// satisfied the “/-Summensatz” or “/-  
summation theorem”:
2 fc/*/ -  2 p /ft• = 1.
The next significant development was Bom’s [1924] attempt to construct a quantum 
mechanics—the first time this phrase had been used—to replace classical perturbation 
theory in the calculation of interactions between electrons in the same atom. Electrons and 
radiation, he noted, interacted non-classically; he therefore applied the method of 
quantisation used by Kramers in the construction of his dispersion theory to interactions 
between electrons. Bom—assisted in writing the papa* by Heisenberg—first shows 
classical dispersion theory to be an application of classical perturbation theory: what is 
needed is the quantum-theoretic perturbation theory of which the quantum-theoretic 
dispersion theory is a special case. Kramers had reached his quantum theory of dispersion 
by replacing certain differential terms in the classical formulae by difference terms. Bom 
does the same with a formula derived from classical perturbation theory to get a “quantum 
mechanical” perturbation formula. Jammer ([1966], p. 193) calls this process ‘Bom’s 
correspondence rule’, it being a formal special case of the correspondence rule of Bohr’s 
[1913] and [1918].
In the spring of 1925, Heisenberg made a number of attempts to derive formulae for the 
intensity of lines in the hydrogen spectrum by considering the Fourier expansion of the 
electron’s Keplerian orbit. After a (now famous) attack of hay-fever, Heisenberg retreated 
to an island without vegetation, Heligoland, and overnight had a burst of inspiration. For 
once, it is not simplistic to say that the fruit of this labour, published as his [1925], was the 
decisive breakthrough to the long-foreseen quantum mechanics. In the paper, Heisenberg 
attributes the frustrating lack of success in dispersion theory to the incorrectness c f classical 
kinematics. Heisenberg accepts the classical equation of motion for an electron:
d2x/dt2 + f(x) = 0,
except that the function x(t) no longer represents the spatial position of the electron as a 
function of time. In classical mechanics, a periodic motion x(t) can be expanded as a
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Fourier expansion. Quantum theory makes the frequency of the periodic motion, and the 
coefficients da, depend on the quantum number n:
X ( t )  =  2 a a ( « j e ia a "  •
Heisenberg replaces the Fourier terms by quantum mechanical terms of the form:
a(n, n-a)#™ <n> n~a^ \
the coefficients of which, thea(n, n-a), again represented “transition quantities”, which in 
turn were measures of transition probability, which, in turn, Einstein had linked to line 
intensities. These would be the new quantum-mechanical quantities, manipulations of 
which would replace the manipulation of position and momentum variables.
There were a number of reasons to proceed with the construction of a kinematics in terms 
of line intensities and frequencies. Firstly, they were observable, unlike the classical 
kinematics of position and momentum variables, and thus had two possible advantages: all 
attempts at a theory of dispersion founded on a mechanical model of the atom had failed: 
one way to interpret this failure was as a refutation of the very notion of oibit. Jammer 
reads Heisenberg’s move thus:
Basically, Heisenberg’s attitude, in this respect, resembled that of Einstein, for whom the concept of 
Newtonian time had lost its physical significance not only, as he showed in his analysis of the 
simultaneity of spatially separated events, because of its insusceptibility to operational determination 
but also because classical physics which assumed this concept as observable conflicted with experience. 
([1966],p.l99>
Heisenberg had been impressed by Einstein’s denial of any sort of physical reality to 
absolute time: a calculus of observables might therefore have appeared attractive. A last 
(crucial) advantage was that for these quantities, a reliable version of the correspondence 
principle had been developed by Kramers and Bom. Heisenberg built the correspondence 
principle (with its obvious heuristic advantages) into the new mechanics, to replace the ad 
hoc “systematic guessing” that had been the hallmark of the old quantum theory’s 
application of the same principle.
To construct a kinematics—his avowed aim—Heisenberg would have to derive a 
multiplication law for the all-important coefficients, which turned out to be:
a(n, n-a) = a(n, n-a')a(n-a\ n-a), 
which Bom recognised to be the rule for the multiplication of matrices:
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(xy)mn ~~ 2kXmkykn•
Bom then proceeded to develop a coherent matrix-mechanical formalism in joint papers 
with Jordan [1925] and Heisenberg and Jordan [1926].
Cassidy [1991] identifies at least three stages in Heisenberg’s interpretational views: (i) an 
initial instrumentalism with respect to the equations of quantum mechanics, and the 
probabilities it appeared to invoke (what was real was only the non-classical discreteness); 
(ii) acceptance of the complementarity of the wave and particle pictures under pressure from 
Bohr; (iii) a shift of emphasis with the Kantian version of the Copenhagen interpretation 
under the influence of his student von Weizsacker. It should be stressed, however, that at 
each stage the interpretation appears to have been seen by Heisenberg as a natural reading 
of the lessons that quantum mechanics can provide as to the nature of the physical world, 
rather than a position with a more general epistemological rationale. The indeterminacy 
surrounding the classical states arises from the structure of quantum mechanics: to call this 
position ‘instrumentalist’ is to get the inference the wrong way round (see Redhead [1987], 
pp.50-1 and Krips [1987], chapter 1). Heisenberg argued that the duality of the description 
afforded by his interpretation was a property of nature itself, as were the probabilities 
appearing therein: ‘the laws of nature determine not the occurrence of an event, but the 
probability that an event will take place’ (Heisenberg [1958]). As is also well known, 
Heisenberg linked these probabilities to the possibilities or potentia of Aristotelian 
metaphysics. The subject-dependent element enters only when we note that ‘the 
determinateness of phenomena exists only insofar as they are described with the concepts 
of classical physics’ (Heisenberg [1958]). This raises the question of why the concepts of 
classical physics are not just abandoned, to be replaced by the new ones:
Here it first of all necessary to stress, as von Weizsacker has done, that the concepts of classical 
physics play a role in the interpretation of the quantum theory similar to that of the a priori forms of 
perception in the philosophy of Kant Just as Kant explains the concepts of space and time or causality 
aprioristically, because they already formed the premises of all experiences and could therefore not be 
considered as the result of experience, so also the concepts of classical physics form an a priori basis 
for experiments in quantum theory, because we can conduct experiments in the atomic field only by 
using these concepts of classical physics. (Heisenberg [1958])
For Heisenberg, then, the formalism of the matrix mechanics was interpreted partly 
realistically, and partly conventionally, the conventionalism having a Kantian gloss. The 
indeterminacies were real, in whatever sense the Aristotelian potentia were, but our inability 
to describe the outcomes of experiments other than in classical terms—and the apriority of 
causality—yields a version of Kant’s transcendental conventionalism with respect to the
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concepts of classical physics. The interpretation had a realistic heart, but with a pessimistic 
overlay that denied the knowing subject’s ability to depart from the classical physics of 
everyday experience, a departure that would be necessary for the comprehension of events 
at the level of applicability of his matrix mechanics.
To conclude, Heisenberg’s progress fails to fit Fine’s description in the following ways. 
Firstly, Heisenberg applied non-empirical (and only tenuously empirical) constraints on the 
construction of his new theory: he carried over structural features of earlier quantum 
theories (the correspondence principle, for instance) and interpreted the failure of the BKS 
theory abductively as a demonstration of the conservation of energy for individual events. 
Secondly, he took the success of quantum mechanics to be evidence for the Copenhagen 
interpretation, an interpretation whose content surely transcends the evidence in its favour. 
This bears all the signs of an abductive inference to the correctness of quantum mechanics 
under the Copenhagen interpretation.
4.3. Schrodinger’s Realistic  Analogy
Three distinct approaches to the construction of the wave mechanics can be given. The first 
is a historical account of the influences on Schrodinger’s thought, and his strikingly 
relevant work in connected fields before 1926. The others were presented explicitly as 
derivations in published papers: I will rehearse the historical development first.
Schrodinger’s published derivations, and considerations on their relevance to the 
circumstances of the construction of wave mechanics, will follow.
Schrodinger studied at the University of Vienna from 1906 until receipt of his Ph.D. in 
1910. He had altered the university just after the suicide of Ludwig Boltzmann, whose 
tradition in statistical physics was therefore still dominant. Later, he was to call 
Boltzmann’s line of thought his ‘first love in scioice’ (Schrodinger [1935], p. 13). Much of 
Schrodinger’s work before 1926 was concerned with the kinetic theory of gases and 
statistical mechanics; this aspect of his work has been covered in detail by Hanle [1977a], 
Wessels [1977], and Moore [1989]. After serving in what is now Slovenia during the first 
world war, Schrodinger published a number of papers on the statistics of ideal gases.
There had been much debate among physicists in the period between 1918 and 1924 
regarding calculations of the absolute entropy of an ideal gas. In classical theory, the 
natural way to proceed was count the number of ways that energy states could be assigned 
to the N  molecules of the gas, to give W, the number of complexions the gas could take. 
The entropy S could then be found from S = k In W. Sackur and Tetrode had 
independently realised that entropy so calculated would fail to be an extensive state
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function: it would not satisfy S'(X1+2) = S(X 1) + S(X2), where X1+2 is the supersystem 
composed of two subsystems X \ and X 2. The resultant statistics therefore had to be 
corrected, effectively by dividing the number of arrangements W by a factor N!—a 
correction widely thought ad hoc. In 1921 Planck proposed to interpret this correction as an 
acknowledgement of the indistinguishability of assignments of energy states to gases that 
differed only by the exchange of identical molecules.
In 1924, S.N. Bose sent Einstein a copy of a manuscript—following its rejection by the 
Philosophical Magazine—in which he constructed a novel statistics for light quanta in a 
new derivation of Planck’s radiation law. Einstein did two things: arranged for the paper to 
be published, and himself applied the new statistics to ideal gases. The result was the Bose- 
Einstein statistics, in which the N! correction was found to be unnecessary, for the new 
statistics effectively enumerated the different the ways that cells in the energy phase-space 
could be assigned occupancies by molecules. Thus indistinguishable complexions were not 
counted more than once. The physical foundation of the new statistics was unclear, 
however, and there were many objections, notably from Planck and Ehrenfest, who 
defended the motivation of that the N! correction within the classical treatment. In some 
early papers on the subject, Schrodinger attempted to give a motivation or physical 
foundation to the application of the Bose-Einsttin statistics. Schrodinger argued that the 
physical background to Planck’s definition of entropy would, if applied consistently, imply 
Einstein’s statistics rather than Planck’s, for Planck’s motivation for the Sackur-Tetrode 
correction amounted to the attribution of individuality to molecules followed by a denial of 
the distinguishability of states of the system that differed by the exchange of identical 
molecules. It would be better, argued Schrodinger, to deny identical molecules 
individuality in the first place, and apply classical statistics only to the gas as a whole. This 
would result in a procedure that was mathematically equivalent to that of Bose and Einstein, 
but would—physically—make the same sense as the classical Boltzmann-Gibbs statistics.
In the second of two papers on the subject (Einstein [1925]), Einstein cited the ideas of 
Louis de Broglie, whose Ph.D. thesis of November 1924 proposed a complete parallel 
between matter and light. Material particles were assigned a “phase wave” of frequency 
v±b., where v&b. = Elh = mc2fh, and K±b. -  hip.
Shortly after reading Einstein’s paper (on 3 November 1925), Schrodinger wrote to him:
I have read with greatest interest a few days ago the ingenious thesis of Louis de Broglie, which I 
finally got hold of; with it also 18 of your second degeneracy work has become completely clear to me 
for the first time. The de Broglie interpretation of the quantum rules seems to be related in some ways 
to my note in die [Zeitschrift fur Physik] 12, (p.) 13,1922, where a remarkable property of the Weyl 
'gauge factor’ along each quasi-period is shown. The mathematical situation is, as for as I can
134
SCHRODINGER VS. HEISENBERG
see, the same, only from me much more formal, less elegant, and not really shown generally.
(Schrodinger, letter to Einstein, quoted in Hanle [1979])
In 1922, Schrodinger had published a paper called “On a Remarkable Property of the 
Quantized Orbits of a Single Electron” (Schrodinger [1922]), in which he noted that if the 
quantum conditions are applied to a model of the hydrogen atom in which only electrostatic 
forces are taken into account, and a vector was associated with the electron (which is in a 
closed Bohr orbit) such that the vector was always displaced parallel with itself, the tract of 
this vector would, on completion of one orbit, be multiplied by an integral power of c~h/y. 
Schrodinger’s final paper on gas statistics—his last publication before the construction of 
wave mechanics—contains some striking echoes of wave mechanics.
Bloch [1976] relates an anecdote concerning the social events that put Schrodinger on the 
last steps of the route to wave mechanics. In early 1926, Bloch, a student at the E.T JH. 
(Zurich’s Federal Institute of Technology), was in the habit of attending a physics 
colloquium, which although run by Debye of the E.TH., was held jointly with the 
University of Zurich, where Schrodinger taught. According to Bloch, Debye suggested that 
Schrodinger give a presentation on de Broglie’s thesis. Schrodinger gave a ‘beautifully 
clear account’ (Bloch [1976], p.23) of de Broglie’s association of a wave with each 
particle, and the consequent derivation of the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantisation rules. 
Apparently, Debye commented that the de Broglie picture was ‘childish’, and suggested 
that Schrodinger set up a wave equation. Schrodinger began his next colloquium 
presentation— which was only ‘a few weeks’ later—with the comment ‘My colleague 
Debye suggested that one should have a wave equation; well, I have found one! ’ The 
presentation that followed was essentially what was about to be published as the first of the 
papers on wave mechanics.
There are a number of reasons for being sceptical of the strict historical accuracy of Bloch’s 
account Firstly, although Bloch is not specific about the dates of his story (earlier in the 
article he refers to ‘early 1926’, at which point Schrodinger must have been well on the 
way to wave mechanics), and so one cannot be sure that it contradicts other historical 
evidence (Schrodinger’s letter to Einstein of late 1925, for instance). However, the account 
suggests that Schrodinger’s only, or main, reason for reading de Broglie’s thesis was 
Debye’s suggestion, which is implausible given that Schrodinger had many reasons for 
such an interest, including his earlier work on the Weyl ‘Tract factor’, Einstein’s reference 
to de Broglie and his own work on gas statistics. Secondly, Debye later claimed to fail to 
remember the incident. Now Bloch takes this to mean that Debye had expunged the incident 
from his memory in regret at not carrying through the suggestion himself. On the other 
hand, Debye’s ‘lapse’ might indicate that the episode should be interpreted as a contribution 
to scientific folklore, rather than scientific history. Erwin Fues, an assistant of
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Schrddinger’s, remembers only that Debye made suggestions as to the presentation of the 
wave mechanical formalism in the first paper (Schrodinger [1926b]). Although of 
questionable accuracy, Bloch’s story does bring into sharp relief the factors that were 
available to Schrodinger: firstly de Broglie’s rdation; secondly the crucial switch from 
model of a moving wave associated with a single election to the construction of a suitable 
wave equation for the system as a whole.
A short and highly appealing construction of Schrddinger’s wave equation appears in 
Moore’s biography of Schrodinger (Moore [1989], p. 197-9). Although it never appeared 
in print, it is historically apposite in two ways. Firstly, it reflects considerations that were 
uppermost in Schrddinger’s mind. Secondly, something similar—a relativistic version— 
appears in one of Schrddinger’s notebooks from the time. Interestingly, this derivation 
yields an equation equivalent to the Klein-Gordon equation, which Schiddinger mistakenly 
discarded. The no/i-relativistic procedure amounts to the simple-minded substitution of the 
de Broglie relation into an ordinary steady-state equation describing wave motion, in line 
with Debye’s reported suggestion. It begins with the classical equation for the amplitude ip 
of a wave motion:
Aip + k*ip = 0, 
where k = 2jt/A,
and A = 2 - &/dq£.
Into the second formula substitute the de Broglie relation:
A = h/mv;
rearranging and substituting E -V  =T -  mv2/2 yields the wave equation:
Aip + 8 n2m2/h2 (E-  V)ip = 0.
The first published derivation is presented by Schrodinger in the first of the “Quantization 
as an Eigenvalue Problem” papers (Schrodinger [1926b]), and proceeds via the famous 
Hamilton-Jacobi extremum argument. Ostensibly, the paper is neutral with respect to 
interpretation: the presentation turns on the application of purely mathematical constraints to 
a function whose intended physical interpretation is not explicitly stated, although it is clear 
from some of Schrodinger’s comments that he does have an interpretation in mind.
A second derivation (Schrodinger [1926c] and [1928b]) proceeds explicitly via the wave 
interpretation, surprisingly enough given its short and turbulent history. Contrary to Fine’s 
claim that Schrodinger quickly dropped any attempt at realistic interpretation, it is in line
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with the foundations for wave mechanics that Schrodinger constructed later, and referred to 
in his debates with the Copenhagen opposition. Much later, (in his [1952]) Schrodinger 
notes that, given the quantisation of the storage of energy by matter, and of electromagnetic 
radiation itself, it was a ‘really quite obvious deduction’ that ‘with a particle mass m which, 
according to Einstein has an energy me2 (where c = the velocity of light), there must be 
associated a wave process of frequency mc2/h \ a deduction first drawn by Louis de 
Broglie in 1925. To this de Broglie frequency corresponds the de Broglie wavelength, 
kd.b.. Furthermore, the theoretical “electron waves” were experimentally demonstrated only 
a few years later, in diffraction and interference experiments. He continues: ‘This was the 
point of departure for the early recognition... that everything—realty everything—is both 
particle and wave field’ (Schrodinger [1952]).
In his [1928b], Schrodinger presents a number of arguments for this realistic and non- 
probabilistic interpretation of the wavefiinction ip. Although by no means always 
convincing, they do underline the importance of the wave picture in the construction of 
Schrodinger’s version of quantum mechanics, and his continuing adherence to a realistic 
interpretation. MacKinnon [1980] argues that this interpretation-lead derivation was a mere 
reconstruction on Schrodinger’s part, historically more important being the first derivation 
via the extremum principle as presented in the first of the wave mechanics paper 
(Schrodinger [1926b]). There are, however, a number of reasons to think that the Hamilton 
analogy was an integral part of the theory’s genesis: Wessels [1980] sets out the case in a 
reply to MacKinnon’s paper, the above historical account underlining this. In any case, the 
standing wave modd is mentioned even in the supposedly interpretationally neutral paper 
(Schrodinger [1926b]), where Schrodinger argues that his theory explains the Bohr- 
Sommerfeld quantisation rules—unexplained in the old quantum theory—much as the 
presence of a standing wave explains the discrete modes of vibration in a string. The 
[1928b] presentation is the most elegant, beginning with an analogy:
As: Geometrical Optics is to Undulatory Optics
so: Ordinary Mechanics is to Wave Mechanics
The analogical argument runs as follows: When Huyghens’ undulatory optics replaced 
Newton’s corpuscular theory, it was realised that geometrical optics, with its definite rays 
of light, approximates to the undulatory theory. The correspondence between the two 
theories can be illustrated by comparing motion in the two theories, as Schrodinger does in 
his [1952], following Debye’s deduction of ray optics from wave optics and Hamilton’s 
optical-mechanical analogy. Perpendicular to the wave surface of a moving wave (i.e. in 
the direction of motion) are the wave normals, which correspond to the “rays” of 
geometrical optics. The motion along the normal of a small part of the wave front—the rest 
of which is damped—approximates the motion of a corpuscle along the path defined by the
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ray, with the same velocity as the spreading of the corresponding wave front. The 
geometrical description holds only when the optical phenomena under consideration are 
coarse in comparison with the wavelength of the relevant light. It breaks down, however, 
for ‘minute’ optical phenomena. It was the failure of the corpuscularist picture in these 
cases that resulted in light being regarded as constituted by waves.
Schrodinger then considers the correspondence between classical and quantum mechanics. 
The classical equations of motion break down for ‘minute’ phenomena, although adequate 
for ‘ macro-mechanical ’ phenomena. Empirical problems for the classical theory occur in 
just those situations where the associated (de Broglie) wavelength becomes a non- 
negligible quantity. The analogy between the failure in the two cases of the corpuscular 
picture suggested a second order differential equation, used in classical physics to describe 
wave motion, for the motion of (for instance) elections. The solution to this equation—the 
wavefunction ip—would represent the motion of the system, capturing its undulatory 
nature. The rest (as they say) was history: ‘we are led to describe what really happens in 
such a system by a wave motion in the generalised space of its coordinates (#-space).’ 
(Schrodinger [1928b], p.160)
In a footnote in his [1926d], Schrodinger paid tribute to the influence of Einstein and de 
Broglie:
My theory was inspired by L. de Broglie,and by brief, yet infinitely far-seeing remarks of A.
Einstein (Schrodinger [1926d], p.46)
Raman and Forman [1969] have traced the reasons why it was Schrodinger—rather than 
anyone else—who developed de Broglie’s ideas into a mechanics of matter waves. They 
note three relevant factors. Firstly, Schrodinger appreciated the relativistic framing of de 
Broglie’s theory, which would have been congenial to the author of Schrodinger’s [1922]. 
Secondly, he was outside the Copenhagen-Gottingen circle of physicists influenced by 
Bohr and Sommerfeld, who had two reasons to be suspicious of de Broglie’s work: its 
naive faith in definite electronic orbits, and de Broglie’s poor personal reputation. This 
infamy was partly the result of an acrimonious priority dispute between de Broglie’s 
collaborator Dauvillier and the Copenhagen group over the discovery of element 72,1 and 
partly the result of de Broglie’s temerity in interpreting the correspondence principle in a 
fashion unacceptable to its creator (see Raman and Forman [1969], pp.294-5). A third 
factor would have been the reference to de Broglie’s work by Einstein—a major influence 
on Schrodinger. There is direct evidence for the importance of both the first and last factors
1 The Copenhagen claim won out: the element was named Hafnium, for Copenhagen.
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in Schrodinger’s letter to Einstein of 3 November 1925 (see above), written at the time that 
Schrodinger was first working on matter waves.
However, another letter to Einstein, this time of 23 April 1926 seems to deny the “gauge 
factor” theory any importance:
the whole thing [i.e. wave mechanics] would certainly not yet, and perhaps never, have been developed 
(I mean not by me) if the importance of de Broglie’s ideas had not been put right Under my nose by 
your second paper on gas degeneracy. (Schrodinger, letter to Einstein, quoted in Raman and Forman 
[1969],p.311>
The three different factors appear to invoke different conceptual routes into wave 
mechanics. The first two suggest that Schrodinger, someone who was interested in atomic 
structure and spectroscopy, was uniquely suited—by his lack of intellectual antipathy—to 
build on de Broglie’s work. Thus it was 'qua theoretical spectroscopist’ that Schrodinger 
developed wave mechanics. The third factor, however, implies that wave mechanics was 
an attempt to provide a foundation for the theory of matter waves that Schrodinger thought 
was a necessary motivation for the work on gas theory. In stressing the importance of the 
1922 paper—i.e. the first factor—Raman and Forman were correcting Klein’s [1964] 
emphasis on the gas theory work as the precursor to wave mechanics. Hanle [1977b] 
supports Raman and Forman’s reading over Klein’s, on the evidence of the letter of 3 
November 1925 (see above). Since there is evidence for both historical accounts, perhaps 
they both contain an element of truth. Schrodinger was caused to read de Broglie’s thesis 
because of his work on gas statistics, and Einstein’s consequent influence. However, what 
he saw o f value in the thesis—the possibility for a wave theory of the atom—was 
determined by both the “Remarkable Property” paper, and the need for a physical 
foundation for the Bose-Einstein statistics. As often with major scientific advances, wave 
mechanics was the fruit of many different conceptual strands.
Common to all the possible routes to wave mechanics, however, is the indispensable role 
that physical intuition played in guiding Schrodinger’s mathematical work. Wessels [1977] 
has charted the importance of Schrodinger’s thoroughgoing realism on his attitude to 
contemporary scientific developments. For instance, in a letter to Bohr of May 1924, he 
commented on the recently published Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory:
I cannot completely go along with you when you keep calling [this radiation] ‘virtual’, ... For what is 
‘real’ radiation if it is not that which causes transitions, i.e. that which creates the transition 
probabilities?... one might even venture to wonder which of the two electronic systems has a greater 
reality—the ‘real one’ which describes the stationary states or the ‘virtual one’ that supplies die virtual
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radiation and scatters inpinging virtual radiation. (Schrodinger, letter to Bohr, quoted in Wessels 
[1977],p.313>
In a published paper on the subject, Schrodinger interpreted the theory realistically, rather 
than via the notion of “virtual” radiation.
The old question of what medium the wave motion was a fluctuation in remained, 
however, and Schrodinger had no clear answer. He did have a number of rather murky 
arguments for his realistic interpretation of the ^function. One of these was that quantum 
mechanics gave the wrong results if interchange between particles of the same type in a 
system was neglected, leading one to the conclusion that such particles could not be 
unambiguously assigned individual identities (a position Schrodinger had earlier taken in 
his work on gas statistics). The identity of a particular wave train, in contrast, was 
conceivable and sensible within quantum mechanics. A second argument was directed at 
the probabilistic interpretation, which he pointed out raised the question of what types of 
events \tfp- represented probabilities of. The standard answer was, of course, that from the 
^-function one could calculate the probability of finding the system in one of a set of 
allowed classical states as the outcome of a measurement. This Schrodinger later found 
curious: ‘Is it not rather bold to interpret measurements according to a picture which we 
know to be wrong?’ (Schrodinger [1952]) A further perceived advantage of the wave 
interpretation was its avoidance of such ‘irrational’ features of the theory as ‘quantum 
jumps’ which could be given no mechanical description. In wave mechanics, the 
discreteness embodied in the quantum jumps were readily explained.
In summary, it seems that Schrodinger both constructed and interpreted his wave 
mechanics realistically, in terms of his (admittedly sketchy) wave/field picture. Not only 
was this interpretation important heuristically, but it continued to be Schrodinger’s intended 
interpretation, notwithstanding the difficulties in its reconciliation with the apparently 
discrete experience of everyday life. Schrodinger also recognised that if the Copenhagen 
interpretation were correct, and quantum mechanics better understood formalistically, then 
the wave picture would be just misleading, despite the formal equivalence of its associated 
formal theory. However, characteristic of Schrddinger’s route to wave mechanics was his 
concern with more than mere empirical adequacy. He was fully aware of the importance of 
the intended interpretation which turned a set of equations into a physical theory:
Physics does not only consist of atomic research, science does not only consist of physics, and life 
does not only consist of science. The aim of atomic research is to fit our empirical knowledge 
concerning it into our other thinking. All of this other thinking, so far as it concerns the outer world, 
is active in space and time. If it cannot be fitted into space and time, then it fails in its whole aim and
140
SCHRODINGER VS. HEISENBERG
one does not know what purpose it really serves. (Schrodinger, letter to Wien of 25 August 1926, 
quoted in Moore [1989], p.226)
In the early months of 1926, there appeared a number of proofs which were taken at the 
time to show that matrix and wave mechanics could be identified. This might have been 
unexpected at the time, given the backgrounds of the two theories. Jammer echoes this 
sentiment:
Heisenberg’s was a mathematical calculus, involving non-commutative quantities and computation 
rules, rarely encountered before, which defied any pictorial interpretation; it was an algebraic approach 
which, proceeding from the observed discreteness of spectral lines, emphasized die element of 
discontinuity; in spite of its renunciation of classical description in space and time it was ultimately a 
theory whose basic conception was the corpuscle. Schrodinger’s, in contrast, was based on the familiar 
apparatus of differential equations, akin to the classical mechanics of fluids and suggestive of an easily 
visualizable representation; it was an analytical approach which, proceeding from a generalization of the 
classical laws of motion, stressed the element of continuity, and as its name indicates, it was a theory 
whose basic conception was the wave. (Jammer [1966], pp.271-2)
Jammer’s comments invite a question: how is it that two theories with such disparate 
conceptual origins could have turned out to be so intimately connected? We have seen that 
they were distinct, at least from the point of view of their construction and the intended 
interpretations of their authors. Proofs of their equivalence were published by Schrodinger 
[1926d], Eckart [1926], and presented in a letter from Pauli to Jordan (Pauli [1926]), 
written before the publication of Schrodinger’s proof. So did the proofs work, and what 
did they prove?
I will follow Pauli’s version, which is by far the most elegant. Let tfe, ..., ... be a
complete orthonormal set of functions satisfying a one-dimensional Schrodinger equation,
4 .4 . The Two Were  No t  th e  Sam e
so that:
f  ty r i  t y m  d r  — b n m ,
where
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Pauli leaves out the complex conjugates ip*n because in the one dimensional case, the 
eigenfunctions are single and real. Given that the set is complete, any arbitrary function of 
x  can be expressed as a linear combination of the ipn- Consider in particular
Xtynty) = XnmlpmQc) 9
OO
so that xnm — J* xipn ipm dx.
~oo
With the comment ‘One also puts’, Pauli stipulates that
OO
(Px)nm = IK I n>m dx.
J dx
—OO
so that iK ^ts. = '2 m(px)nmil>mQc). (K = h/2jt)
6x
Observing that ‘xnm = xmn is real, (px)nm = (Px)mn is purely imaginary’, Pauli states:
It can be shown without difficulty that the matrices for x and px thus defined satisfy the equations of the 
Gottingen Mechanics. (Pauli [1926], p.281)
In other words if x and p, are matrices formed from elements xnm and (px)nm respectively, 
they will satisfy the matrix-mechanical equations of motion:
p*x -  xpx = -iK  
and ^  Px2 + V «  = E,
where E is a diagonal matrix representing the total (non-relativistic) energy, and V (x) 
represents the potential energy for the system. Pauli concludes by noting that the rule of 
multiplication of matrix mechanics implies that for any function F(x), the corresponding 
matrix is given by
oo
Fnm = /  F&^ lpnlpm dx.
—OO
Thus the proof is general: from the solution to the wave equation can be constructed 
quantities that describe any physical system—regardless of the form of the potential—
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which correspond to a matrix that will obey the equations of motion of the ‘Gottingen 
Mechanics’.
Now Hanson [1961] has argued that Schrddinger’s and Eckart’s published proofs—which 
are very similar to Pauli’s—do not in fact show that matrix and wave mechanics can be 
identified, even though that is how they were read at the time. Hanson’s argument turns on 
what is meant by the phrase ‘physical theory’:
A physical theory is, at least, a contingently interpreted formalism—a delicate trinity of algorithm, 
physical interpretation, and correspondence rules. ([1961], p.405)
Consider first theformalisms of matrix and wave mechanics—the algorithms in Hanson’s 
terminology. Hanson argues that the most that could be claimed for the proofs is that they 
demonstrated an analogy between the two formalisms. Consider first Pauli’s stipulation 
that
We have seed that Pauli gave no rationale for this assumption, and could not have done. On 
the left-hand side is a term which characterises the momentum matrix, a mathematical object 
which is basic to the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg, Bom and Jordan. On the right-hand 
side, there appear wavefunctions ipm and ipn, the wavefunction being the central theoretical 
tool of Schrodinger’s wave mechanics. The equation cannot be a definition, because the %  
and the (px)nm have already been defined in their respective calculi. Nor can it be a 
consequence of either published theory: wavefunctions are as absent from the papers on 
matrix mechanics as matrices are from Schrddinger’s papers. Hanson ([1961], p.418) 
makes the same point with respect to the analogous assumption for position:
Perhaps (*) and (**) are translation rules, from which it follows that the proof establishes 
the mtertranslatability of matrix mechanics and wave mechanics, rather than their 
equivalence. However, (*) and (**) must have been natural assumptions to make: both 
Schrodinger and Eckart, as well as Pauli, made these assumptions for the purposes of their 
equivalence proofs. So if matrix-mechanical system representatives are translatable into 
wave-mechanical analogues, what can be inferred about the relationship between the two 
physical theories of which the algorithms were the formal expression? Even if the two
oo
oo
X n m  ~  f  X t y n t y m  dx
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formal theories were intertranslatable, the two physical theories might be distinguished by 
their physical interpretation, if theories are interpreted mathematical structures.
That Heisenberg and Schrodinger entertained different physical interpretations is evident 
from 4.2 and 4.3: the differences continued after the proof of the equivalence of the ‘rival’ 
theories. Heisenberg commented that he found wave mechanics ‘disgusting’ (Heisenberg: 
letter to Pauli, quoted in Jammer [1966], p.272). Schrodinger was ‘discouraged, if not 
repelled, by what appeared to me as very difficult methods of transcendental algebra, and 
by the want of perspicuity’ of the matrix formalism (Schrodinger [1926d], p.46). If 
translated into the first-order predicate calculus, Heisenberg’s theory would quantify over 
the discrete states of particles, providing calculation rules for transitions between them. 
Schrodinger’s version, in contrast, speaks of the contingently-quantised motions of wave- 
groups. So did these interpretations do any scientific work, or did Schrodinger and 
Heisenberg disagree over an extra-scientific matter? For the moment let the scientific be 
assimilated to the (in principle) decidable-by-observation. The question then becomes: 
could the two theories have been distinguished observationaltyl An answer requires some 
stage-setting. Schrodinger claimed his proof to be general:
I will first show how to each function of the position- and momentum-co-ordinates there may be related 
a matrix in such a manner, that these matrices, in every case, satisfy the formal calculating rules of 
Bom and Heisenberg... This relation of matrices to functions is general-, it takes no account of the 
special mechanical system considered, but is the same for all mechanical systems. (In other words: the 
particular Hamiltonian function does not enter into the connecting law.) (Schrodinger [1926d], p.46)
Hanson, however, makes a curious claim: that in fact the proof was inductive in character, 
in the sense that Schrodinger proceeded by showing—problem by problem—that matrix 
and wave mechanics give the same results:
A proof showing [two different calculi] C\ and C2  mathematically identical would consist not only in 
the provision of logical transformations converting any selected statement of C\ into a corresponding 
statement of C2 . It would also establish that for all possible statements within C\ there is a 
transformation into a corresponding statement of C2 . Do Eckart and Schrodinger provide such a proof?
I think not. What they do is select ‘typical’ or ‘paradigmatic’ types of microphysical problems (for 
example, the harmonic oscillator, Compton scattering, Doublet atoms, etc.), and show that, via the 
operator calculus, every wave-mechanical formulation and solution of these problems has a matrix- 
mechanical analogue. (Hanson [1961], pp.422-3)
Although correct for Eckart’s proof Hanson’s claim is strictly false: Schrddinger’s and 
Pauli’s proofs gave a rule that shows how to construct a matrix corresponding to any 
physical quantity that can be expressed as a function of position and momentum, given an
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arbitrary wavefiinction—and therefore the eigenfunction of any Hamiltonian. In another 
sense Hanson has a point, because what the proof shows is how to construct a matrix. It 
does not prove that the matrix so constructed is the matrix that would result from the 
application of matrix mechanics qua physical theory. What (*) and (**) provide is an 
identification of wave- and matrix-mechanical terms that are antecedently defined. They do 
not establish that if wave- and matrix-mechanical descriptions are written down to describe 
a physical system j, the resultant equations will coincide under the translation scheme 
defined by (*) and (**). For particular systems considered by Schrodinger and Eckart, this 
was found to be the case. Suppose we start with an equation pwm(s) that encodes a wave- 
mechanical description of s. Suppose the translation of pwm(s) is ttipwm(s)), an equation of 
matrix mechanics. Now suppose the ‘natural* application of matrix mechanics to s yields 
pmm(s). If the equivalence of the two theories is to follow from the mathematical 
intertranslatability of their associated calculi, we would need, as well as the translation 
scheme:
(t) Vsitripnmis)) o  pmm(s)) and \/s(tripm™(s)) pwm(s))
So how might (t) be argued for? The ‘natural’ description of a system for a given calculus 
is fixed by the other parts of Hanson’s ‘delicate trinity’—the correspondence rules and 
physical interpretation. Now interpretations are difficult things to prove anything about, but 
2/the details of both wave- and matrix-mechanical descriptions of physical systems are 
provided by equivalent translations from classical mechanics, then (t) can be assumed to 
hold. There are reasons to think that the antecedent of this last conditional is false.
Both Hanson and van der Waerden take Schrodinger’s comments in the equivalence paper 
to suggest that Schrodinger thought that his proof would allow the identification of the two 
theories. On the face of it, this is borne out by a remark at the beginning of the final section:
If the two theories—I might reasonably have used the singular—should be tenable in the form just 
given, i.e. for more complicated systems as well, then every discussion of the superiority of the one 
over the other has only an illusory object, in a certain sense. For they are completely equivalent from 
die mathematical point of view, and it can only be a question of the subordinate point of convenience 
of calculation. (Schrodinger [1926d], p.57)
However, in a highly significant footnote, he retreats:
There is a special reason for leaving this question open. The two theories initially take the energy 
function over from ordinary mechanics. Now in the cases treated the potential energy arises from the 
interaction of particles, of which perhaps one, at least, may be regarded in wave mechanics also as 
forming a point, on account of its great mass.... We must take into account the possibility that it is
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no longer permissible to take over from ordinary mechanics the statement for the potential energy, if 
both ‘point charges’ are really extended states of vibration, which penetrate each other. ([1926d], p.57)
In the body of the text, Schrodinger later argues that
the validity of the thesis that mathematical and physical equivalence mean the same thing, must itself 
be qualified. Let us think, for example, of die two expressions for die electrostatic energy of a system 
of charged conductors, die space integral j  ji^ d r and the sum ~ Y.ei v i taken over die conductors. The
two expressions are completely equivalent in electrostatics; the one may be derived from the other by 
integration by parts. Nevertheless we intentionally prefer the first and say that it correctly localises the 
energy in space. In the domain of electrostatics, this preference has admittedly no justification. On the 
contrary, it is due simply to the fact that the first expression remains useful in electrodynamics also, 
while the second does not ([1926d], pp.58-9)
Schrodinger’s vision for the ^-function is just such a role:
the mechanical field scalar (which I denote by ip) is perfectly capable of entering into die unchanged 
Maxwell-Lorentz equations between the electro-magnetic field vectors, as the ‘source’ of die latter. 
([1926d],p.60)
Here is a reading of these comments: Schrodinger is retracting either the equivalence of the 
two theories, or their joint tenability as they have so far been formulated. The reason for the 
retraction is that he takes his initial treatment of (for instance) the hydrogen atom to be 
approximate, in that the potential term in the Hamiltonian is based on a Coulomb attraction 
between point particles. Schrodinger’s intended physical interpretation of wave 
mechanics—the picture of particles as wave-crests—implies to him that this description is 
approximate, and dictates that its form be changed at some lata stage in the development of 
his research programme. Given its roots in the old quantum theory that followed Bohr’s 
1913 theory, the interpretation of matrix mechanics would, in contrast, seem to dictate that 
the form of the potential be taken ova from classical pomf-mechanics. So in 1926, a 
heuristic diffaence has opened up between the two theories: it is not yet expressed in the 
form of the fundamental equations, but waits in their interpretation. As well as being central 
to the construction of the two calculi, the intended physical interpretations place constraints 
on how the presently-approximate descriptions of physical systems are to be made more 
accurate in future: if the intended interpretations encode the futures of the research 
programmes in this way, they should not be dismissed as idle metaphysics.
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Conclusion
A serious objection to the methodological instrumentalist account of Heisenberg’s route to 
matrix mechanics is the millennial reception that even the arch-positivist Pauli gave to the 
published theory. Heisenberg himself was also aware that the new theory was an 
explanatory breakthrough compared to his earlier work: the last five years of the old 
quantum theory had been marked by the proliferation of mutually-contradictory ad hoc 
theories each of which, however, was empirically adequate over some well-defined 
domain. Why was the new mechanics so preferable? Because its explanations were better, 
despite its lack of AnschauUchkeit. The lack of easy spatio-temporal models for the new 
theory was a—possibly temporary—problem only for those realists who insisted on one 
particular kind of realistic interpretation: one that involved the spatio-temporal descriptions 
appropriate to ordinary experience.
Both Schrodinger and Heisenberg followed typically realist patterns of reasoning when 
constructing their respective formalisms, by (i) applying constraints based on theories in 
other domains in their constructions of their nascent theories; (ii) carrying over interpreted 
theoretical structure from previous theories of atomic structure and of spectroscopy, using 
correspondence arguments couched at the theoretical level; and (iii) declining to be satisfied 
with the piecemeal—but empirically adequate—theories embodied in the old quantum 
theory. They later compounded this with what—to the instrumentalist—is an inexplicable 
attachment to the interpretations that either inspired their work or arose naturally from the 
context of the metaphysical and epistemological views they held at the time. Whether or not 
such conduct was reasonable, my case is that this is what Schrodinger and Heisenberg did, 
and that had they done anything else, there is no reason to think that quantum mechanics 
would have appeared in the form that it did. If the Copenhagen interpretation did finally 
triumph, this was not the triumph of instrumentalism over realism, but a victory for one 
transcendent philosophical superstructure over another.
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Introduction
Where smaller entities are to be found among the remains of larger ones, it has often been 
inferred that good theories of the former should explain good theories of the latter. So when 
successful theories of the sub-atomic realm began to appear early this century, it seemed 
natural to expect that out of them would emerge deeper insights into the structure and 
interactions of molecules. After all, molecules are made of atoms, and atoms of electrons 
and nuclei. Many of the equations produced by this application of quantum theory to 
molecules turned out to be insoluble, but methods for their approximate solution were 
developed by quantum chemists. Philosophical expectations that reductive explanation 
would be a straightforward deductive affair were protected with the claim that the soluble 
approximate equations served merely to elucidate the content of the as-yet inscrutable exact 
ones: “in principle”, the approximate proxies introduce nothing new. This assumption has 
been the subject of critical attention from a number of quarters. Critics have argued that the 
“approximations” do not invoke approximate versions of the exact equations, but introduce 
new assumptions about molecules that may be incompatible with the reducing theory, 
quantum mechanics. The chief task for this chapter will be to examine the methodological 
arguments that underpin these critiques, in order to see whether there is anything in these 
problems that is peculiar to quantum chemistry.
Therefore in 5.1,1 look at the motivation of the traditional view of explanation by high- 
level physical theories, and the approximate theories that take their place when the deductive 
explanations invoked by philosophers fail to appear. In 5.2, some critiques of these 
approximate theories are surveyed. 5.3 tries to lay bare the core of methodological 
requirements—the notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ explanations—that run through these 
critiques. Then in 5.4, it is argued that some of these critiques get the methodology the 
wrong way round: motivation for the approximate theories arises from the local context of 
the application—specific knowledge of specific molecules—rather than the general 
principles of quantum mechanics. A methodological realist lesson is drawn.
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5.1. Quantum Chem istry  in  an  Ideal  World
In this section, I will very briefly outline the standard model of how abstract theories are 
applied to the explanation of less general facts. Along the way, I will note the conditions 
that realists might place on explanation, if explanation is to be more than a linguistic 
exercise. What this view entails for the explanatory relations between physical theories and 
chemical facts will then be drawn out. The4 standard model’ of scientific explanation is the 
deductive-nomological or covering-law model due to Hempel [1965], comprehensively 
criticised by Cartwright [1983]. According to Hempel’s model, the explanation of facts 
about a particular system by a more general theory draws on two types of statement: 
internal principles and bridge principles. Internal principles (like Newton’s laws or the 
Schrodinger equation) are general statements which are tied to the specific case at hand by 
bridge principles, which supply an enrichment model in the sense of Redhead [1980]. In 
any explanation, we want the explanans to show why the explanandum is true. One way to 
ensure this connection is for the derivation to be logically sound, so that truth flows from 
the true explanans along truth-preserving channels to the explanandum. Now we cannot be 
sure of the truth of the general laws, in fact realists often want to argue for the truth of a 
theory from the number and variety of facts it can explain, making explanation and theory- 
testing two aspects of the same procedure. That the connection between explanans and 
explanandum is truth-preserving is therefore crucial, and a good explanation must at least 
be a valid deduction in which the internal principles are the major premises, the bridge 
principles the minor premises, and the explanandum the conclusion.1
For realists, the aim of explanation is to understand salient features of a system’s behaviour 
on the basis of a physical theory coherently applied to it. By ‘coherently applied’, I mean 
that properties and relations are attributed to the constituent parts of the system—via the 
bridge principles—in a consistent, rather than ad hoc, manner in line with the putative 
explanatory theory. The motions of electrons, for instance, should be subject to the same 
general constraints wherever they occur. The complex of theory and bridge principle will 
determine the state of the system and its evolution. If the theory is not coherently applied in 
this sense, the enriched explanatory model might not be consistent with the standard 
interpretation of the reducing theory. This would amount to a theoretical difficulty, in need 
of either ‘quarantining’ (Lakatos [1970]) or instrumentalist interpretation (Feyerabend 
[1964]).2 This account of explanation is, of course, inimical to instrumentalism, for which
1 Leaving aside the complications associated with statistical explanation.
2 For this Feyerabend, “one should not rest content with a theory which at most admits of an instrumental 
interpretation but becomes false when interpreted realistically” ([1964], p. 190).
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explanation and intertheoretic reduction are matters of administrative convenience in the 
business of saving the phenomena. It is an old realist accusation that the Ptolemaic system 
'explained’ planetary motion under the instrumentalist criterion of explanation, but became 
creakingly improbable when its epicycles were interpreted realistically as crystalline 
spheres. Instrumentalism, realists argue, over-emphasises the quantitative aspects of 
explanation at the expense of qualitative factors. A methodological commitment to realism 
requires more of explanation than calculation: explanatory models in different areas should 
make mutual sense against the background of theory, and so must be amenable to the same 
realistic interpretation. Primas [1975] calls this a requirement of interpretive connection, 
which makes clear why it is not usually articulated separately from the requirement of valid 
deducibility: the soundness theorem for first order logic assures us of the interpretive 
compatibility of a statement with its logical consequences.
If we wish to explain some chemical facts, we enter a two-stage process of theoretical 
description (Cartwright [1983] provides a detailed discussion of what she calls theory- 
entry). First we decide on a set of bridge principles which describe the system under study 
within the general theory. We then write down the equations yidded by the theory for this 
description. In quantum chemistry, this is the familiar process of enumerating the particles 
in the molecule, and writing down the Hamiltonian in terms of their charges, masses and 
any incident potentials. Textbooks of quantum chemistry typically consider only 
Hamiltonians containing Coulombic potential terms (see for instance Atkins [1983], or 
Szabo and Ostlund [1982]). It should be noted that a certain amount of idealisation has 
already taken place, because we have written down a Hamiltonian that we know is incorrect 
for any real system: rdativistic effects have been ignored, and the usual Hamiltonians are 
relevant only to isolated molecules, of which there are none in the real world.
The second stage should be the unfolding of the logical consequences of the application of 
the theory to this description, beginning with the solution of the Schrodinger equation. 
However, further idealisation becomes necessary if it is insoluble. Useful idealisations 
might falsify the interactions between subsystems of a composite system. In molecular 
calculations, nuclear and electronic motions are almost universally separated in this way 
through the adiabatic approximation. The Bom-Oppenheimer approximation compounds 
this by setting the nuclei instantaneously at rest; electrons move in the resultant nuclear 
potential. We could then explain structural features of the molecule by calculating the effect 
of change in nuclear configuration on electronic energy. How is the electronic energy 
calculated? The Hartree-Fock procedure replaces a multi-electron wavefunction W(xu x2,
..., x„) with a product ^i(*i)^(*2)-.-^(*h)of single-electron 'orbitals’ representing a 
system of non-interacting electrons. This distortion can be calculated away using 
increasingly-sophisticated mathematical devices to model the electronic interactions.
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A different approach is the direct quantisation of the motion of subsystems of the molecule. 
For instance, the action of carbon dioxide as an atmospheric greenhouse gas is explained by 
associating its infrared absorption with its rotational and vibrational energy levels. Without 
solving the Schrddinger equation for CO2 , we know that it is a linear triatomic molecule.
By analogy with macroscopic systems of three balls attached by springs, we can imagine 
the types of motion that such a system would exhibit The molecule is then treated as if it 
were a coupled system of the quantised oscillators and rigid rotators that appear in any 
undergraduate quantum mechanics course. Similar explanations appear in the spectroscopy 
of more complicated organic molecules (see for instance Silverstein, Bassler and Morrill 
[1981], pp.95-6). The problem is then to derive the molecular structure from the 
fundamental equations that quantum mechanics gives as the most general descriptions of 
such systems.
These idealisations would, at first sight, present a serious obstacle to explanation and 
theory-testing under the standard model. If one of the premises of a deduction is known to 
be false, there is no reason for the explanans or prediction itself to be true: the theory has 
neither explained nor been tested. Laymon [1987] puts the problem succinctly: ‘If we 
conceive of our theory T as justifying the material conditional x & TDy, where y is the 
theory output, then the fact that x  is false relieves T from the responsibility of yielding a 
true prediction* ([1987], p.210). Arguments such as this have often provided the starting- 
point for instrumentalist contentions that the truth of abstract theories is irrelevant to their 
predictive power and scientific worth, and is therefore otiose as a presumed theoretical 
virtue (Duhem, for instance, takes this line). The task for realists is then to construct 
appraisal criteria applicable to approximate theories which will nevertheless support the 
abductive inferences they wish to make.
Leaving aside the difficulties associated with the first stage of idealisation, we will merely 
note the reasons why idealisations at the second stage are not usually thought to present a 
problem. When an approximate model is introduced, mathematical or physical arguments 
are presented that purport to show that it can be mapped on to the ‘exact* treatment it 
replaces by some continuous transformation. The deductive nature of the explanation can be 
defended if the explanatorily-relevant features of the approximate solution can be shown to 
be possessed by the exact one.
5.2. Critiques of  Approxim ate  Models
Earlier, I outlined the standard view that the idealised models of quantum chemistry are 
mathematical devices designed to approximate the exact equations embodied in isolated
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molecular or atomic Hamiltonians. Over the last two or three decades, a relatively small 
number of articles have appeared in which this interpretation has been questioned. The 
various critics detect problems in different parts of the body of approximate methods, and 
for varying reasons. Their suggested solutions are just as diverse, ranging from the 
revision of classical notions that molecular structure is a property possessed by molecules, 
to the suspension of the application of quantum mechanics in large areas of chemistry. 
Claverie and Diner [1980], Weininger [1984], and Woolley [1985] provide something 
approaching surveys of this literature. In what follows, I will give only a brief selective 
sample of these critical views.
Hans Primas has been one of the longest-serving critics. His views are set out most fully in 
his [1983]. A more succinct statement is his [1975], on which the following discussion will 
concentrate. Primas* starting point is the holism that is associated with quantum mechanics. 
Theoretical propositions in physics are typically formulated with closed systems in mind, 
and then applied in modified—perturbed—form to open systems. Even for classical 
mechanics, background knowledge implies that all systems interact: there are no closed 
systems apart from the universe as a whole. The effect of EPR correlations in quantum 
mechanics is, however, more dramatic: composite systems must be represented as single 
quantum systems, rather than as networks of coupled subsystems each having a well- 
defined state. For a given system s composed of two interacting subsystems sx and s2, the 
state of the composite cannot in general be represented as a simple product of well-defined 
subsystem states, no matter how weak the interactions:
<P(s) * W(s1)® E(s2).
For Primas, this holism has some interesting consequences. Firstly, the process of picking 
out for study a system, and calculating its well-defined quantum state presupposes a 
separation of the world into system-plus-background. This process—which for Primas is 
fundamental to the scientific enterprise—therefore necessitates a degree of idealisation: there 
are no exact quantum-mechanical theories3 that exactly describe real systems. Secondly, if 
there is only one real closed system, and therefore one system to which one could attribute 
a well-defined quantum state, ‘we need an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which 
the notation of a world state is conceptually wen-defined* ([1975], p.132). Thus 
‘traditional* epistemic and operational interpretations such as the Copenhagen interpretation, 
or the von-Neumann-London-Bauer ensemble formulation—which are ‘meaningless’ when 
applied to the universe as a whole—are to be rejected in favour of an ‘ontic’ alternative.
3 Or at least any that can be written down.
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Background knowledge implies universal entanglement, and entanglement implies non­
separability: subsystems of the Great System do not have quantum states to call their own.
“ It is therefore mistaken to take the central activity of quantum chemistry to be the calculation 
of the correct quantum states for real molecular systems. Instead, quantum chemistry 
associates quantum states for model molecular systems with recognised phenomenal 
patterns. Neither the subsystem states nor the phenomenal patterns are given by nature: 
both are created, and essentially interest-dependent. Primas presents an interesting formal 
characterisation of this process. When we single out a system for study and attempt to 
calculate its quantum state, we decompose the state space H* for the world or ‘universe of 
discourse’ into a tensor product of system and environment Hilbert spaces H and He 
respectively:
Hw = H® He.
For arbitrary world state <P E Hw, there are non-unique expansions:
0  = 2. 2 , cjk Wj ® Eh
such that !P,eH  and Ek E He. Primas quotes a theorem due to Schmidt that if the 
coefficients cjk are chosen to be diagonal, and the Wj and Ek are orthonormal, there is (if the 
Cj are non-degenerate) a unique expansion of the form:
<P = 'Z~0 cj WJ®Ej, 
from which it follows that if 0 is normalised:
m2 = 2.  kjp = i
and
(Wj\0) = q Ep 
(Ej\<P) = Cj Wj.
Now if it is chosen that
1 > W  > faP > ... > 0 ,
then in order to generate an idealised model of a quantum system such as a molecule, the 
world state 0  is replaced by the particular direct product <P0 of system and background 
states W0 and EqI
0 o = ® A>*
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<2>o then provides the best approximation to the real world-state that can be expressed in 
product form for this particular decomposition. Now it is obvious that
K 4 W P  =  IcbF <  1 .
The entanglement of all real systems means, however, that |cbl2 can never reach unity; 
Primas uses its proximity as a measure of the closeness of model world state 0O to 0 . |CoP 
also provides a measure of the accuracy with which the exact world state can be treated as a 
simple product state, that is, the extent to which the system under study is independent of 
its environment. If |cbF * 1, 0 O is the dominant Schmidt state, and is robust with respect to 
environmental perturbation. It is, however, ‘background-dependent*, in that its applicability 
depends on the particular decomposition of the world state into system and environment, 
and therefore on our interests. The non-linear process by which the entangled world state is 
replaced in our calculations by a separable dominant Schmidt state for a system of interest 
creates any properties we attribute to the system on the basis of the representation, with |cbp 
representing the degree to which the real system could be said to have those properties. 
Molecular structure is one such property: it is an artefact of our separation of the world into 
molecule-plus-background. Successful quantum chemistry is the construction of robust 
model states which ‘explain* the phenomenal patterns that we read into the structureless 
quantum world, and label ‘molecular*.
For a shorter period—since the 1970s—R.G. Woolley has been publishing articles critical 
of the ‘fundamental dogma of quantum chemistry’ (Woolley and Sutcliffe [1977], p.397). 
The dogma in question is the supposition that the Bom-Oppenheimer procedure is a 
mathematical approximation to the solution of the exact isolated molecular Hamiltonian 
eigenvalue equation. Woolley and Sutcliffe [1977] present an argument to the effect that 
Bom-Oppenheimer structures do not have the required symmetry properties, which goes as 
follows. It can be shown that the standard electrostatic Hamiltonian of quantum chemistry 
commutes with translation and rotation operators P and J:
[H,P] = [H,J] = 0.
The Bom-Oppenheimer procedure picks out a structure in which the nuclei have 
determinate positions and are at rest The electrons move in quantum-mechanical molecular 
orbitals in the field of the nuclei. For the purposes of explaining chemical facts, the most 
useful such structure will be the most probable one: the equilibrium structure, for which the 
energy of the system as a whole is a minimum. Momentum-position uncertainty implies that 
the nuclear positions must be blurred, and adds a zero-point energy Ao to the classical 
minimum energy Ecl. Thus the Bom-Oppenheimer energy E*° is given by:
= 2}cl + Ao
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The zero-point energy, Ao, may be visualised as corresponding to an ‘uncertainty 
oscillation’ about the equilibrium nuclear position. Woolley and Sutcliffe call this model 
semi-classical: a classical structure perturbed by quantum effects. Furthermore, it is of 
lower symmetry than eigenstates of the isolated-molecule Hamiltonian. Operations on it by 
P and J  sweep out a six-dimensional hypersurface of constant—albeit blurred—energy (see 
below for further discussion).
Does this mean that the Bom-Oppenheimer procedure is illegitimate? Woolley argues not, 
and presents a fundamental discontinuity between the behaviour of small isolated molecules 
and large molecules which interact strongly with their environment. In his [1976], Woolley 
points out that non-adiabatic calculations based on the isolated molecular Hamiltonian are 
accurate for describing atoms and small molecules in the form of rarefied gases or 
molecular beams, where the energy levels are probed with high resolution. When care is 
taken to minimise line-broadening processes such as intermolecular collisions and Doppler 
effects (see Woolley [1976] and [1977]) and the molecules are illuminated by lasers, the 
spectra will be very close to those of the isolated molecule Hamiltonian. In such 
calculations, the notion of molecular structure is not required, and is indeed ‘no longer 
appropriate* ([1976], p.30).
In contrast, when environmental interactions cannot be ignored, and for large molecules 
which are not suitable for preparation in states of high rarefaction, the classical notion of 
molecular structure—embodied in the Bom-Oppenheimer procedure—becomes 
‘indispensible*. The typically ‘chemical* facts whose explanation was considered in 5.1 
require determinate asymmetrical structures to be attributed to molecules. The history of the 
investigation and explanation of isomerism and optical activity illustrates that this is 
explicitly the case for some chemical facts.
The above considerations have been an argument to the effect that the properties of 
molecules have not so far been derived from properties of the full molecular Hamiltonian. 
Worries were raised that some of the properties of molecules that play central roles in 
chemical explanations might be arising as artefacts of the approximations. A problem of 
principle arises when one considers the symmetry properties of the usual electrostatic 
molecular Hamiltonians. It would appear that some of the explanatorily useful properties 
are bound to vanish as quantum-mechanical exactitude is approached. Woolley [1976] 
argues that the Hamiltonian for an isolated molecule is fully symmetric, and so, therefore, 
are its eigenfunctions. One argument for this is as follows: Consider a Hamiltonian H for a 
molecular system with eigenfunctions % and eigenvalues En. Thus:
HVfc = E n tyn
155
QUANTUM CHEMISTRY
Now suppose H is symmetric with respect to inversion of coordinates. If we consider an 
operator R, which effects such a transformation, we have
R(H ipn) = H(R^„)
putting these two together:
H(R^„) — EnRipn
So if H is symmetric, and tpn is one of its eigenfunctions, then so is R(^n) with the same 
energy eigenvalue. If % and R(^n) have some directional property such as a dipole 
moment, the dipoles will act in opposite directions, but they have the same energy. One 
could therefore imagine an energy degeneracy among distinct spatial states: any energy 
eigenstate could be represented as a superposition of different sharp-dipole states. In such a 
representation, structures with (for instance) equal dipole moments in opposite directions 
would be equiprobable: % and R(Vfe) would appear with equal weight in any expansion of 
a general state in which they appeared. It follows that no such directional properties would 
be possessed by an isolated molecule in a general eigenstate of the Hamiltonian.
Woolley has interpreted these arguments in two quite different ways. The first concentrates 
on the different experimental contexts in which energy eigenvalues and structural properties 
are measured. Physical concepts such as these are well-defined only for those experimental 
situations in which quantum systems with sharp values for the corresponding quantities 
have been prepared. If we cannot prepare molecules with sharp values for both energy and 
structural quantities, these concepts must be ‘complementary in Copenhagen sense*
([1976], p.30). In standard discussions of complementarity between physical quantities, its 
formal expression is the relation of non-commutivity between the corresponding operators. 
In his [1976], however, Woolley does not present a proof that the operator for some 
quantity necessary for the definition of molecular structure fails to commute with the 
Hamiltonian. In the second interpretation with which Woolley glosses his formal 
arguments, he is much closer to Primas. He takes seriously the lack of classical structure 
attributed by quantum mechanics to isolated molecules in stationary eigenstates of the 
Hamiltonian. Molecular structure may be the effect of a physical interaction of a molecule 
with its environment. Molecular properties may therefore be expected to ‘disappear 
abruptly’ ([1978], p.1077) as a molecule’s interactions with its environment decrease. For 
Woolley, the future of quantum chemistry lies in the development of rigorous quantum- 
mechanical (for instance non-adiabatic) treatments of small molecular systems in isolated 
states, in which molecular structures do not figure.
The aim of Ogilvie’s rather more trenchant criticisms (Ogilvie [1990]) is to distinguish 
between ‘what is fundamental and what is artefact’ in quantum chemistry ([1990], p.280).
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His chief target is the sq)aration of multi-electron wavefunctions into single-electron terms 
which is basic to the Hartree-Fock procedure. It is not the approximation itself to which he 
is hostile, but the use of approximate one-electron orbitals in the explanation of chemical 
facts. The worst such case is the typical account of chemical bonding in terms of 
hybridisation (the interference of atomic orbitals to form bonding molecular orbitals): the 
subtitle of Ogilvie [1990] is “There are no such things as orbitals”. Ogilvie takes the 
quantum-chemical account of the structure of methane (CH4) as his main example. It is 
often claimed in textbooks of chemistry that methane’s tetrahedral structure arises from its 
electronic structure. Eight electrons occupy 5P3-hybridised molecular orbitals, resulting in 
increased charge density in the space between the carbon nucleus and each of the four 
hydrogen atoms. This decreases electrostatic repulsion between these nuclei. The remaining 
two electrons are localised close to the carbon centre, and do not significantly contribute to 
bonding.
The attack on electronic orbitals has three main prongs. Firstly, the choice of basis orbitals 
in a molecular orbital expansion is irrelevant to the quality of the final energy values, and is 
therefore arbitrary and can have no physical meaning. From the success of calculations 
using atomic orbital bases one therefore cannot infer that molecular orbitals are somehow 
formed from the interactions of atomic orbitals. Secondly, the ten electrons in CH4  are 
‘fundamentally identical and indistinguishable’ ([1990], p.283). It therefore makes no 
sense to distinguish qualitatively between them, as their occupancy of single^electron 
orbitals must.4 Thirdly, on formal grounds, ‘a molecule consists of only electrons and 
nuclei, certainly not orbitals or even atoms.’ ([1990, p.287). Atoms do not exist in 
molecules as atoms: Methane consists of a carbon nucleus, four protons and ten electrons, 
rather than a carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms. In fact it is a ‘category fallacy’
([1990], p.287) to think otherwise. It makes no sense to explain the properties of a system 
by reference to the properties of entities which are not in fact present, so explanations of 
molecular structure by the interactions of either atoms or one-electron orbitals are ruled out
Historically, Ogilvie argues, molecular structure—and the standard electrostatic accounts of 
chemical bonding—arose against the background of classical physics. There is no reason 
why these explanatory tools should be transferable into a quantum-mechanical context. 
According to the arguments set out above, the idealised quantum-mechanical explanations 
are essentially parasitic upon the classical accounts they are supposed to supersede, because 
they certainly make no sense against the background of rigorous quantum mechanics. 
Ogilvie quotes photoelectron studies of methane to argue that the approximate models of
4 To be fair to the Hartree-Fock method, this artefact can be calculated away using exchange integrals.
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quantum chemistry are not even empirically adequate; the purported electronic structure is 
not found. Classical models of molecular structure and bonding may do no worse, and at 
least have the advantage of conceptual consistency. The valence shell electron pair repulsion 
theory is cited by Ogilvie as an—admittedly unsatisfactory—starting point.
Scerri [1991] detects conceptual problems in standard quantum-chemical models of the 
electronic configuration of atoms. These difficulties would also infect the accounts of 
molecular structure in which they are embedded. Scerri points out that these models depend 
on the aufbau principle by which the electronic configurations of successive dements in the 
periodic table were built up in the quantum theory of atomic structure that devdoped out of 
Bohr's atomic model of 1913. Central to the building-up process was the possession by 
individual dectrons of stable stationary states embodied in the attribution of quantum 
numbers to dectrons. Such individual stationary states would of course be perturbed by the 
addition of further electrons, but the continuity of their existence was a cornerstone of the 
spectroscopic theory.
The retention of individual dectronic stationary states during perturbations of the atom was 
problematic even within the old quantum theory, claims Scerri, because it relied on the 
adiabatic prindple. This prindple, which had been proven to hold for particular classes of 
systems by Ehrenfest, and extended by Burger, had not been shown to hold generally. In 
particular, the prindple was not known to hold in aperiodic systems, a class that sadly 
includes multi-electron atoms.5 In the context of quantum mechanics, Scerri notes that one- 
electron angular momentum operators for individual dectrons do not commute with the full 
Hamiltonian, from which it follows that dectrons in atoms described by dgenstates of the 
full Hamiltonian cannot also be in stationary states characterised by the usual quantum 
numbers. For among the usual quantum numbers are some which correspond to dgenstates 
of one-electron angular-momentum operators, and non-commuting operators cannot share 
tigenfunctions. Scerri concludes: ‘standard quantum mechanics thus shows that giving 
electrons individual quantum numbers, or putting them into boxes or orbitals is incorrect’, 
and ‘only the atomic system as a whole possesses stationary states’ ([1991], p.317). The 
‘orbital approximation’, however, is a useful device for classifying spectroscopic terms, 
and as a zero-order starting point for more accurate calculations. Scerri concludes by 
arguing that the approximate orbital models, although indispensible in practice, are
5 Ehrenfest, following Einstein, in fact called die principle a ‘hypothesis’ in his [1917]. Bohr, who in his 
[1918] called the hypothesis the Principle o f Mechanical Transformability, was aware of its status as an 
idealisation, and stressed the “limits of its applicability” ([1918], p. 102).
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‘floating’ models in the sense of Post [1974]: lacking either theoretical justification or 
empirical support.
The approximate methods—interpreted realistically—introduce semi-classical rigid 
structures. The crucial explanatory parts of the model are: the separation the molecular 
quantum system into the subsystem under study, and the semi-classical balance. When 
tractable methods are applied to complex molecules, the semi-classical nature of the 
molecule is presupposed. Under the Bom-Oppenheimer approximation, the molecular 
descriptions are more reminiscent of the old quantum theory than of quantum mechanics 
proper, in their haphazard quantisation of the motion of fast quantum-mechanical electrons 
perturbed by a framework of classical nuclei. In even the adiabatic approximation, these 
nuclear configurations are averaged over in an iterated process which hopefully approaches 
the quantum-mechanical limit According to Woolley and Primas, there are good reasons to 
think that some of the structural properties of the approximate solutions that play a crucial 
role in chemical explanations based on molecular structure are artefacts of the 
approximations. If this is accepted, molecular structure cannot be said to have arisen as a 
concept derived from—or as a limiting case of—quantum mechanics applied to molecules.
5.3. A p p r o x i m a t i o n  a n d  E x p l a n a t i o n
The arguments presented in the previous section share a common structure, and there is a 
sense in which they express legitimate wonies. In this section, I will elucidate this 
structure. In the final two sections, I will attempt to set out a different conclusion. Consider 
the application of theory T to a physical system S. Bridge principles suggest a conjunction 
of boundary or initial conditions A, which invokes a (possibly idealised) model of S (call it 
M(S)) within T. Now suppose that application of T s  mathematical apparatus to M(S) 
invokes an equation E(a). The solution, a, describes aspects of the state of S relevant to 
the intended explanatory domain of T.
If, as is often the case, E(a) is insoluble directly under present mathematical methods, 
theorists may overcome the difficulty by:
1. Amending A, for instance by constructing a model of a subsystem of S, from which 
salient aspects of S's behaviour may be inferred (an example in quantum chemistry is the 
calculation of vibronic energy levels for complex molecules by treating certain functional 
groups as if they are isolated quantum-mechanical harmonic oscillators). A T-theory of the 
subsystem follows.
2. Finding some a ’ such that:
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a  « a 1
This assumption would typically be supported by the construction of a T-model of a 
simpler—but relevantly similar—system S ' which under T invokes a more readily solved 
state equation E\a'). There might follow an argument (physical or mathematical) that the 
difference is not significant. Perhaps a convergent mathematical series might be found for 
which:
a  = ao + ai + ... + an + ... 
i.e. a  = 2/a,-
n
or a  = limn-^ oo2 a* •
i=0
Approximate solution a ’ would therefore correspond to the sum of a finite initial portion of 
the series. It is of course possible to mix these approaches, as perturbation theory does. 
Another possibility is the construction of a T-model of the system which is valid only under 
certain conditions (this is a variant on the first strategy), or over a certain time interval.
Now consider some state of affairs e within T  s explanatory domain, thought to be 
attributable to an S. Suppose that e can be inferred from the mathematical properties of a '. 
Approximate description a ' might correspond to ‘simplified’ or idealised boundary 
conditions As. The properties of a are unknown (due to the insolubility of equation E(a)); 
e has not yet been shown to be derivable from T and A alone. The logical possibilities are:
a. If, in whichever platonic heaven a  can be said to exist, e is implied by T&A  (and 
therefore is implicit in the properties of a) T would have explained e on the basis of 
model M(S). In this case M(S)—realistically interpreted—represents S and evolves in 
accordance with T and its bridge principles. The simplifying assumptions are logically 
otiose, their only function being to facilitate the calculation of T  s consequences with 
respect to 5, given M(S) as the representation of S within T .
b. If e is independent of T&A, As would not be a ‘simplifying assumption’ at all, but 
rather an auxiliary assumption which fixes some mathematical property undefined for a 
(to that of the ‘approximate solution’ a ’) to yield e. In this case, the simplifying 
assumptions A 5 are an indispensable part of the theoretical complex from which e is 
derived. It is doing a significant amount of the explanatory work. For a methodological 
realist, whether the complex T& As yields a coherent picture under a realistic 
interpretation would then become an issue.
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c. If e’s falsity can be inferred from T&A, then the theory-model complex is, in some 
sense, refuted, although the ‘simplifying assumption’ has somehow overwritten T &
A’s prediction. I will neglect the possibility that complex T & As is inconsistent.
In fact, by assumption, we don’t know which of the above three possibilities holds: the 
insolubility of E(a) by present methods implies our imperfect knowledge of the topology of 
this area of platonic heaven. The simplifying assumptions are indispensable in practice 
when constructing a theoretical model whose properties are amenable to mathematical 
analysis, and it is only through such analysis that T  s content can be explored. It is 
theoretical complex T & As which is the effective explanans of e.
It might be argued that mathematical approximations merely express numerical identities or 
asymptotic convergence, and the situation described by (a) can be taken to hold. This is 
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, in one sense it merely imports the 
instrumentalist ‘computation is explanation’ thesis, as the following comparison hopefully 
illustrates. Consider the argument that quantum mechanics ‘reduces’ to classical mechanics 
in the limit h-+ 0. The dynamical behaviour of a classical theoretical model can be imitated 
to any desired level of accuracy by setting h equal to a low enough numerical value. 
However, there is a discontinuity between h-Q  and h having an infinitesimal value: the 
non-zero spacing between adjacent energy levels. The two systems are distinct, though they 
are not observationally distinguishable: a quantum system can never he a classical one, no 
matter how small the spacing between its energy levels. For those who concentrate on the 
observational level, however, an infinitesimal difference is effectively no difference at all 
So far so unconvincing, but there might be attendant practical difficulties. Limit theorems 
invoked by quantum chemists—even where available—typically concern the relative 
energies of the approximate and exact solutions. They do not imply that all dynamical 
quantities will smoothly converge to their exact values. In fact it is proverbial among 
quantum chemists that a wavefunction that gives a good value for energy will usually give 
bad values for other quantities such as charge distribution. Thus one cannot, without 
further argument, simply identify the exact solutions with limiting cases of increasingly 
accurate approximate models.
The arguments presented in the previous section, although differing in their conclusions, 
identified properties of approximate molecular models which could not be attributed to the 
exact solutions of the Schrodinger equation for an isolated molecule. If they are correct, 
these models cannot be rationalised as its approximate solutions. Explanations that invoke 
these properties cannot therefore have the desirable status (outlined in the first section) of 
deductive inferences from quantum mechanics plus suitable auxiliaries. If a model does 
successfully render some molecule’s behaviour accurately, under what conditions can that 
model be said to have explained that system’s behaviour? If it is approximate, the coherence
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of the model invoked by the theory and ‘simplifying’ assumptions together becomes an 
issue for a realist. This, claim the critics, is just the problem that afflicts quantum 
chemistry. The exact equations of quantum chemistry are insoluble, and attempts to solve 
them approximately introduce ad hoc assumptions—like the separability of the electronic 
wavefunction into single-electron molecular orbitals—that are non-qiumtum-mechamcal. 
Worst of all, the rationale for making these assumptions is background knowledge about 
molecular structure, which is what is supposed to be derived. Consequently, claim the 
critics, there is an air of methodological scandal.
5.4. Approxim ation  and  Id ea lised  Models
It is a commonplace of recent philosophy of science that abstract physical theories do not 
provide detailed descriptions of the behaviour of interesting systems on their own. Instead, 
they must be supplemented with some characterisation of the particular facts of the system 
to be studied of interest to the theory in question. In the covering-law model of explanation, 
these characterisations are the bridge principles: they originate in that famous catch-all 
category ‘background knowledge’. Together, theory and background determine a model. In 
her [1983], Nancy Cartwright attempts to inject some realism into our understanding of 
how abstract physical theories are applied to concrete situations.6 The covering-law model 
is, she argues, a ‘model for a physics we do not have’ ([1983], p. 145). When a theoretical 
account is given of some system’s behaviour, we don’t just write down a literal description 
and apply the formalism. Instead, there are two distinct stages of theory entry. First 
imagine a list of everything we know about the system. We cannot go from this to an 
equation. The description has to be prepared for entry into theory: we must pick a 
description for which the theory has an equation. Now these equations can be tailored to 
some extent, and the list of them is always growing, but we must realise that they are ‘off 
the peg’ rather than bespoke: we fit the facts to the equations, rather than vice-versa. How 
we go from an unprepared description to a prepared one is not dictated by the theory, but 
there are good and bad prepared descriptions. The criteria for this assessment are ‘rules of 
thumb, good sense, and, ultimately, the requirement that the equation we end up with must 
do the job.’ ([1983], p.133) The job in question here is a pragmatic one, of meeting 
practical requirements.
6 By realism, I mean a hard-headed recognition of the actualities of explanation: the account itself is 
instrumentalist with respect to laws, in that the laws of physics could not be literally true.
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The critiques surveyed in the previous two sections proceeded by comparing the models 
used in quantum chemistry with the solutions to the exact equations they supposedly 
approximate. The exact solutions were unavailable, of course, but some of their features 
could be discerned with the help of such general considerations as symmetry arguments. 
We could see that the molecular models were not approximations at all: they differed 
qualitatively from what quantum mechanics says about molecules concerning those features 
we can discern. The critics drew different sorts of conclusion, but the conclusions always 
bore on the relation between molecular structure as an explanandum and quantum 
mechanics as a putative explanans. It is the relevance of the critical arguments to this 
relation that should be qualified in the light of Cartwright’s account of how abstract theories 
are applied to concrete cases. The exact equations did not drop fully-formed from the 
quantum-mechanical formalism: a prepared—fictional—description first had to be given.
So the critiques were not comparing the approximate molecular models with what quantum 
mechanics says about molecules simpliciter, but with what quantum mechanics says about 
molecules if we pretend molecules are isolated systems of point-mass nuclei and electrons 
subject only to Coulomb interactions. This description is itself zn idealisation: there are no 
isolated molecules; electrons and nuclei experience interactions that are non-Coulombic; 
nuclei are not without internal structure; and the energies referred to by the Hamiltonian 
should be relativistic.
So the fact that the approximate molecular models falsify some of the details of real 
molecules cannot itself be a good reason not to use them. The argument now concerns 
which model Hamiltonians provide the most useful results. An immediate response could 
be given here: perhaps the molecular models constitute worse falsifications than the more 
exact treatments, maybe by introducing qualitatively different untruths (like the Bom- 
Oppenheimer models) which will further distort our understanding of what molecules are 
really like. This, however, begs a number of important questions. Firstly, can we order 
idealisations in this sort of way, so that phrases like 'more exact’ have a precise meaning? 
In his [1987], Laymon presents a formal characterisation of a criterion for the appraisal of 
theories which are applied to counterfactual initial conditions: monotonic piecemeal 
improvability. This criterion has been argued by Laymon to be operating in a number of 
historical case-studies (see for instance his [1983]), and underpins his defence of the realist 
use of the covering-law model of explanation against Cartwright’s critique (Laymon, 
[1989]). In simple form, the reasoning goes as follows. We know that theories are only 
ever applied to idealised models of real systems, and so we cannot expect them to provide 
predictions that are precisely true. However, if our idealised descriptions are close to the 
real systems, the predictions of a good theory will also be close. Thus if we improve our 
models (i.e. make them more realistic) we can expect that the predictions of a good theory 
will also improve. Hence the criterion: a good theory is one whose predictions improve
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monotonically as the input theoretical descriptions are improved. This account assumes that 
increased accuracy is necessarily a good thing.
Do more exact treatments necessarily contribute more to our understanding? It depends on 
what you wish to understand. What we need is a way of deciding when an approximate or 
idealised theory is good or useful distinct from how many lies it tells. Cartwright gives 
some pragmatic answers: a good approximate theory should have as many of the usual 
instrumental virtues as is consistent with mathematical tractability. This is why it is a 
mistake to criticise the standard approximate methods of quantum chemistry by making an 
unfavourable comparison with the 'exact’ equations: being insoluble, they were of no help 
in finding out about molecules. Ramsey [1992] argues that formal accounts like Laymon’s 
miss something important about the construction of idealised theories. They concentrate on 
the comparison of idealised models to 'exact’ descriptions. Ramsey feds that we should 
also appraise the motivation of such models:
When praising or blaming an approximate result, it is not sufficient to consider only the magnitude of 
the discrepancy between the theoretical and experimental results. How we got to the result is just as 
important as the fact that we got pretty close to where we wanted to go. ([1992], p.162)
I think Ramsey is correct. Woefully inaccurate molecular models may in certain 
circumstances provide interesting insights, but which circumstances?
Redhead [1980] distinguishes approximation from idealisation. The distinction is not one of 
principle: Redhead points out that for every approximate solution to an exact equation (an 
approximation in Redhead’s terminology), there is an approximate equation which can be 
solved exactly (i.e. an idealisation). However, the distinction can be made in practice, and 
will turn out to be a very useful one. Some approximate methods come with a ready-made 
physical justification. This specifies a new—and readily interpretable—model, which is 
related to the ‘exact’ model through the process of idealisation: it is an impoverishment 
model in Redhead’s terminology. Now the purely mathematical approximations, being 
more abstract, will not come with such an intended physical interpretation. Although they 
will pick out a different set of allowed values in the space of the variables in which they are 
expressed (see Redhead [1975]), how this ‘approximate’ set of values differs physically 
from those picked out by the ‘exact’ theory may not be obvious. In contrast, the physically 
motivated approximate theory will differ systematically from its exact partner in ways that 
can be understood physically, and therefore might allow causal differences between real 
systems to be inferred. The systematic difference between exact and approximate model 
might, for instance, be interpreted as a physical perturbation.
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Del Re [1974] observes that some approximate models are more amenable than others to 
this type of interpretation. The much-maligned LCAO-MOQ model is—despite its formal 
inadequacies—a good basis for chemical explanation, notwithstanding what he calls the 
‘basis problem* (mentioned also by Ogilvie [1990]). This is because it is readily 
interpretable in terms of the ‘bonds, atoms and simple orbitals* (Del Re [1974], p.95) with 
which practical chemists work. He has in mind something very similar to the heuristically 
useful interpretation described above. He also provides ([1974], p.97) an example of the 
kind of reasoning considered at the end of the last paragraph. When we counterfactually 
replace a many-electron wavefunction for an organic molecule with a product of individual 
bond-pair-states, we can envisage separating the pairs into those occupying o-bonds, and 
those in rc-bonds. If the electrons did not interact, the electronic energy would be the sum 
of the pair-bond energies. Obviously, molecules in which Ji-bonds are close together will 
deviate further from this sum-energy than molecules in which they are further apart, 
because the rc-bond electrons will interact more strongly. This is the origin of the 
(in)famous resonance energy of benzene. Ogilvie singled out this type of explanation for 
special disapproval. What is the alternative? Insoluble equations have little heuristic value.
Liegener and Del Re [1987] introduce the notion of the ‘reverse of reduction’: the process 
whereby the content of the theory which is to be ‘reduced’ plays a useful role in the 
elucidation of the theory which is supposed to be doing the reducing. If this is what is 
going on with models of molecules, it is clear why they such models will offend the 
expectations embodied in the standard view of scientific explanation: they appear to assume 
what is supposed to be derived. But if we have explanatorily powerful approximate modds 
that conflict—when interpreted realistically—with ‘rigorous’ isolated molecule treatments, 
so much the worse for the latter.
Conclusion
Critics of the approximate methods of quantum chemistry argue that chemical theories such 
as molecular structure have not been reduced to quantum mechanics. This is true if 
reduction is deductive, but it is not a state of affairs that is peculiar to quantum chemistry. It 
was only the standard view of explanation that provided a reason for thinking it would be 
so. By the same token, Cartwright’s numerous examinations of quantum-mechanical 
models of lasers might suggest that lasers are not quantum-mechanical. Instead, Cartwright 
took the failure of modds of lasers to fit the covering-law template for explanation to be a 
failure of that template, rather than a failure of the modds. By analogy, the arguments 
presented in 5.2 reflect as much on the structure of explanation in quantum chemistry as on 
a peculiar irredudbility of chemical facts to physical theory. In any case, there is something
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funny about the approximate models being criticised from the point of view of the general 
theory. How can any theory earn support except through its applications? If you chip away 
at approximate models, at some point you must begin to chip away at the support enjoyed 
by quantum mechanics itself as a theory for molecules.
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Methodological realism (MR) is the thesis that some methods of theory construction that are 
applied successfully in science presuppose realism, because they make internal sense only 
if motivated by realist aims, or if theories are construed realistically and can be confirmed 
as true. This thesis, as we saw in 2.3 and 2.4, has been used as the premise of two 
different kinds of argument for scientific realism (SR). In 2.5, it was argued that SR is 
independent of MR. Leaving aside the arguments from MR to SR, and the status of SR 
itself, both the realist and the anti-realist can ask whether or not MR is (meta-)inductivdy 
supported by the history of science as a plausible description of successful scientific 
practice. If appraised according to Lakatos’ metamethodology (discussed in 1.6 and 1.7), 
MR would be expected to provide new insights into successful episodes in science. By 
providing those insights, MR would be supported as a description of methods for 
producing growth in knowledge. But MR’s methods are accessible only to realists: 
practical reason then tells us that realism is an instrumentaUy rational position where growth 
in knowledge is sought. Growth in knowledge is an uncontroversial aim for both realist 
and anti-realist, although each will interpret ‘knowledge’ differently. Thus either can 
endorse realism as a position for scientists on pragmatic grounds, although the realist may 
propose a particular explanation of this pragmatic rationality of realism.
In 2.6,1 set out an account of theory construction and development in which the intended 
interpretation of a set of equations systematically enriches them over time. This, it was 
argued, is a realist method in the sense outlined above. The historical case-studies of 
chapters 3,4 and 5 were intended to illustrate and support that account of theory 
construction, and therefore to also to show how realism has been a motivating 
presupposition in important examples of theorising. Suppose, however that these histories 
provide too poor an inductive base for this kind of reasoning. Or perhaps that—despite 
these few cases—scientists too often settle for messy and non-explanatory theories in their 
creation of predictive knowledge for the methods of 2 .6  to provide an accurate description 
of the use of models in science. Instead of getting into an argument about numbers, the 
methodological realist could, raise some historical counterfactuals for the methodological 
instrumentalist. Some theories have, after their construction, gone on to provide long term 
frameworks for successful research. They were accepted at the times of their construction 
for their unity, coherence and explanatory power, and interpreted realistically then and 
thereafter. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that this progress would have been 
achieved if scientists had soldiered on with their attempts to make the messy and ad hoc 
predecessors to these theories empirically adequate. Nor is there any reason to think that a 
different set of theories—had they been accepted instead—would have inspired this 
progress. Thus we should be glad that the scientists in question made these choices, never
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mind what we think of the aims, assumptions or inferences that motivated their methods. 
Anti-realists may see in this a pragmatic rationale for the scientists’ adoption of realism in 
some cases. Realists may see instead an argument for realism: such long-term success 
would have been a miracle unless the presuppositions of the methods in question were 
correct. Therefore the success would have been a miracle unless the theories in question 
really did make some approach to the ontological order. The realist’s explanation is, 
however, outside the argument presented here.
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